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The current - and very relevant - debate about the way authors and performers lose 
control over exploitation, and more importantly, revenue generated through use of 
their works and performances in the digital world somewhat overshadows the fact that 
there are existing scenarios arising from the normal course of dealings in such works 
where the same occurs and were remedy of any such “injustice” has not been fully 
enshrined in law. A right to additional fair remuneration is a concept recognised to 
various degrees in some Member States of the EU but not all, scaling from (seemingly) 
zero in the UK to quite an elaborate regulation in Germany. Where they are 
recognised, application and enforcement of relevant provisions also vary. 
The EU sought to harmonise the issue of author´s and performer´s access to fair share 
of revenue generated from exploitation of their work or performance (for normal 
dealings and in digital spheres of copyright exploitation) in its new draft Directive. 
The Proposal for a Directive on Copyright in the Digital Single Market published in 
September 2016 dedicates its Chapter 3 of Title IV to Fair remuneration in contracts 
of authors and performers; contract adjustment mechanism introduced in Article 15 
attempts to tackle the issue by proposing a statutory right to additional remuneration 
being introduced throughout the EU Member States. Or, was the aim of this provision 
originally even broader? 
In this work, three main areas are addressed: (i) the background and justification of 
inclusion of such provisions into the Draft DSM Directive; (ii) current applicable law 
in Germany, Czech Republic and the UK;  three countries each representing different 
historical and doctrinal approach to copyright law and thus providing unique 
benchmarks for the analysis, (iii) reconciliation of the first two parts: analysing what 
– if any – change in the national legislation would be needed for the three Member 
States to transpose the provision into the national laws.  
By way of conclusion, recommendations to amend Article 15 of the draft Directive is 
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In September 2016, the European Commission released the Communication from the 
Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and 
Social Committee of the Regions promoting a fair, efficient and competitive 
European copyright-based economy in the Digital Single Market3 together with the 
Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on copyright 
in the Digital Single Market4.  
Stakeholders and commentators were strongly divided on the Proposal. Much of the 
debate focused on the creation of a new neighbouring right for press publishers, the 
measures imposed on platforms storing and giving access to user-uploaded content, 
and the scope of the new text- and data-mining exception.5 Due to the controversy of 
these issues and strong competing interests of various stakeholders, the Proposal has 
seen many changes throughout the legislative process.6 Many of the disappointment 
also stems from the fact that the Commission “failed to critically question the actual 
fundaments of copyright”7, or “have not taken full account of how copyright licensing 
works to provide incentives to invest in the great range of content that consumers 
enjoy”8. 
The proposed DSM Directive´s Title IV Chapter 3 deals with Fair Remuneration in 
contracts of authors and performers, and specifically in its Article 15 (Contract 
adjustment mechanism) introduces into the EU copyright law an author´s or 
performer´s claim to additional compensation from their contracting party to which 
they transferred exploitation rights if the remuneration received for such exploitation 
rights is disproportionately low compared to the proceeds generated through the use 
                                                 
3 COM(2016) 592 final 
4 COM(2016) 593 final 
5 https://epthinktank.eu/2016/11/30/copyright-in-the-digital-single-market-eu-legislation-in-
progress/, accessed June 2017 
6 More details are provided in Chapter 5. 
7 Comments of SA&S on the Directive Proposal on Copyright in Digital Single Market, 
http://www.auteursrechtensamenleving.be/en/comments-sas-on-the-directive-proposal-on-
copyright-the-digital-single-market/, published December 1, 2016, accessed June 2017. The SA&S 
makes an appeal to the European Commission to effectively establish  a major reform of copyright 
laws. 
8 ´Comments from The British Screen Advisory Council (BSAC) on the Digital Single Market 
Copyright Proposal published by the EU Commission on 14 September 2016´, 
<http://www.bsac.uk.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/BSAC-Response-EU-Sept-2016-Copyright-
Package-FINAL.pdf>, published 6 December 2016, accessed June 2017. The BSAC also comments 




of the work or performance by such contracting party (providing for so called 
“bestseller clause”, already implemented in some of the Member States´ laws). 
However, from the accompanying documentation driven by the Digital Single Market 
Strategy adopted in May 2015, it seems more likely that the initial goal of the EU 
legislator was not to introduce a “mere” bestseller clause. It seems more likely that 
the original goal was supposed to be ensuring that creators receive fair remuneration 
for uses of their creations throughout the whole supply chain in the flourishing digital 
markets, as well as traditional channels. 
Authors and performers have traditionally been seen as the weaker parties in 
contractual transactions relating to the exploitation of their works and performances.9 
“One of the first relevant acts accomplished by the author, after the creation of an 
original work, is to entrust a publisher or producer to exploit commercially his/her 
rights, hence to give up some part of control over her work, in order to obtain access 
to the market. This first contract, transferring copyright over an artistic work might 
be a tricky episode for creators as they will in most cases be in a weaker bargaining 
position, due to their inexperience, lack of information or will to be published or 
produced at any cost.”10 Through personal as well as work-related contacts, the author 
of this thesis has been acquainted with many authors and performers in the Czech 
Republic and, knowing their personal stories, has for long felt that more attention 
could be paid to the – at least seemingly – imbalanced correlation between the 
creative efforts and the remuneration creators receive for such efforts, especially at 
the beginning of their careers. Such imbalance may be minimised when the creator 
becomes well recognised, but such recognition often is a result of luck or other 
unusual circumstance. Amount of creative efforts will not always be equal to amount 
of remuneration received. Unlike in some other professions, that is not how it works 
in arts, music, writing, etc.  
Initially the research aim was to see if it makes any sense to introduce a harmonised 
European measure that would help bring closer together the piecemeal legislation of 
some EU Member States.  In various forms and to different extent, laws of the EU 
                                                 
9 See more details with regards to Germany in Chapter 4.1 and to Czech Republic in Chapter 4.2. 
Further commentary provided in http://gdknowledge.co.uk/ec-proposals-for-a-directive-on-
copyright-in-the-digital-single-market/. 




Member States provide assistance and protective measures against unreasonable 
exploitation of the creators´ weakness.11 There is, however, a vast difference in 
mechanisms employed by various jurisdictions. Common law jurisdictions, such as 
the United Kingdom, promote a relatively laissez-faire attitude towards the inclusion 
of protective measures within copyright law. It is believed that the optimal 
mechanism is a regulatory-free, economic environment encouraging the concepts of 
“freedom to contract”, and collective bargaining and management. Civil law 
jurisdictions adopt a variety of measures, but overall promote a legal environment 
which ensures general protection against exploitative contracts, as well as conferring, 
or, at least, encouraging equitable authorial remuneration to both authors and 
performers. It is not very clear though which system produces optimal remuneration 
for authors and performers balanced with the financial risks taken by the producers 
and publishers. 
While contemplating about the approach, the Commission introduced the Proposal 
for the DSMD. The way the Proposal deals with the Contract Adjustment Mechanism 
(Art. 15) was relatively surprising. It has always been the aim of the author of this 
work to focus on the contractually agreed remuneration rather than on different 
models of collectively managed rights, compulsory licensing, various digital 
schemes, new business models, etc. A lot has been written about these issues while 
analysis of the former is almost nonexistent.12 The focus was always going to be very 
narrow in this respect anyway. But the fact that the wording of the Proposal seems to 
be tackling only such limited sphere and thus aligns with the research goal came as a 
surprise, especially after reading the accompanying documents which suggest 
otherwise. It is argued later in this thesis that this may have not been the initial goal 
and that the text in the form it reached its initial publication gave in to many 
compromises needed between all relevant stakeholders. The Proposed Article 15, as 
well as this thesis, primarily address the issue of fair contract-based remuneration for 
creators, allowing to reflect the creation´s exploitation success. Is such fair 
                                                 
11 For example, ban of “opt-out” contractual clauses introduced in the Czech Copyright law in 2006 
in relation to bestseller clause, or the whole German legislation aiming for strengthening authors´ 
bargaining position – see below. 
12 The Bibliography chapter provides many sources on the former but very limited on the latter, 
especially in relation to the UK, EU, and also Czech Republic. The only jurisdiction providing 




remuneration secured in the national legislations observed? And, is the provision of 
Article 15 of the draft DSMD capable of tackling the issue on a European level? If 
the answers are no, what should follow? 
Given that there is little empirical evidence to support a claim that preservation of 
copyright is economically inefficient13 some suggest that the opposite is true14. From 
efficiency, a parallel can be drawn to “fairness” and to the lack of firm evidence that 
it is in fact not achieved. However, lack of evidence does not always mean non-
existence of the issue. In this discussed topic, this may also result from insufficient 
research done to this respect. Therefore, until we have such research at hand, we may 
rely on the ever-present perception that the system is not always fair to creators; if 
not to all then at least to those who are at the beginning of their careers and need a 
“break-through”. 
There are several models applied to secure fair compensation to authors and 
performers through collective rights management, levy systems to compensate for 
private copying etc. However, only some EU Member States provide measures to 
secure fair compensation for uses dealt with through individual contracting. As 
indicated, this work specifically focuses on the remuneration based on these 
individual negotiations, and in particular on the way how an author or performer can 
claim equitable remuneration (in ideal scenario) or any additional participation, if it 
turns out to be due. 
The content of exploitation contracts and the level of remuneration paid to authors 
and performers have not been subject to comprehensive regulation at the European 
level.15 This results in a very diverse legislation of Member States, some having 
adopted protective measures to the benefit of authors and performers with respect to 
                                                 
13 Consultation on Copyright - Comments on Economic Impact, (Oxford Economics 
(Commissioned by the UK Government), Oxford, 2012), at p. 1 
14 Discussed in S. J. Liebowitz, ´Is the Copyright Monopoly a Best-Selling Fiction?´ (School of 
Management University of Texas at Dallas, 2008). This specific study relates to the US 
copyright system and admits that before relying too much on the conclusions thereof, it should 
be scrutinized by more academics (at. p. 28). But it demonstrates that making claims of 
inefficiency or unfairness of a system is not as straightforward as it seems and should be 
accompanied by reliable empirical data. Lack thereof  is exactly the factor missing for a 
bulletproof justification for introduction of measures such as the bestseller clause discussed in 
this work. 
15  Commission of the European Communities, Communication from the Commission to the 
Council and the European Parliament on European Contract Law, Brussels, 11 July 2001, 




scope of transfer of rights or the formation, execution, and interpretation of contracts 
concluded with broadcasters, publishers and other producers; other Member States 
leave it basically to the contracting parties (respecting fully the principle of freedom 
of contract) to negotiate the content of their agreements and the amount of 
remuneration of authors and performers.16 Also, in many Member States authors and 
performers have formed trade unions or rely on CRMOs to provide support in the 
negotiation of contracts or the fixation of the level of remuneration.17 The landscape 
is so diverse that – with the advancement of digital exploitation of rights and cross-
border uses – it became virtually impossible for the authors and performers to follow, 
in already complex web of relationships and transactions, use of their works and 
fixations of their performances and the level of remuneration obtained. The European 
Commission has flagged this issue as one of the areas possibly hindering free 
movement of creative content and services throughout the Internal Market in the 
digital-driven world, and started - relatively recently - looking into the causes and 
solutions of the problem. The studies commissioned or accessed by the Commission 
which have direct relevance for this topic are discussed in this thesis. It is evaluated 
to what extent the EU legislator was able to project the outcomes and 
recommendations of these studies into the Digital Single Market Strategy and the 
final draft of the DSM Directive. 
Some form of “best-seller” clause and other provisions helping authors and 
performers to secure fair remuneration for their creative effort can be imposed into 
given regulation in various ways. Through statutory contract law (as lex generalis), 
through statutory copyright law (as lex specialis), or through other mechanisms 
raging form case law or equity to collective bargaining, tariffs set up by CRMOs, etc. 
The primary focus of this thesis is a mechanism best described as the “best-seller” 
clause; however, it cannot be taken out of context. The primary goal of any “best-
seller” clause is to secure for the authors and performers a fair compensation for their 
creative effort through portion of the proceeds made from every use of their work or 
fixed performance for the cases when the work or performance became very 
successful but the initial transfer does not reflect the possibility of the creator 
                                                 
16 The 2015 EU Remuneration Study, p. 32 
17 S. Dusollier et al., Contractual Arrangements Applicable to Creators: Law and Practice of 
Selected Member States, study prepared for the European Parliament, Committee on Legal and 




participating proportionately on the proceeds from exploitation of such creation. That 
can however be achieve through variety of routes, including (in addition to the 
bestseller provisions) rules on equitable remuneration in general (not only in reaction 
to specifically successful works), options to terminate transfer contracts due to 
various “failures” on the part of the transferees, reversion of copyright, collectively 
managed unwaivable statutory right for specific transfers of rights, etc. While in 
detail only the “best-seller” clause will be examined in relation to national provisions 
of Germany, Czech Republic and United Kingdom, and in relation to the new EU 
proposal, a lot of account will still be given to these other options as well. 
A lot of European context will be provided through reproduction of conclusions of 
studies conducted in recent years on the issues of remuneration of creators, copyright 
and contract law within the European legal framework. 
Evaluating all the data assessed, it will be argued in the end that the current wording 
of the Proposal is not capable of harmonizing sufficiently creators´ right to fair 
remuneration throughout Europe. Several recommendations will be done into how to 
possibly amend the proposed text of Article 15 of the DSM Directive. While 
rhetorical question is posed in the concluding chapter as to why even introducing 
such measures on a European level when there is no empirical evidence that a) it is 
needed and b) will resolve the issue at hand, this line of thinking is not much pursued 
in this work. The work will build on a premise that until proven otherwise one should 
assume that there can be certain degree of unfairness in the way some creators are 
remunerated for exploitation of their subsequently successful creations (or, in 
general, for their creative efforts), and that this topic needs to be addressed on a 
European level in order to achieve a truly free market with creative content within 
the EU. Accepting this premise, the analysis will go further in assessing whether the 




In developing the arguments and recommendations presented in this thesis, mainly 
comparative approach has been adopted, on both micro- and macro- scale. The issues 




their overlaps and interactions, were examined from different angles. On the one hand 
a microscopic revue of the legislation in three different EU jurisdictions, namely 
Germany, Czech Republic and the United Kingdom, has been conducted; looking at 
the historical development and justification of grant of copyright protection in those 
countries, including any constitutional basis for the protection and provision of 
reward to creators, analysis of current applicable law revolving around contract-based 
remuneration for creators, and – where any relevant exists – case law and market 
practice.  
The sources for these data were academic literature, including commentary in journal 
articles, applicable law including case law, and with regards to the Czech Republic 
also personal practical experience and access to relevant stakeholders. In relation to 
Germany, the access to resources was limited by the need for materials in English 
language only. A lot of information was found in journal articles written by German 
scholars and practitioners in English and some reliance on specialised copyright blogs 
(by renowned authors) must be admitted. Given that English law in the area of 
copyright contract law is not too developed, English chapter is not very detailed in 
the examination of history and statutory provisions. More attention is paid to the area 
of case law in the area of contract law, where a weaker party to contract seeks to 
reverse a transfer of rights or obligation undertaken. This has been done with some, 
though limited, knowledge of the English legal system. Comparison with English law 
is insisted on though in order to demonstrate the whole scale of legal systems co-
existing within the European Union. While Germany represents a monistic tradition 
within copyright law, and Czech Republic is a (quasi)dualistic civil law system, 
United Kingdom (or, England and Wales to be precise) is a typical common law 
country with all its specifics.   
In order to put the national provisions into a broader, EU-wide, context, a lot of 
studies were consulted in great detail. It is impossible to capture all 28 EU 
jurisdictions and the studies reviewed provided a helpful sample of relevant data. To 
maintain enough space for own analysis, however, only a top-line overview of the 
conclusions of the research conducted by their authors is provided in Chapter 3. Basic 





In addition to the study of these traditional resources, given the very topical nature of 
the overall analysis presented in this thesis, in relation to the European Proposal, the 
main source of information comes from the DSM Directive itself and the 
accompanying documentation forming the Commission’s Digital Single Market 
Strategy. In addition, records of discussions and proposals made within various 
Committees in the EU structures were studied and used. This provided a very up-to-
date insight into the overall acceptance of the Proposal in individual Member States 
and helped support the confirmation of the hypothesis set out below in the Objective 
and Scope of work. 
Also, to demonstrate on a real practical example the differences between various 
jurisdictions´ solutions to the same problem, a case study was prepared. A non-
fictional scenario is introduced and then it is discussed how such problem could be 
resolved in each of the three jurisdictions. 
 
1.3. Previous research 
There have been several studies conducted by academics for different EU or national 
governmental bodies that deal with the issues of copyright law, contract law, and 
remuneration, and correlation between them; not always factoring in all these areas 
in one study together though. Due to the multi-jurisdiction scope of each of the 
studies, there is a sufficient amount of data on these various aspects in various EU 
Member States. However, none of them cover all the 3 three areas mentioned above 
for all Member States. Also, whereas Germany and the United Kingdom are 
represented in all of them, none of them covers law applicable in the Czech Republic. 
While some of the studies do touch upon the topic of best-seller clause, no specific 
study has been conducted to see how variations of this clause have been utilised by 
creators and whether they provided them with any support in their bargaining. And 
there has not been a comparison yet provided to the new provisions of the draft DSM 
Directive.  
Some of the studies listed below were specifically conducted for the European 
Commission as a supporting material in preparation of the DSMD Proposal or as help 
in shaping the Digital Single Market Strategy, but it nevertheless does not seem that 




extent by the EU legislator. Speculations as to why that is the case follow later in the 
analytical part. 
Specifically, the studies supporting the research made during work on this thesis are 
the´2016 Print Remuneration Study´ on the remuneration of authors of books and 
scientific journals, translators, journalists and visual artists for the use of their works; 
the ´2015 EU Remuneration Study´ on the remuneration of authors and performers 
for the use of their works and fixations of their performances; the ´2014 Creators´ 
Contracts Study´ looking into the contractual arrangements applicable to creators and 
the law and practice of selected Member States; the ´2010 SABIP Study´ providing 
insight into the relationship between copyright and contract law; and the ´2002 EU 
IP Contracts Study´ on the conditions applicable to contracts relating to intellectual 
property in the European Union, which was conducted in all (then only 15) Member 
States of the EU.  
Since the DSM Strategy and the pieces of regulation introduced by the European 
Commission as tools to bring the Strategy into reality are all very recent, making the 
research very topical, it is needless to say that there is very limited amount of 
materials on this. Besides documents provided by the EU bodies, accompanying the 
DSM Strategy (which will tend to be critical and self-reflecting to only limited extent 
– compared to academic materials normally available in support of similar research), 
there is only a very limited amount of academic and practitioners´ commentary, 
available in journal articles. 
There is almost no material on any of these areas of law with respect to the Czech 
Republic available in English. The ability to translate the relevant provisions into 
English from the author´s native language therefore also represents some, although 
small, contribution to the knowledge in the field. 
With respect to language barriers, it needs to be emphasised that while there is surely 
plethora of commentary on the German copyright contract law in German language, 
not much work is available in English. General explanation and commentary on the 
new legislation is available in English (mainly through journal articles written by 
German academics), but a comprehensive commentary on the individual provisions 
of the German Copyright Law and their history and development has not been 




understanding of rationale behind the examined provisions by someone whose 
knowledge of German language is very limited. 
Therefore, most resources are available on English law, although very little is 
available on measures helping to strengthen creators´ position in their contract 
negotiations due to the fact that such measures are almost non-existent. Since there 
is enough material available on general copyright and general contract law, only the 
minimum background is mentioned in this thesis which is necessary to provide 
comparable set of data to the Czech and German national rules and to support any 
arguments made. Therefore, the text related to English law is rather “poor” 
(hopefully, only in terms of quantity) on purpose, in order to save space for the 
“previously unexplored” topics. 
 
1.4. Definitions and clarification of intent 
Some concepts, terms, and doctrines follow like a thread through the whole text of 
this work. It seems to be beneficial for the easy flow of reading the text to explain 
these terms and also the scope of this work at the very beginning. 
Copyright v. Authors’ Rights 
To clarify the differences between the two different approaches, when speaking about 
the rights to author’s creations, term ‘copyright’ shall be used in relation to the UK and 
other common law jurisdictions, having its origin in the right to stop others from copying 
a work, while the term ‘author’s rights’ shall be connected to civil law jurisdictions and 
thus refer to rights conferred to the author of a work, including both economic and moral 
rights as they together form author’s rights. Therefore, where speaking only about one 
category of the author’s rights, it will be explicitly stated whether economic or moral 
rights are addressed, otherwise the term should be taken to stand for both of them. 
However, when referring to an area of law, either as applicable legislation or in a 
scholarly meaning, the term ‘copyright law’ is to be used for both common and civil 
law jurisdictions as it includes, in a broader sense, not only rights conferred to authors 
(exclusive rights and remuneration rights) but also provisions regarding rights to 




Authors or Performers? 
This work aims to capture and analyse the protection granted to both authors and 
performers. In the description of the individual jurisdictions´ provisions, it will be 
specifically stated if (and where) there is a difference between the provisions regulating 
authors´ and performers´ rights. Specific provisions´ numbers will be provided for 
regulation related to author´s and performer´s rights or numbers of cross-referencing 
provisions.  
For the sake of smoother reading and fluency of the text, however, in many cases only 
‘authors’ will be mentioned, while also performers are meant to be included. Unless 
specifically pointed out otherwise, when describing a situation related to author´s rights 
same applies for performers mutatis mutandis. Also, to simplify, authors and performers 
may be collectively called ´creators´. 
Transfers (Assignment, License, Waiver) 
Once copyright/author’s rights protection of a work is established under the relevant 
jurisdiction, an author has a right to exercise his rights to such work personally or to 
transfer their use to others, either by way of assignment or by way of a license, either in 
part or in their entirety, to one person or separately to different persons. He/she can also 
confide their administration to another person, for example to a collecting society.18 In 
certain jurisdictions he/she can also waive the exercise of certain aspects of his rights. 
For the purposes of this work, to unify the terminology; ‘transfer’ shall mean any of 
these transactions: ‘assignment’, ‘license’, and ‘waiver’. Thus, when referring to 
‘assignment’, this shall mean specifically transfer of ownership, particularly outright 
transfer of author’s economic rights, as one of the means of transfer under a 
copyright/author’s rights regime. 
Remuneration types 
There are different ways to remunerate the author. The three most common forms 
used are (1) proportional remuneration, (2) equitable remuneration and (3) a lump 
sum. A combination is also possible. Proportional remuneration allows authors to be 
associated with the success of their works. On the other hand, payment of lump sum 
                                                 




can represent a certainty for the creators, as proportional remuneration (royalty) is 
dependent on the works success which at the beginning of dealing is not always 
certain. “Equitable remuneration” within the meaning of contract based remuneration 
(as oppose to remuneration provided as a compensation for uses based on copyright 
exceptions) is specific to German law. Beyond this meaning, there is no particular 
difference made between the terms reward/ compensation/ remuneration/ 
participation (with the term “remuneration” being used most frequently due to its 
usage in many of the documents analysed) and understanding of what is fair or 
equitable. Fairness is used more often due to its better understanding “on the 
continent”, while “equity” is a concept enrooted in English law. Nevertheless, both 
terms will sometimes be used interchangeably in this work. 
Best-seller clause 
In order to make sure that creators are able to participate on the financial success of 
their work, some countries opt for a best-seller clause. The provision gives authors 
and/or performers a right to ask for modification of the remuneration based on their 
contract if they feel that the transferee is gaining a disproportionate economic 
advantage from the exploitation of the work in comparison to the payment agreed19.  
English law 
This thesis examines the law of England & Wales, as distinct from Scottish law and 
Northern Irish Law, which are not in scope of this work. As such, while for the sake 
of variety reference to the UK will also be used in this paper, it always refers to the 
legal system of England and Wales; “English” law refers to the same, as does “UK” 
law. Hopefully, this inconsistency will be pardoned in the interest of colourful 
language. 
International copyright law 
In order to avoid unnecessary repetition in the subsequent chapters - mainly in the 
parts of national chapters dedicated to history and justification, when referring to the 
international copyright law, all the below listed international instruments are taken 
into account. Since all the three jurisdictions discussed in this thesis gradually 
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accessed to all the relevant international copyright treaties and conventions, there is 
no need to mention them again in the individual subchapters. For more details on 
timings of accession of United Kingdom, Germany, and the Czech Republic to 
individual documents and their Protocols one can consult for example Chapter 23 of 
the latest edition of Copinger and Scone James on Copyright20 or go to the World 
Intellectual Property Organisation website21. 
All the three above mentioned countries are members of the following treaties: Berne 
Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works of 1886, as amended, 
Universal Copyright Convention of 1952, Rome Convention for the Protection of 
Performers, Producers of Phonograms and Broadcasting Organizations of 1961, 
Convention for the Protection of Producers of Phonograms Against Unauthorized 
Duplication of Their Phonograms of 1971, the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects 
of Intellectual Property Rights of 1994 (the TRIPs Agreement), WIPO Copyright 
Treaty of 1996, WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty of 1996, Beijing Treaty 
on Audiovisual Performances of 2012. Only the latest 2013 Marrakesh Treaty to 
Facilitate Access to Published Works for Persons Who Are Blind, Visually Impaired 
or Otherwise Print Disabled has not been accessed by either of them22. 
The major contribution to protection of authors and performers in the discussed 
jurisdictions is the Berne Convention´s introduction of the two fundamental 
principles of “national treatment” and “convention rights”. As such, as of the 
Convention´s adoption an author can claim in any state which is a party to the 
Convention the same protection as the country of claim gives to its own nationals. 
And any author entitled to rights under the Convention can claim such rights, 
irrespective of whether the country of claim gives these rights to its own nationals. 
                                                 
20 K.Garnett, G.Davies, G.Hardbottle, Copinger and Skone James on Copyright. Volume 1 (17th 
edn., Sweet & Maxwell, 2016) 
21 hhttp://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ (accessed July 2017), although this web site will only show 
WIPO-administered treaties. 





Theoretical Background to Monism and Dualism in Copyright Law 
There are fundamental theoretical differences between the copyright and author’s rights 
systems and although, as Rahmatian23 points out, they lead to similar results in everyday 
business, these differences are important for the present analysis. The system to which 
each jurisdiction belongs heavily influences how strong is the bond between the author 
or the performer and their work or performance respectively. That in turn influences 
how limited is the author´s dealing with the work and how much the legislator tends to 
protect the author, even from his/her own imprudence, when entering into contracts. 
“Assignment/licensing rules are directly dependent on the conceptual decision of 
copyright/author’s rights system in question.”24  
Under copyright systems, the UK being a paradigmatic example, a work does not have 
to reflect its author’s personality and it does not have to have any cultural or artistic 
merit; the author’s skills and labour are protected.25 This follows Locke’s labour theory 
as a justification of property rights.26 Rahmatian sums this up further: “copyright is not 
directed at the protection of ‘creativity’ or artistic creation of any kind; the general 
principle is that if the work originates from the author’s own skill and labour, it 
represents a potential economic value and deserves protection (normally) in favour of 
its maker, and someone’s copying indicates the protectable value of copied source.27 
”This concept of protection affects rules on the transfer of copyright as “once a creation 
is protected, the copyright turns the creation into property”28. In the UK, and in general 
also in other copyright systems, copyright in a protected work can be freely assigned29 
because it is merely a type of property and this entails transferability, or the use of the 
property without outright transfer can be granted by way of license30 in the same way 
that real property can be sold or rented31.  
                                                 
23A. Rahmatian, Dealing with Rights in Copyright-protected Works: Assignment and Licenses in E. 
Derclaye, Research Handbook on the Future of EU Copyright, 2009, Chapter 12, at p. 287 
24 Ibid 
25 Ibid at p. 288 
26 Ibid at p. 287 
27Ibid, at p. 289, referring to Petersen J’s decision in University of London Press v. University 
Tutorial Press [1916] 2 Ch 601, 610 
 28Ibid at p. 290 
29Copyright, Design and Patents Act 1988 (“CDPA 1988”), s. 90 (1) – “Copyright is transmissible 
by assignment, by testamentary disposition or by operation of law, as personal or moveable 
property.” 
30CDPA 1988, s. 90 (2) 




First assignment splits the authorship and the ownership; after that the copyright vests 
in the assignee and no longer in the author. The author retains moral rights; however, 
these are quite a recent feature in UK copyright and are very fragile; in fact, they are 
often curtailed, especially by way of their waiver32.33 “Thus moral rights have no 
decisive relevance in a copyright system and can almost always be ignored in the 
context of assignment and licensing rules”.34 
Under authors’ rights systems, on the other hand, moral rights are extremely important. 
In contrast to a copyright system, where they are merely an addendum to the copyright 
protection laws, they are arguably the backbone of an author’s right system and the 
primary justification as to why protection is granted in the first place as Rahmatian 
argues35. This is definitely the case in countries accepting the monistic approach, like 
Germany or Austria, and even though recent commercialization of the area puts moral 
rights slightly on the back foot, it is in principle true for ‘dualistic countries’ as well. 
Protection of an author rests principally on the author’s person, thus the author’s right 
is primarily a personality right from which economic rights also originate36. The 
emphasis of the personal aspect of the modern author’s rights is expressed in the 
protection criteria, which differ in theory significantly from copyright systems; a work 
is only protected by an author’s right if it bears the “mark” or “stamp” of the author and 
is therefore “original”37. It falls upon national legislators, or eventually courts, to decide 
what level of originality is necessary in reality. However, in author’s rights jurisdictions, 
reference to an author’s person and/or his intellect is always involved in one or another 
way. Thus, in French law, a work is original if it represents a “work of mind”38, German 
law requires “personal intellectual creation”39, a Czech author’s work has to be a 
“unique outcome of the creative activity of the author”40, Bulgarian law provides that 
a work has to “result from creative work”41, and so on. 
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34Ibid  
35Ibid Rahmatian, (2009), 292 
36 Ibid Rahmatian, (2009), 291 
37Ibid Rahmatian, (2009), 254 
38Article L.112-1 of 1992 IP Code – “all works of the mind, whatever their kind, form of 
expression, merit or purpose are protected”  
39Article 2 (2) Act No. 35/1965 Coll., on Literary, Scientific, and Artistic Works (the “1965 Act”) 
40Article 2 (1) of CZCA 




There are subsequently major differences between the regulations of civil law countries 
which have adopted a monistic approach to author’s rights and those applying the 
dualistic concept. The essence of dualism lies in the legal independence (sovereignty) 
of author’s economic rights and moral rights, in complete transferability of economic 
rights inter vivos and in the different duration of moral and economic rights after 
author’s death.42 The monist theory on the other hand regards author’s rights as an 
indivisible whole with both personal and economic aspects43. In countries applying this 
approach, moral and economic (patrimonial) rights cannot be separated and assignment 
of author’s right is not possible. There is also an issue regarding the duration of rights; 
both aspects of an author’s right have the same term of protection in countries following 
a monistic approach. 
 
1.5. Objective and scope of the thesis 
The main objective of this study is to assess how likely is the proposed Contract 
adjustment mechanism set out in Article 15 of the DSMD Proposal to achieve its 
goal. That is, how likely is it to secure such fair remuneration of creators for the 
transfer of their rights in their creations which will reflect all the relevant uses taking 
place throughout the supply chain in both the “analogue” but also the digital channels, 
except where the remuneration for such use is managed through different channel 
than contractual arrangement (e.g. remuneration based on exception to copyright 
protection and collectively managed). 
In order to understand all the relevant factors and complexities, however, closer look 
is taken at the correlation between remuneration for creators, copyright law and 
general contract laws. What are the tools used by legislators in these areas that 
somehow affect creator´s remuneration when they wish to strengthen their bargaining 
power? Given that the context here is EU-wide, but at the same time it is impossible 
to capture the situation in all the 28 markets, two actions were taken. Firstly, micro-
approach was taken in relation to three jurisdictions within the EU, where each 
represents one of the traditions within copyright laws; that is namely monistic 
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Germany, (quasi)dualistic Czech Republic, and common-law United Kingdom 
(England and Wales). Secondly, a lot of intelligence was taken from studies 
addressing the above outlined areas. The studies, in most cases conducted for multiple 
EU jurisdictions by larger teams of copyright (and economics) academics, provide a 
very useful set of information. 
Together, these two sets of data should help not only to fulfil the main objective of 
answering the research question set out in the title of the work: How to best “sell” the 
best-seller clause? What steps should be taken (amendments made) to convince the 
national legislators to take on board the “contract adjustment mechanism” proposed 
by the Commission. Combining the two sets of data extracted from the analysis also 
enables to compare copyright contract frameworks of the three jurisdictions studied 
in detail within the practices throughout Europe. 
As regards the scope of the study, it needs to be explained that the work focuses only 
on the first layer of relationships and contracts within the process of creative effort 
and subsequent dissemination. The relations analysed are those of authors and 
performers and their “first transferees”, i.e. the publishers and producers they first go 
to with their creations. It does not concern subsequent intermediaries, such as 
broadcasting organisations, distributors, online platforms etc. Below in Figure 1.5. 
the scope of the study is outlined by the green box. 
In addition, only the remuneration based on the contracts entered into with these first 
transferees, not remuneration based on exceptions to copyright law, collected by the 
collective rights management organisations or otherwise, is evaluated. Nevertheless, 
one must at least be aware of the whole context in which the contractual remuneration 
is provided, which includes these other forms of remuneration. However, mere 
acknowledgement of existence of those forms of remuneration is provided. This work 











Finally, in relation to the Proposal of the DSM Directive, the scope of detailed 
analysis is defined by Article 15. While some attention must be paid to the 
accompanying provisions of Articles 14 and 16, it is done only to the extent 
necessary. 
The hypothesis of this work is that Article 15 of the DSMD, as drafted by the 
European legislator and introduced in September 2016, is not - in its current wording 
- fit to achieve its objective, which is to secure fair remuneration for authors and 
performers for the uses of their works and fixations of their performances. Comparing 
it to similar provisions in EU national legislations, it is not, arguably, even fit to 
secure fair additional remuneration, i.e. additional compensation for “bestsellers”. 
This leads to another sub-hypothesis: the Commission must have not originally 
intended to impose on EU Member States an obligation to introduce a “best-seller” 






The research provided in this thesis is limited by several factors. It is not possible on 
the space given to provide an overview of all the legal frameworks within the EU. 
For that reason, only three MS were chosen for in-depth evaluation. At the same time, 
however, since the materials were available, conclusions made in a detailed study of 
other MSs´ legal frameworks could be utilised by way of consulting several studies. 
Also, there is a time limitation in play. The debate about the shape of the DSM 
Directive is at the point of submission of this thesis still ongoing, partially as 
predicted but partially against expectation. Therefore, the conclusions can only be 
made based on the status known by June 2017. 
Additional limitation is given by language capabilities of the author. While Czech 
and English languages pose no problem, resources related to German copyright law 
can only be used where available in English (as none exist in Czech language). This 
limitation also drives the selection of countries examined in detail. Firstly, for 
example France could have been a better representative of dualistic civil law systems, 
but due to language barrier the author of this thesis would not be able to access 
enough materials. When choosing a monistic civil law jurisdiction, the limitations 
were twofold. First, there is very limited number of countries following monistic 
tradition. But also, only German lawyers and scholars produce sufficient amount of 
material in English language to provide enough basis for the study. 
Finally, due to the limit of amount of words, a lot of issues has been taken for 
established and was not further analysed in the work, unless absolutely necessary. 
The extent of analysis is already quite extensive without providing explanations on 
differences between common law and civil law countries with respect to authorship 
of “entrepreneurial works”, neighbouring and related rights, scope of employee and 
commissioned works etc. The author is aware of the differences between some 
concepts in civil and common-law copyright laws but chooses to ignore them unless 





1.7. Thesis outline 
By way of introduction, Chapter 1 sets the scene and explains the intention of the 
research, its scope, objective, methodology, previous research available, the 
terminology used, and extent of contribution of this work to knowledge in the field. 
It delineates the limitations of the work. 
Chapter 2 provides further context for some of the topics and factors discussed further 
in the following chapters. Specifically, the chapter explains briefly the distinction 
between exclusive rights and remuneration rights and to what extent which of them 
are discussed; it explains the bargaining process and how copyright law justifies 
provision of compensation provided to creators; looks into the stakeholders involved 
in the creative industries, but only to the extent necessary to provide some 
background. This also means touching upon the levels of “copyright contracting”. 
Further, the chapter provides an outline of various legislative tools used across EU 
Member States to protect creators in copyright contracts – both available in copyright 
law and general contract law; and non-contractual options such as collective 
bargaining.  
Chapter 3 primarily deals with the Proposal for the Digital Single Market Directive, 
specifically its Title IV, Chapter 3 – Fair remuneration in Contracts of Authors and 
Performers. The provision under microscope in this work is Article 15: Contract 
adjustment mechanism. However, the overall context of that Chapter 3 must be 
considered, including the Transparency obligation (Article 14) and Dispute 
resolution mechanism (Article 16). 
In an attempt to understand why the Commission chose the wording and scope of 
Article 15 in particular, and of Chapter 3 of the fourth Title of the draft DSMD in 
general, a thorough analysis of (i) the relationship between copyright and contract 
law at the European level, and (ii) issue of adequate remuneration of creators within 
the acquis is also discussed in Chapter 3. Reference is made to several studies about 
these issues commissioned by the European Parliament, the Commission, or UK 
Government to some European academic institutions.  
At the beginning of Chapter 3, recent CJEU jurisprudence on authors´ remuneration 




currently ever-present in the European couloirs. More importantly, it also 
demonstrates the other controversies of the Proposal. 
Chapter 4 is divided into three subchapters, each dealing with the applicable national 
law on the additional participation of authors and performers on the revenues 
generated through the use of their creations and generally on creators´ contract- based 
remuneration.  
Chapter 5 is divided into three equally important sections. First, capture of scholarly 
commentary and current debate within the European institutions on the wording of 
the DSMD proposal is provided, looking into any amendments proposed so far. 
Second part outlines what (if any) steps would need to be taken for the Article 15 to 
be transposed into the respective national copyright laws (and partially also deals 
with Article 14). Finally, a case study is presented, offering a real case considerable 
for the claim of additional adequate remuneration. It is discussed, how the outcome 
of such claim would differ applying the three national laws. 
If the Commission primarily attempted to tackle with Article 15 DSMD what can be 
described as the need for harmonisation of a “best-seller” claim in European 
copyright law the outcome is not ideal but acceptable. If, however, provisions of Title 
IV, Chapter 3 aim at securing an overall fair distribution among right holders of 
revenues generated from all uses of works and fixed performances throughout the 
whole supply chain of copyright works, including digital uses and new business 
models, it is argued in the concluding chapter that the Article 15 must be amended.  
Some recommendations on how specifically to amend the Proposal and thus fill any 
gaps in the text to rectify the situation follow. 
 
This study reflects the respective laws and status of the legislative debate as of 




















This chapter aims to provide a wider context for the outline and analysis that follows 
in the subsequent chapters, which operate with variety of terms, and refers to 
legislative techniques used in order to modify positions of contractual parties. In 
order to avoid the need to explain these concepts within the respective text where 
they are discussed and thus achieve easier flow of the paper, these concepts are 
explained as a preamble to what follows in the main chapters of this work. 
Specifically, this chapter explains the distinction between exclusive rights and 
remuneration rights; it explains the bargaining process and how copyright law 
justifies provision of compensation provided to creators. 
Also, as an important pre-text to the discussion that follows, to the extent necessary 
for present debate, it maps the stakeholders involved in the creative industries, and 
what are the levels/layers at which copyright contracts are concluded.  
Finally, the chapter provides an overview of various legislative measures used across 
EU Member States to protect creators in copyright contracts. Such measures are 
available in different jurisdictions mainly in copyright law and general contract law 
in addition to non-contractual options such as collective bargaining.  
The measures discussed include restrictions related to the form of transfer of rights 
and in general requirements of specific form, compulsory determination of the scope 
of rights transferred or of the remuneration scope (incl. general obligation to specify 
the amount of remuneration in the contract) or type (proportional remuneration, 
equitable remuneration or lump sum).  
Other measures how to give way to legislative goals are specific interpretation of 
contracts embedded in the law (e.g. lack of certain provision will be construed as 
meaning a limited transfer), automatic termination of contract upon certain triggers, 





2.1. Exclusive rights and remuneration rights 
Copyright (author´s rights) and related rights (or in some jurisdictions called 
neighbouring rights) are frequently described as a bundle of rights “[…] applicable 
to various types of use and defined by their technical nature, such as making copies 
(reproduction), performing in public, communicating (by wire or wireless means), 
renting, displaying etc.”.44 
Copyright laws grant exclusive rights to authors and performers that allow their 
owners to authorise or prohibit particular uses with respect to the works or fixed 
performances to which they pertain. Exclusive rights, forming part of this bundle, can 
mostly be transferred (via assignment or licence) or sometimes even waived in favour 
of a third party. It is up to the individual creator whether they decide to allow others 
to do what the law initially exclusively allows only them. 
Rather than exclusive rights, the law in some cases confers on authors and performers 
a right to receive remuneration for the use of works or other subject matter by a third 
party. Under these conditions, the use can take place even without the prior consent 
of the creator if remuneration for the use is paid. These rights are called remuneration 
rights. They are usually non-transferable. Sometimes, depending on the wording of 
specific law, they can be waived though.  
“In addition, EU law also provides an in-between model in the exercise of copyright 
and related rights, whereby the transfer of an exclusive right is coupled with a right 
of remuneration.”45 
The below Figure 2.1. is taken from the 2015 EU Remuneration Study, because it not 
only depicts the types of economic rights of authors and performers, as perceived 
within the EU copyright law, but also because the scope of the study corresponds 
with the scope of this thesis. In addition to authors, it is only concerned with 
performers and not holders of other related rights. It does not deal with moral rights 
or systems of remuneration for private copying and similar “other” economic rights. 
In fact, as explained in Chapter 1, the 2015 EU Remuneration Study goes beyond the 
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scope of this thesis in that it addresses all the forms of remuneration, including those 
based on non-contractual arrangements, such as remuneration rights/exclusive rights 
with mandatory transfer. In the thesis, such forms of remuneration are not addressed 
in detail. They are only mentioned as complementing financial flows based on the 
exploitation contracts between creators and their first transferees. 
Figure 2.1: (Legal) source of remuneration for authors and performers in the 
music and audiovisual industry46 
 
2.2. Compensation to creators as part of justification for copyright 
For many creators, the essential goal of the copyright contract is to secure 
remuneration for the transfer of their work so that they can “make their living” and 
continue creating. Despite the romantic notion of the urge to express oneself, only a 
small portion of creators does not seek any compensation for their efforts.47 This 
notion is also repeated in the EU directives in the field of copyright. The InfoSoc 
Directive states that “if authors or performers are to continue their creative and artistic 
work, they have to receive an appropriate reward for the use of their work, as must 
producers in order to be able to finance this work”48. Securing appropriate reward for 
creators is a matter of “safeguarding the independence and dignity of artistic creators 
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47 Situations, when remuneration may not be the primary purpose of the exploitation of works and 
authors do not get paid specifically for the creative effort with the view of economic 
exploitation of the creation; will include scientific work and corresponding publications. 




and performers”49. It is discussed later that irrespective of the legal tradition, the 
justification for copyright protection is always underlined by the economic interests 
of the author and/or the right to “reap what one sewn”. 
Agreeing on remuneration for the transfer of rights in a work or fixation of 
performance is the first opportunity for a creator to arrange some income in exchange 
for the transfer and to secure some participation in the revenue and economic 
exploitation of the work or the fixation of the performance. Such exploitation will be 
done by the transferee and subsequently by other exploiters with whom the creator 
may not (and most likely will not) have any relationship. This is why so much 
emphasis is given on the remuneration based on this first transfer of rights. At a later 
stage, if the reward is not properly negotiated, there are very limited options to secure 
additional agreement on payments. 
The “first transfer contract” might determine the model for remuneration but will not 
automatically ascertain that any remuneration will be paid. This might be subject to 
the benefits generated (or not) by the work. But where the remuneration is 
proportional to such benefits generated (and the contract is well executed by the 
transferee), the creator will participate on the success achieved. If the reward agreed 
in this “first transfer” contract is unfavourable in the first place, the reasoning 
justifying introduction of copyright protection will have failed.  
 
2.3. Stakeholder mapping 
The below description does not aim to provide a comprehensive enumeration of all 
stakeholders ever involved in the activities taking place in relation to creative 
industries. It wishes to demonstrate on a few examples the complexity of the multi-
layered web of relations and transaction involved and to (in addition to scope and 
limitations outlined in Chapter 1) set the “scene” for the following text.  
It is impossible to list all stakeholders. In each layer of the relations there is an 
enormous multiplicity of players involved. There is a vast number of types of 
creators, of publishers/ producers, intermediaries and users. Creators (authors & 
performers) can be further divided into subgroups such as actors and stunts, (and in 
                                                 




some countries, a category of its own – voice over artists), recording artists and 
session musicians; authors of works musical (film scores, recording music, 
advertisement jingles), literary (books and articles, scripts, lyrics accompanying 
music, computer programs, databases), dramatic (directors), artistic (photograph, 
works of visual art, sets, costumes, visual effects, etc.). There are producers of films 
and book and music publishers, accompanied by music record producers. Producers 
will enter into deals with broadcasting organisations, DVD/BlueRay/CD distributors 
as well as providers of online services (VOD/streaming services, platforms such as 
iTunes, Spotify, etc.). We also should not forget collective management 
organisations. Ultimately there are users, who – in some sectors – may, however, be 
able to skip one of the layers. In some scenarios, creators are able to get to “users” 
directly or through just one intermediary, mainly where there is no complex or large 
scale “production” step. 
The web of stakeholders involved will also vary depending on the specific sector in 
question. For example in the music industry, the supply chain is particularly complex. 
Distinction must be made between offline and online distribution of music, different 
repertoires and authors and performers. The offline supply chain will mainly involve 
publishers, playing essential part, and the authors (e.g. songwriters), who transfer 
their rights to the publishers. CMOs collect royalties and distribute them between the 
relevant right holders. But in the online sphere, the traditional dynamic between 
authors, publishers and CMOs has shifted. The role of CMOs in the online supply of 
music is more prominent compared to offline dealings. The record label (as a 
producer of phonograms) plays the central role in the supply chain for performers in 
the music industry both in the online and offline environment. In most cases, featured 
artists and session musicians transfer virtually all their rights to phonogram producers 
when signing a record agreement, with the exception of the right to equitable 
remuneration for the broadcasting and the communication to the public of 
commercial sound recordings, pursuant to Article 8 of the Rental Directive.50  
For authors and performers in AV sector, the dominant player is the producer who 
acts as a central point in the film and the TV industries; role of CRMOs is much more 
limited. In most cases, the producer is (by law or by contract) the initial owner of the 
                                                 




rights of creators in the audio-visual work. Producers, as the key right holders of a 
completed work are in charge of the granting of licences for the use of their products 
to the distributors and aggregators, while CRMOs play a role in granting licences and 
distributing the royalties collected from the cable retransmission right.51 
Below in Figure 2.3., a “location of copyright contracts” depiction, borrowed from 
the later discussed SABIP study, is provided. This is just one example how the three 
(or more) layers of stakeholders can be visualised. This may vary when reflecting 
various sectors, some roles of the stakeholders outlined can be exchanged, etc. 
Figure 2.3.: Copyright contracts – levels 
Source: the SABIP Study, page 1. 
 
As explained above in Subchapter 1.5. when defining the scope of this work, only 
the first layer of the above depicted contracts will be considered in this thesis, yet 
knowledge of the overall context is needed. 
2.4. Contractual bargaining in copyright contracts 
When creators transfer their authors rights/copyright to a publisher or producer, they 
do that in consideration of a contractual bargain, of a deal providing some advantages 
                                                 
51 The 2015 EU Remuneration Study, at p. 6 
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in compensation of the transfer of their right.52 The creator aims to have a work 
publicly distributed and disseminated so as to bring her some revenue and 
recognition. This first transfer contract is a fundamental act for the work, as it enables 
it to become an economic asset and to produce some revenue. The transferee is 
normally an economic actor which will provide to the author in exchange for the 
transfer the necessary investment in the production, publishing, and marketing of the 
work, its capacity of production and promotion, some endeavour in exploiting the 
work and finding channels for its public diffusion, access to the market, and the 
expertise and know-how in the said market.53 The publisher or producer takes the risk 
of commercialisation of the work, by making it happen (film or phonogram 
production), by manufacturing commodities (books or phonograms publishing) or by 
including the work into some comprehensive product (newspapers articles or 
scientific articles). Sometimes, the creator does have the access to production 
capacities or the market on their own, but normally it is more practical to entrust the 
producer or publisher to assume such a role. 
The transfer of rights is the contractual counterpart of the investment and risk 
undertaken by the transferee and, in return, remuneration should be paid to the creator 
for that transfer. With the producer exploiting the work, the author will hopefully be 
able to secure some profit. 
This represents the essential bargain underlying copyright contracts between creators 
and producers or publishers. Creators expect in return for the transfer of rights not 
only fair remuneration. In addition, they utilise the access to the market provided by 
their transferee and seek the transferee’s investment in making their work ready for 
such market. This is often overlooked or forgotten when discussing what is a fair 
benefit a creator should have from the exploitation of a work. If there were not these 
benefits from the transferees´ end of the bargain, creators might as well do without 
them and self-publish or otherwise exploit the work. After all, this is often the case 
with some online “self publishing”. But in those cases, creators are usually willing to 
allow free use of their divulged creations. Because currently it is even more difficult 
to track the uses (and corresponding payments which are due) in the online sphere 
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than in “physical” world. The ability to collect the proceeds from utilisation of works 
and performances is additional benefit the transferees provide to creators. Both, in 
digital and analogue worlds. Clearly, in many cases, if it was not for the transferee, 
the creator would obtain no remuneration, let alone fair. 
In addition, creative works are “experience goods” in economic terms, which means 
that their value is only revealed after their use. This is projected in the difficulty to 
assess the value of the work and hence, the adequate remuneration for its transfer, in 
advance. It can be risky for the creator to request only proportionate remuneration, as 
there may be not enough revenue generated to even recoup any investment in the 
manufacture and expedition of the work. In those cases, the creator shares the risk 
with the exploiter. On the other hand, if the agreement is based on lump sum payment 
only, the creator will not be able to participate on success of the work. As such, it is 
argued that the optimal solution is the combination thereof.  
 
2.5. Legal provisions possibly protecting authors in copyright contracts – 
copyright law 
There are various tools specific for copyright law utilised across Member States in 
order to provide some form of support to authors and performers in a way that 
strengthens their bargaining position with their contractual counterparts to whom 
they transfer their rights. The most frequent or relevant ones are briefly outlined 
below. 
Restrictions related to the form of transfer of rights 
As explained above, the three main forms of transfer are (i) assignment, (ii) licence, 
and (iii) waiver of rights. Member States often use the limitation of certain form of 
transfer as another form of protection of authors. These limitations arise from the 
historical and philosophical justifications for copyright protection and differ rather 
dramatically across the jurisdictions. They can be generally grouped into three 
buckets. There are countries following common law tradition, civil law countries 
adhering to monistic system and civil law countries following dualistic system. The 
theoretical background to monism and dualism and how these two doctrines work is 
described below in Chapter 2, specific details on the link to history and justification 





Authors are better protected if there is a legal requirement of written form. For 
transferees, a written agreement is also useful if, for example, they wish to sue third 
party for infringement of transferred rights. Requirement of the contract to be in 
written form can also help the parties to lay down the scope of the transfer and the 
obligations of the parties, which would reduce further dispute. 
Most frequently, written form is required for assignments of rights or provision of an 
exclusive licence, while non-exclusive license will often be concluded orally or by 
conduct.  
Determination of the scope of rights transferred 
Many countries implemented in their copyright laws mandatory contractual 
provisions to determine precisely the exact scope and terms of the rights transferred 
(including issues such as category of rights, geographical scope, duration, application 
to future works, unknown forms of exploitation, etc.). Authors can claim the nullity 
of a contract if certain of these mandatory items have not been laid down in it. This 
is another measure helping authors to have better position and to find some legal 
certainty, especially when applied in combination to rules on interpretation. It also 
allow authors to be more aware of the scope and the terms under which they transfer 
their rights. Indirectly, this helps limit the automatic transfer of the rights to one single 
exploiter.  
These mandatory clauses can include the general obligation to determine the 
assigned/licensed rights and modes of exploitation in contracts, obligation to 
determine the geographical scope and duration of the transfer of the rights, 
prohibition to waive or assign some rights for remuneration, obligation to determine 
applicability to future works54 or unknown forms of exploitation55, restriction of 
                                                 
54 Germany admits the possibility to grant exploitation rights for unspecified works that are not yet 
in existence but are to be created in the future; these rights do not need to be specified in an 
agreement but they need to be in writing; the contract can be terminated by either party after 
five years (all Sec. 40(1) UrhG). In the UK it is also possible to assign future rights according to 
case law (Schroeder Music Publishing Co Ltd v Macaulay [1974] 3 All E.R. 616, discussed 
later), there are no rules limiting the transfer of future works to protect the interest of the 
authors. 
55 Technological changes and new digital media are opening new exploitation modes for authors to 
exploit their rights and rules on unknown forms of exploitation allow authors to retain a certain 




transfer of moral rights. 
Determination of remuneration 
Remuneration of an author, especially within the context of this work, is one of the 
most important features of a contract. Given that authors are presumed to be in a 
much weaker position to negotiate an adequate level and type of remuneration some 
states introduce rules that can assist authors in obtaining an equitable/fair 
remuneration for the exploitation of their works. EU Member States generally tend 
to have some provisions on determination of remuneration, with the exception of the 
UK. In contrast, Germany has even recently amended the copyright law in order to 
recognise equitable remuneration as a key objective of copyright (Sec. 11 UrhG). 
Here are some examples how the sought determination of remuneration can be 
secured.  
General obligation to specify the amount of remuneration in the contract 
An obligation to specify amount of remuneration in the contract can also prove 
helpful. The national rules can also differ as to whether the remuneration amount can 
be zero, as long as it is explicitly stated in the contract, or if an actual amount must 
be agreed, even if just £1.  
In Germany,56 authors have a right to remuneration for the transfer of rights, but a 
contract will not be found null and void just because it does not mention it. If no 
specific payment is determined, the author will have the right to an adequate 
remuneration as discussed in detail below in the national chapter. According to Czech 
                                                 
freedom to exercise their rights in the way they consider would best serve their interests at the 
time such previously unknown form exploitation becomes evident. Author cannot evaluate the 
economic importance of the forms of exploitation that will arise in the future. Many countries 
adopted very stringent rules (Belgium, France, Hungary, Poland, Spain). In 2008, Germany has 
added a new provision in its legislation, stating that authors (not performers) are entitled to 
demand equitable remuneration for previously unknown forms of exploitation, rather than 
challenging the transfer of the rights as such. Before that, contracts on future uses unknown at 
the time of the licensing agreement were prohibited. The new rule simplifies dealing with 
copyright rights. Contracts dealing with unknown types of exploitation have to be in a written 
form and authors have the right to revoke the transfer of the right(s) within a period of three 
months after the transferee informed the author about the new form of exploitation. The author 
may not exercise this right contrary to the principle of good faith if her work is part of an entity 
of works that is being exploited (Sec. 31a UrhG). More details provided in the 2002 EU IP 
Contracts Study, p. 35. 




law, the remuneration must be agreed or it must stipulated that a licensee is provided 
free of charge.57 
Type of remuneration (proportional remuneration, equitable remuneration or lump 
sum) 
As explained above, there are several types of remuneration possible: proportional 
remuneration, equitable remuneration and a lump sum; or a combination thereof. 
Proportional remuneration best allows authors to be associated with the success of 
their works. Some jurisdictions insist on proportional remuneration58.  
Germany is the only country so far that has introduced the principle of “equitable 
remuneration” in the 2002 copyright law amendment as discussed in detail below. If 
the negotiated remuneration is not equitable, the author can claim an equitable 
remuneration. It provides for a mechanism to adjust contractual remuneration on a 
repeated basis if the qualifying circumstances occur. In addition, remuneration 
stipulated in the collective agreements is presumed to be fair59.  
In the UK, there is no provision on the remuneration of authors and only a 
consideration is necessary according to English contract law. A consideration of 
payment of pound will be deemed sufficient. 
Best-seller clause 
In order to make sure that creators  are able to participate on the financial success of 
their work, some countries opted for a best-seller clause. The provision gives authors 
and/or performers a right to ask for modification of the remuneration based on their 
contract if they feel that the transferee is gaining a disproportionate economic 
advantage from the exploitation of the work in comparison to the payment agreed. 
This provision should be distinguished from general regulation of equitable 
remuneration as introduced in Germany.  
                                                 
57 Section 2366(1), b) NCZCC, also stipulating that lack of agreed remuneration will not make the 
contract invalid, if it can be deducted that the parties wished to conclude the contract even 
without the amount of remuneration agreed; in such case, the licensee will pay a fee „customary 
for given use in given time“. 
58 E.g. France, Spain. In France, the rule applies to all works unless the law stipulates otherwise and 
France has the most detailed set of rules on remuneration. In both countries payment of lump 
sum is allowed only under special circumstances. More in the 2014 Creators´ Contract Study, 
p.37 




Such provisions can be found for example in the copyright laws of Belgium, Czech 
Republic, Germany, Hungary, Poland, and Spain.60 Generally, such claim will only 
be permitted if the creator received a lump sum payment, but for example German 
law does not provide such limitation. Neither does the Article 15 of the draft DSM 
Directive dictate the Member states to condition the claim under that provision by 
such form of payment. 
Interpretation of contracts 
Unclear contractual clauses, on exact meaning of which the parties are unable to 
agree, will have to be interpreted and clarified by the courts. The interpretation 
principle “in dubio pro auctore”61 is discussed further below, but in general it means 
that any right or mode of exploitation not appearing in the contract is presumed not 
to be covered by the transfer. Such a principle supports legal certainty for the authors 
and limits the transfer of their rights.  
Germany has interpretation rules that favour the author and follows the so-called 
"purpose-of-transfer" rule (“Zweckübertragungslehre”)62. Uses not envisaged by the 
parties at the time the contract was concluded will remain outside the scope of 
contract and the author will not have transferred her rights.  
Czech copyright law also provides similar mechanisms which are discussed below in 
the national chapter. English law has not adopted any such approach in statutory 
provisions, general principles of contract law apply; there is some case law applicable 
to these scenarios discussed below. 
In practice, these interpretation rules lead transferees to a careful formulation of 
transfer contracts, making sure that they are wide enough to cover different types of 
exploitation modes.63 
                                                 
60 As stipulated in the 2014 Creators´ Contract Study, p.39, referring to Article 26(2)(2) of the 
BCA, Article 48 of the Hungarian Copyright Law (Act No. LXXVI of 1999 on Copyright, as 
amended), Article 44 of the Polish Copyright Act (Act of February 4, 1994, on Copyright and 
Neighbouring Rights, as amended), Article 47 of the Spanish Copyright Law 
61 Author´s free translation: „where in doubt, the interpretation goes in favour of the author“. 
62 Sec. 31(5) UrhG – „If the types of exploitation have not been specifically designated when an 
exploitation right was granted, the types of use to which the right extends shall be determined in 
accordance with the purpose envisaged by both parties to the contract.“ 




Termination of contract 
One of the means for the creators to regain control and reverse back the rights from 
the person to whom they transferred them are provisions on withdrawal from the 
license agreement or reversion of copyright. The circumstances will differ (lack of 
exploitation, exploitation against the author's interests, lapse of time, etc.). Reversing 
assigned rights to the author after a fixed period could be very beneficial for the 
creators. This possibility of reversion has been included in the recent Term of 
Protection Directive (Article 3.2a) as a way to promote the exploitation of the works 
after 50 years. In the US, in 2013 the reversion of copyright claims started occurring 
when the 35-years term since effective date of the 1976 Copyright Act lapsed 
(January 1, 1978). In both, the Czech Republic and Germany there is a provision 
enabling the author or performer to withdraw from a licence due to inactivity of the 
licensee. 
Presumption of transfer in audio-visual contracts 
In most of the countries in the EU there exists a presumption of transfer of rights to 
the film producer.64 Therefore, unless agreed otherwise, authors of audiovisual works 
are presumed to have transferred their “exclusive exploitation” rights to the film 
producer. These rights will normally cover the rental and lending; the fixation right; 
the broadcasting and communication to the public right; and the distribution right. 
This presumption has been incorporated into the acquis communautaire through the 
Rental Directive which enables Member States to introduce a parallel presumption as 
regards rental rights only.65 In such case, the author retains the right to an equitable 
remuneration. This remuneration right is unwaivable and its administration is 
normally entrusted to a collecting society representing the authors.  
The presumption of transfer concentrates rights to all works and performances 
combined into an AV work in the producer’s hands, which is justified by a number 
of economic and practical factors. The producer needs to have all the rights secured 
in order to ensure the exploitation of the work. Very high costs of the film production 
justify this limitation of creators’ rights. The fact that the producers assume the 
economic risk of the production of the work, and the fact that in production of each 
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film a great number of creators are involved, it makes it more convenient for film 
producers to have the rights “safely in hand” to be able to exploit the film effectively. 
To limit the scope of the presumption of transfer, some countries excluded some 
rights or works; musical works are excluded in most countries. In the Czech Republic, 
the transfer does not cover private copy remuneration. Film producers cannot claim 
private copy levies on behalf of the authors involved in the making of the film.  In 
Germany, the presumption of transfer does not apply to authors of pre-existing works, 
such as novels or screenplays66 - they have the right to use their works for other 
cinematographic purposes after the expiration of ten years from the conclusion of the 
contract.67 
Conclusion 
There is no harmonisation across European borders with respect to copyright contract 
rules implemented with the goal to strengthen creators’ position in contract 
negotiations. “The national legal frameworks are very fragmented and many 
disparities exist in their application. On the one hand, countries like Belgium, 
Germany, France and Spain have detailed rules to protect authors in their contractual 
relations, and on the other hand, Member States such as Sweden and the UK provide 
transferees with a high degree of contractual freedom.”68  
It is discussed in greater detail below in the national chapters how these various 
provisions in practice do or do not fulfil their aim. 
 
2.6. Legal provisions possibly protecting authors in copyright contracts – 
contract law 
It is important to realise that copyright contracts are, to some extent, contracts as any 
others. General rules on contract law will apply where copyright law is silent on 
specific aspect of the scenario. Although the principle of freedom of contract applies 
across Member States, rough edges – as they can be – of this principle are sometimes 
filed by principles such as good faith. While general legal rules are not intended to 
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protect creators and thus their application can sometimes fail to provide the intended 
results, they can still be explored in search for “fairness” where copyright laws have 
not caught up yet to the “digital” reality. Arguably, these general principles could 
play a more prominent role in legal systems where there are almost no specific 
protective rules in copyright law for authors69. This is explored in greater detail in 
Chapter 4.3. dedicated to English law on fair creators’ remuneration. 
General contract law principles will affect the formation, performance, and 
interpretation of contracts, including those related to creative industries. Where the 
“special law” does not provide any tailor-made guidance, general contract law will 
normally apply. These principles are strongly enrooted in each MS´s legal system 
and their application will differ state by state (which is one of the reasons why any 
previous attempts to harmonize EU contract law have been ricocheted back). Despite 
the differences though, there is always some form of the doctrine of good faith, 
fairness, equity, defect of consent, etc.  Even in English law where “good faith” 
doctrine does not exist, doctrines such as “undue influence”, “unconscionability” or 
“restraint of trade” may achieve setting aside of contracts exploiting other party´s 
weakness. These principles will, however, only be used in special circumstances. 
Otherwise the principle of freedom of contract will prevail in most cases. Parties to a 
contract are normally fully bound by their agreements. Other principles of contract 
law will only exceptionally lead to the modification or cancellation of contracts by 
courts. 
Groups of concepts and measures available in contract law that can provide some 
form of influence over creators´ contracts are briefly outlined below. 
Principle of Good faith 
The principle of contractual freedom is “subject to the requirements of good faith and 
fair dealing”70. Good faith is a source of obligations for the parties to a contract and 
it also rules the negotiation process and may lead to the liability of the party who has 
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not acted in good faith in the negotiation71. Parties are also required to inform their 
negotiating partner of decisive facts and when determining whether good faith 
requires that a party disclose particular information, regard may be had to whether a 
party has a special expertise. In copyright contracts, this expertise will usually be with 
the publisher or the producer.  
Rules of interpretation 
Where a term of a contract is unclear or parties have different understanding of its 
meaning, courts may be asked to interpret contracts. Many national copyright laws 
stipulate a strict “in dubio pro auctore”72 interpretation rule in the field of copyright. 
This is evident in both German and Czech copyright laws when providing rules on 
assumption on scope of rights granted through the license agreement where this is 
not captured adequately in the agreement or each party argues a different 
understanding. When interpreting unclear contracts, reference to the common will of 
the parties or purpose of the contract will also be used. Often, courts will first try to 
identify the common intention of the parties instead of relying on a mere literal 
reading of the contract. Some rules of interpretation may also lead to interpreting 
contracts so that, between two possible meanings, the one that is consistent with the 
law will be preferred.73 
Another common rule of interpretation is the “contra proferentem” rule, which 
indicates that where the contract is a standard contract imposed by one of the parties 
(mostly the “stronger one” in the relationship) on the other as a take-it-or-leave-it 
contract, if the contract is unclear, it is interpreted against the party who has written 
it. The contra proferentem rule of interpretation is applicable in most countries, 
including the UK.74 This aspect is also discussed later in the national chapters. 
Purpose-of-grant interpretation rule75 can also be helpful to authors. In English law, 
while there is no such rule of interpretation specific to copyright, in general law the 
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purpose of the contract may lead the jurisprudence to limit the rights transferred. A 
classic example is Ray v Classic FM76 where it was held that Mr Ray had granted an 
implied licence on the catalogues to Classic FM for the radio to use them, however, 
the licence was said by the court to be limited only to the use of the catalogues for 
broadcasting in the UK, and not abroad. 
Legal provisions on unfair terms 
Legal provisions on unfair terms acknowledge the existence of uneven bargaining 
positions and the fact that non-negotiated contracts often result in unfair terms to the 
weaker party.77 The European Directive on unfair terms78 is a prominent example of 
legal protection of the weaker party in contractual relationships (here the consumer) 
vis-à-vis the professional, stronger party. The Directive prohibits non-negotiated 
clauses that cause a significant imbalance to the detriment of the consumer and 
contains a black-list of terms considered unfair, which eases its enforcement. The 
Directive on unfair terms and its national transpositions will not generally apply to 
copyright contracts entered into by authors79, as they do not fall under the category 
of “consumer” in these circumstances; they are acting as professionals when 
concluding contract with exploiters, although in a weaker position. But the overall 
technique of protecting consumers as weaker parties of a contract can help as 
inspiration when providing the same courtesy to creators. “In Germany, there are 
general terms and conditions provisions targeting unfair terms80 which are not limited 
to consumer contracts. These rules can be invoked in professional relationships to 
invalidate a general term that causes an undue advantage to a party without adequate 
consideration of the other party. The hypothesis of a standard clause imposed by the 
transferee in an author's contract may obviously be addressed by this regulation. 
However, the regulation does not allow the assessment of the subject matter of the 
contract (the main provisions), the control of the jurisdiction being limited to what 
departs from the rules of law (excluding what is purely contractual). As an example, 
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78 Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer contracts 
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the remuneration itself could not be controlled by the courts through this 
regulation.”81 
Undue influence, unconscionability, restraint of trade 
In the English law, contracts may also be set aside if a party exploits the other’s 
poverty, ignorance or lack of advice, or if one party is in a position of domination on 
the other, which results in a manifestly disadvantageous contract. The doctrines of 
undue influence, unconscionability and restraint of trade may help target unfair 
contracts. But this approach is not widely used and remains an exceptional remedy. 
These individual doctrines are discussed in detail in Chapter 4.3. 
Conclusion 
The issue of unbalanced positions of authors and transferees in the contractual 
negotiations could - to some extent - be rectified by way of rules of contract law 
aiming at regulating and balancing contractual relationships. But the unspecific 
character of these general rules of contract law makes them unsatisfactory to 
efficiently tackle the weak position of authors. Also, because these rules are not 
designed to specifically protect creators, their application by case law to creators' 
contracts is not very frequent. As their application is subject to circumstances 
intended for whole variety of sectors, these rules often fail to take into account the 
weak bargaining position of creators. They fail to adequately address the peculiarities 
of creators’ specific contractual position. 
General contractual principles might be of some help but will not be tailored to 
address the creators' need of protection. Specific protective rules, that take adequate 
consideration of the contractual position of creators, are needed. Such rules (in line 
with the principles of general contract law) would better contribute to achieve the 
principles of contract law: freedom of contract and the equality of parties to a 
contract, which is necessary to enable creators' contracts to play their economic role 
in full.82 But at least inspiration can be found in them.  
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2.7. Protection of authors in practice through collective agreements 
Collective negotiations can also help protect authors’ interests. Authors become 
members of (or in other form affiliate to) a professional body which represents and 
facilitates dialogue with the exploiters' representatives. Some form of collective 
negotiations exists in most European countries; depending on the country, such 
representatives will be professional associations, trade unions, guilds or even 
CRMOs. Due to the author´s weaker position in the “negotiation with the exploiter, 
collective negotiations between representatives of authors on the one hand, and 
representatives of exploiters on the other, may be a means to reach equilibrium”83. 
Collective agreements are the outcome of these collective negotiations and such 
agreements can concern a variety of issues from employment conditions, formal 
obligations applicable to the author and/or to the exploiter, or remuneration rates. The 
legal foundation for collective negotiations will depend on national legislation, unlike 
collective rights management this area is not harmonised within the EU. Therefore, 
in the eight countries considered, collective negotiations cover different realities.  In 
some countries, the framework contracts have an extended effect for all the agents in 
given sector, in other countries model contracts are not binding, only represent a 
suggestion for best practices. On the other hand, in some countries such model 
contracts become a standard that is used even by those who are not members of the 
given organisations. Collective agreements also allow creators and exploiters to have 
an option to use standard contracts drafted according to rules accepted by both sides 
of the relationship without having to draw up specific contracts for each specific 
situation. The main contribution of these model contracts is that they provide 
collective agreements applying common principles specific for various industry 
sectors. 
There are several specific uses of collective bargaining. In relation to Germany, it is 
paramount to mention collective agreements drafted to ensure “adequate 
remuneration”. The German model is based on a deep-rooted collective negotiations 
tradition: collective negotiations are generally accepted as legitimate tools to regulate 
economic and social relations84. Preference of collective bargaining and common 
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remuneration standards is discussed in detail in the German national chapter (Ch. 
4.1.). This model follows the American example, where groups of authors and groups 
of exploiters can negotiate collective agreements, also known as Guild Agreements 
that regulate the conclusion of exploitation contracts85.  
Although France is not in the focus of this work, to demonstrate how it is possible to 
cope with new exploitations, it is worth mentioning the French Framework Contract 
on e-publishing.  Article L. 132-25 of the French IP Code, allows a collective 
agreement agreed upon by representatives of producers and of authors in the 
audiovisual sector regarding the remuneration of the authors to be made mandatory 
upon the totality of the agents of a defined sector by a simple arrêté (order) of the 
French Minister in charge of Culture86. “Facing the complexities related to the 
development of digital modes of exploitation for the book sector, the Minister of 
Culture mandated representatives of publishers and authors to negotiate on the 
conditions for digital rights’ transferring and exploitation in the book sector. The 
Framework Agreement of March 21, 2013, on publishing contracts in the book 
industry, of the Permanent Council of Writers (Conseil national des écrivains) and 
the National Union of Publishers (Syndicat national de l’édition) represents a very 
interesting example of collective bargaining that is confirmed by the lawmakers.”87  
As legal scholars confirm, collective bargaining agreements are a relevant measure 
to resolve important issues when dealing with copyright contracts: “the conclusion of 
collective agreements between representatives of authors [...] on the one hand and 
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collective labour agreements. Freelancers are also able to negotiate collectively: for example, 
German journalists’ representatives have signed and agreed collective agreements, joint 
remuneration rules, model contracts and memoranda of understanding with representatives of 
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publishers, broadcasters or producers on the other, tends to provide the most 
satisfactory solution for all parties involved [...]. Consequently, collective bargaining 
offers perhaps the only guarantee that the interests of authors [...] will be duly taken 
into account”88.  
In addition, maybe even more importantly, collective organisations can play a key 
role in raising awareness which, as discussed later in this thesis, is essential for any 
of the proposed regulation to be utilised by those in whose benefit it is adopted. 
 
  
                                                 












Chapter 3 – Fair remuneration for authors and performers in 






The need for overall reform of the European copyright law has been surfacing for 
over a decade now, with many commentators claiming that the piecemeal 
harmonisation through Directives is not the right solution and that a Regulation 
replacing national laws is the best way forward, both in terms of form and content.89 
The furthest any of these initiatives have gotten was when The Wittem Project90 
published their proposal of the European Copyright Code.91 In 2011, Cook and 
Derclaye argued that the Wittem Code shows that agreement even on the thorny 
questions is possible and that the gap between the common law and civil law 
traditions can be bridged elegantly and respectfully.92 However, there was one major 
obstacle, emphasised by the Wittem Code´s opponents. Territoriality of copyright is 
very hard to overcome and it would take several generations to address the issue93, 
not a few years in which the Commission now wishes to roll out the Digital Single 
Market Strategy. The measures introduced by the draft DSMD therefore represent yet 
another “provisional”, fragmented regulation, attempting to “fire fight” the issues 
arising from the spread of digital world and emergence of new business models rather 
than conceptually shaping the environment. 
The Wittem Code did contain a very short provision on remuneration, but only in 
relation to limitations, when at all payable. Such remuneration was, however, 
expected to be fair and adequate.94 
The existing EU law only knows explicit provisions on remuneration in relation to 
limitations as well. No reference to contract based remuneration is currently present 
in EU copyright law.  
While every person has their own notion of what is fair, it makes sense to start the 
search for fair compensation by providing some definition. Fair is something that is 
impartial, just, equitable95. This is the beginning of running in a circle. What is 
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equitable? The literature states that it is something which is just, consistent with 
principles of justice and right.96 What does that entail, we ask? Something that is fair? 
In the context of this work we may argue that fair means that every person receives a 
proportion of the proceeds arising in total from the utilisation of the work, such 
portion which reflects that person´s contribution to the creation, publication/ 
manufacture, distribution and collection of the proceeds throughout the whole 
creation and supply chain process for the entirety of the work´s life cycle. Therefore, 
fair remuneration for the creator should also take into account the publisher´s, 
intermediary´s and distributor´s participation on the financial success but at the same 
time should not be diminished in favour of their shares only because the creator is 
not in a position to negotiate a better deal. As, if it was not for the creator, the others 
would have nothing to exploit and thus profit from. But to conjure up a precise 
calculation on how to achieve such equilibrium is like chasing a Holy Grail. Many 
have tried but so far no one succeeded. 
 
3.1. Concept of fair compensation in the EU law prior to the Proposal 
It has been indicated above that, overall, this work is focused on compensation 
received by the creators based on contractual relationships with their transferees at 
the first stage of the rights transfer as depicted above in Figure 1.5. Therefore any 
remuneration collectively collected as a compensation for an exception, remuneration 
for rental, lending, transfer of rights to film producer etc., (even if resulting from the 
EU regulation), is not discussed more than by stating that these streams of 
remuneration need to be taken into account when assessing the extent of remuneration 
already received by the creator when evaluating whether remuneration already 
received was equitable and/or disproportionate to the proceeds generated through the 
use of a given work or fixed performance. 
But a short intermezzo will be made with respect to a case heard recently before the 
CJEU which deals with authors´ remuneration, more specifically with the question 
whether publishers can also be deemed authors and claim a portion of the funds 
collected on behalf of authors. The case has several aspects that are relevant for this 
                                                 




work. It provides judicial confirmation within the EU law that fair remuneration for 
creators is a paramount objective to incentivize creative efforts and thus well-
functioning market with creative content. In addition, it provides a signal that not 
everything concluded by the Court of Justice of the European Union is taken into 
account by the European legislator when drafting subsequent EU legislation. Such 
realisation can be both good and bad, depending on whether one hoped for a specific 
change or not. In this particular case, it seems that publishers will be happy that the 
Commission did not follow the earlier conclusions of the CJEU. 
 
3.1.1. Reprobel (and Luksan) cases 
The issue of fair compensation for authors (right-holders in general) was recently 
discussed before the CJEU in relation to fair compensation for reproduction and 
private copying exceptions under Article 5(2) of the InfoSoc Directive as applied in 
Belgium. In Hewlett-Packard Belgium SPRL v Reprobel SCRL97 several questions 
about whether the way the levy system for reprographic and private copies is 
designed in Belgium is compliant with the InfoSoc Directive were asked in the 
request for a preliminary ruling addressed by the Brussels Court of Appeal. 
3.1.1.1. Introduction 
Belgian copyright law stipulated that half of the remuneration for reprographic uses 
shall be distributed to the publishers (i.e. directed to the “publishers’ envelope”), 
while the other half is reserved for the authors (the “authors’ envelope”). However, 
there was no mechanism in the law to ensure that the authors benefit in any way from 
the amounts collected into the publishers’ envelope. The Belgian collecting society 
for reprographic uses (Reprobel)98 was under no obligation to transfer any of the 
funds from the publishers’ envelope to the authors. On the contrary, publishers 
claimed that - by signing publishing contracts - authors commonly assign their own 
right to fair compensation for reprographic and private copying (this in turn 
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increasing the part of the remuneration that should be given to the publishers).99 
A question arose whether this was consistent with the principles of copyright law in 
general and Article 5(2) of the InfoSoc Directive specifically. Copyright law (in the 
strict sense – excluding related rights) is linked to the freedom of authors to create 
and should primarily remunerate the creative authors, and should not primarily grant 
rights to persons other than the individual creators. The European Copyright Society 
(“ECS”)100, a “group of academics concerned about the copyright reforms envisaged 
in the EU as well as by the interpretation and development of the law by the CJEU”101, 
argues in their article102 that “[This] principle (the author principle) applies to the 
exclusive rights within the copyright bundle. It also applies to any right to 
remuneration provided by law to compensate for the exempted uses of copyright-
protected works. We believe that copyright is not the correct instrument by which to 
confer rights on legal entities to protect their investments.” They admit that there are 
instances when publishers or producers deserve to get an adequate protection, but 
such protection should derive either from the contracts concluded with the individual 
creators or by way of a related right granted by law. The ECS believes that the CJEU 
should “clearly reaffirm the important principle of initial authorship for creators”. 
The Cour d'appel de Bruxelles (Court of Appeal, Brussels) decided to stay the 
proceedings before it and to refer several questions to the CJEU for a preliminary 
ruling. While they all have practical significance, this assessment only focuses on the 
third one. The Brussels Court of Appeal asked103: 
“3. Must Article 5(2)(a) and Article 5(2)(b) of Directive 2001/29 be interpreted as 
authorising the Member States to allocate half of the fair compensation due to 
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rightholders to the publishers of works created by authors, the publishers being under 
no obligation whatsoever to ensure that the authors benefit, even indirectly, from 
some of the compensation of which they have been deprived?” 
 
3.1.1.2. Facts  
The company Hewlett-Packard Belgium (“HPB”) imports into Belgium reprography 
devices for home and business use, in particular ‘multifunction’ devices, whose main 
function is to print documents at speeds which vary depending on print quality, and 
which can also be used to scan and copy documents and to receive and send faxes. 
Those multifunction printers, which are at the heart of the case in the main 
proceedings, are sold at prices not usually exceeding EUR 100.104 
Reprobel SCRL is the collecting society responsible for the collection and 
distribution of the amounts in respect of fair compensation under the reprography 
exception.105 On 16 August 2004 Reprobel sent HPB a fax informing it that the sale 
of multifunction printers involved, in principle, the payment of a levy of EUR 49.20 
per device.106  The meetings arranged and correspondence exchanged with Reprobel 
not having enabled an agreement to be reached on the rates applicable to those 
multifunction printers, HPB, by notice of 8 March 2010, brought an action against 
Reprobel before the Tribunal de première instance de Bruxelles (Court of First 
Instance, Brussels). HPB sought, first, an order from that court to the effect that no 
remuneration was payable for the devices it had offered for sale or, alternatively, that 
the remuneration it had paid corresponded to the fair compensation payable under 
Belgian legislation, interpreted in the light of Directive 2001/29. It sought, secondly, 
an order that Reprobel should, within the year, on paying of a penalty of EUR 10 
million, perform a study consistent with that referred to in Article 26 of the Royal 
Decree of 30 October 1997, relating to, inter alia, the number of devices at issue and 
their actual use as copiers of protected works and comparing that actual use with the 
actual uses of any other devices for reproducing protected works.107 
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On 11 March 2010, Reprobel summoned Hewlett-Packard before the court so that 
the latter might be ordered to pay to Reprobel the provisional sum of EUR 1 towards 
the remunerative payments which Reprobel considered were owed pursuant to the 
Royal Decree.108 The Tribunal de première instance de Bruxelles (Court of First 
Instance, Brussels) joined those two sets of proceedings.109 By judgment of 16 
November 2012, the Tribunal de première instance de Bruxelles (Court of First 
Instance, Brussels) ruled that the first paragraph of Article 59 and the third paragraph 
of Article 61 of the LCRR (as defined below) were incompatible with EU law.110 
Hewlett-Packard and Reprobel have appealed against that judgment to the referring 
court.111 
 
3.1.1.3. Legal context 
EU law 
The preamble to the InfoSoc Directive states that “A fair balance of rights and 
interests between the different categories of rightholders, as well as between the 
different categories of rightholders and users of protected subject-matter must be 
safeguarded. …”112 and that “In certain cases of exceptions or limitations, 
rightholders should receive fair compensation to compensate them adequately for the 
use made of their protected works or other subject-matter. [ …] In cases where 
rightholders have already received payment in some other form, for instance as part 
of a licence fee, no specific or separate payment may be due. The level of fair 
compensation should take full account of the degree of use of technological 
protection measures referred to in this Directive...”113 
According to Article 2 of the InfoSoc Directive, 'Member States shall provide for the 
exclusive right to authorise or prohibit direct or indirect, temporary or permanent 
reproduction by any means and in any form, in whole or in part: (a) for authors, of 
their works; (b) for performers, of fixations of their performances; (c) for phonogram 
                                                 
108 Case C-572/13; Judgment (ECLI:EU:C:2015:750); [17] 
109 Case C-572/13; Judgment (ECLI:EU:C:2015:750); [18] 
110 Case C-572/13; Judgment (ECLI:EU:C:2015:750); [19] 
111 Case C-572/13; Judgment (ECLI:EU:C:2015:750); [20] 
112 InfoSoc Directive (2001/29/EC), Recital (31) 




producers, of their phonograms; (d) for the producers of the first fixations of films, 
in respect of the original and copies of their films; (e) for broadcasting organisations, 
of fixations of their broadcasts, whether those broadcasts are transmitted by wire or 
over the air, including by cable or satellite.' 
Further, Article 5(2) of the InfoSoc Directive provides: 
'Member States may provide for exceptions or limitations to the reproduction right 
provided for in Article 2 in the following cases: (a) in respect of reproductions on 
paper or any similar medium, effected by the use of any kind of photographic 
technique or by some other process having similar effects, with the exception of sheet 
music, provided that the rightholders receive fair compensation; (b) in respect of 
reproductions on any medium made by a natural person for private use and for ends 
that are neither directly nor indirectly commercial, on condition that the rightholders 
receive fair compensation which takes account of the application or non-application 
of technological measures referred to in Article 6 to the work or subject-matter 
concerned; 
And pursuant to Article 5(5) of that directive: 'The exceptions and limitations 
provided for in paragraphs 1, 2, 3 and 4 shall only be applied in certain special cases 
which do not conflict with a normal exploitation of the work or other subject-matter 
and do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the rightholder.'. 
Belgian law 
Article 1(1) of the Law of 30 June 1994 on Copyright and Related Rights (the 
“BCA”), in the version applicable to the dispute in the main proceedings ('the 
LCRR'), provides: 'The author of a literary or artistic work alone shall have the right 
to reproduce that work or to authorise its reproduction in any way or in any form, 
whether direct or indirect, temporary or permanent, in whole or in part.114 
Article 22(1) of the LCRR provides that “Once a work has been lawfully published, 
its author may not prohibit: ... (4.) the reproduction in part or in whole of articles or 
works of art or the reproduction of short fragments of other works fixed on a graphic 
or similar medium where such reproduction is intended for a strictly private purpose 
and does not adversely affect the normal exploitation of the work; (4a.) the 
                                                 




reproduction in part or in whole of articles or works of art or the reproduction of short 
fragments of other works fixed on a graphic or similar medium where such 
reproduction is intended for the purposes of teaching or scientific research, in so far 
as it is justified by the not-for-profit purpose for which it is carried out and does not 
adversely affect the normal exploitation of the work ...(5.) reproductions of sound 
and audiovisual works made within the family circle and exclusively intended for 
that circle.”115 
On the payment of the levies, Articles 59 to 61 of the LCRR state: (Article 59): ´The 
authors and publishers of works fixed on a graphic or similar medium shall be 
entitled to remuneration for the reproduction of such works, including under the 
conditions laid down in Article 22(1), items 4 and 4a ... The remuneration shall be 
made by the manufacturer, importer or intra-Community acquirer of devices 
enabling protected works to be copied, at the time when such devices are put into 
circulation on national territory.´ (Article 60): “Furthermore, proportional 
remuneration, determined by reference to the number of copies made, shall be owed 
by natural or legal persons who make copies of works or, where appropriate, in lieu 
of such persons, by those who, for consideration or free of charge, make a 
reproduction device available to others.” (Article 61): “The King shall fix the amount 
of the remuneration referred to in Articles 59 and 60 by decree … He shall specify 
the detailed arrangements for collecting, distributing and verifying such remuneration 
and the time at which it is due. Subject to international conventions, the remuneration 
provided for in Articles 59 and 60 shall be allocated in equal parts to authors and 
publishers. Subject to the conditions and detailed arrangements which He shall 
specify, the King shall entrust a company that is representative of all the rights 
management companies with the task of ensuring that remuneration is recovered and 
distributed…”116 
 
3.1.1.4. Advocate General´s Opinion 
Eventually, on June 11, 2015, Advocate General Pedro Cruz Villalón delivered his 
Opinion (hereafter in this subchapter as the “Opinion”) in HP Belgium v Reprobel 
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addressing the issue whether it is permissible for a national copyright law to allocate 
a portion of the fair compensation for reproductions exempted under Article 5(2)(a) 
and (b) of the 2001/29 InfoSoc Directive directly to publishers, although they are not 
listed among the initial holders of the reproduction right under Article2 of the InfoSoc 
Directive?  
The AG´s answer to this third question of the reference is generally welcome by the 
copyright law experts; not so much by the publishing industry. The AG opined: 
 “Article 5(2)(a) of Directive 2001/29 must be interpreted as precluding the Member 
States from allocating some of the fair compensation provided for in that provision 
to the publishers of works created by authors, without any obligation for the former 
to ensure that the latter benefit, even indirectly, from some of that fair compensation. 
However, Directive 2001/29 must be interpreted as not precluding the Member States 
from establishing remuneration specifically for publishers, intended to compensate 
for the harm suffered by the latter as a result of the marketing and use of reprography 
equipment and devices, provided that that remuneration is not levied and paid to the 
detriment of the fair compensation payable to authors under Article 5(2)(a) and (b) 
of Directive 2001/29. It is for the national court to carry out the necessary 
investigations in that regard.”117 
As regards the first part of the Opinion, i.e. the question of the allocation of the right 
to fair remuneration, the response proposed by the Advocate General largely 
acknowledges the “author principle” and, to that extent, the Opinion is welcome. 
However, by leaving too much freedom to the Member States, some aspects of the 
Opinion118 might create uncertainty. Specifically, there is a rejection of the view that 
Member States should be permitted to grant publishers a remuneration right as a 
related right as this would seriously reduce the harmonising effect of the InfoSoc 
Directive.119 The InfoSoc Directive prohibits a system which automatically 
distributes part of the fair remuneration for the reprographic or private copies of 
copyright works to anyone but the authors. There is no legal basis or justification 
under copyright law for allocating an exclusive right or a right of remuneration to a 
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person other than the individual creator. Rights comprised within copyright (or 
author´s rights) should first belong to the individual creators. This is fully in line with 
standard justification for copyright/author´s rights protection which is to reward the 
individual creators and/or incentivise those individuals to exercise their freedom to 
create. This is confirmed by the wording of Articles 2 (as cited above) to 4 of the 
InfoSoc Directive120, which grant the main economic rights to "authors".  
Admittedly, provisions of Articles 5(2)(a) and (b) of the InfoSoc Directive do not 
explicitly refer to the authors as the beneficiaries of the associated fair compensation. 
The provisions allow for the introduction of the reprography and private copying 
exceptions "provided that the rightholders receive fair compensation". It is worth 
noting, that the notion of right holder is not as such defined under EU copyright law, 
but neither is there a definition of "author". In line with the previously discussed basic 
"author principle" it is, however, legitimate to expect the primary beneficiaries be the 
authors as individual creators.121 Other “right holders” referred to in the InfoSoc 
Directive include the holders of related rights, i.e. performers, producers and/or 
broadcasting organisations. It is therefore argued that the notion of rightholder in 
Articles 5(2)(a) and (b) of the InfoSoc Directive should thus be interpreted as 
prohibiting a Member State from vesting in publishers the right to receive a share of 
the fair compensation.122 
The remuneration paid to the publishers in Belgium is qualified as a sui generis 
compensation that is adopted outside the scope of the InfoSoc Directive and pursues 
an objective relating to cultural policy. Scholars argue that there is no legal basis for 
that approach as no reference to an objective of cultural policy can be found in the 
text of the relevant Belgian provisions.123 The AG states that the InfoSoc Directive 
does not preclude Member States from establishing a right to “specific remuneration 
in favour of the publishers to compensate them for harm resulting from the marketing 
and use of reprographic devices”. In his opinion, this specific remuneration could 
exist "on the fringes" of the requirements of the InfoSoc Directive124, provided that it 
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does not negatively affect the fair compensation due to authors in accordance with 
Articles 5(2)(a) and (b) of the InfoSoc Directive125. But it is argued that any such 
special compensation mechanisms should be provided outside copyright law only 
(e.g. as a cultural supporting measure for the publishers in the book chain), and only 
if it does not negatively impact the authors’ fair compensation.126 
It is worth noting that the Term Directive127 allow Member States to maintain or 
introduce related rights for publishers. But in the long term, “such optional related 
rights are undesirable insofar as they create divisions within the Internal Market and 
render the law excessively complex” and “such a right might negatively affect what 
authors can obtain, as the fair compensation is arguably capped by the level of harm 
resulting from the exempted copies.” 128 
In reaction to the AG´s Opinion in Reprobel, the ECS argued that the CJEU should 
rely on its Luksan129 decision and thus solely confirm the first part of the Advocate 
General’s Opinion130 and reject the possibility of creating a related right for 
publishers. 
In Luksan case, the principal director of a film, "in his capacity of author of a 
cinematographic work", is one of the "right holders" under Article5(2)(b) and "must, 
consequently, be regarded as a person entitled by operation of law, directly and 
originally, to fair compensation payable under the private copying exception".131 
Similarly, film producer is "the person responsible for the investment necessary for 
the production of the work", and must be regarded as a "holder, by operation of the 
law, of the reproduction right" under Article 2(d) of the InfoSoc Directive.132 The 
court thus concludes that the producer can be considered a "right holder" of the fair 
compensation but suggests that (any other) right holder of the fair compensation 
should belong to the list of the initial beneficiaries of the reproduction right under 
Article 2 of the InfoSoc Directive. Entities which are not "holders by operation of 
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law" of a reproduction right arguably cannot be the initial beneficiaries of the fair 
compensation.  In addition, the court stipulates that in the Member States which have 
decided to establish the private copying exception, "the rightholders concerned must, 
in return, receive payment of fair compensation. It is clear from such wording that 
the European Union legislature did not wish to allow the persons concerned to be 
able to waive payment of that compensation to them".133 
The CJEU referred to the principle of effectiveness, i.e. the obligation for the law to 
achieve a certain result require that the fair compensation for the right holders is 
"actually recovered".134 A system allowing half of the remuneration for reprographic 
uses be automatically allocated to the publishers (who do not belong to the "holders, 
by operation of law" of a reproduction right under Article 2 of the InfoSoc Directive) 
is not compatible with EU law. In Luksan, the CJEU makes clear case in favour of a 
non-transferable right to fair compensation135. As such, the “claim of publishers to 
get half of the collected amounts could be founded on neither a presumed nor actual 
transfer of the right to fair compensation from authors; nothing suggests that the 
reasoning of the court, made under Article 5(2)(b) of the InfoSoc Directive for private 
copying in Luksan, could not be transposed to Article 5(2)(a) of the InfoSoc Directive 
for reprography in Reprobel.”136 
 
3.1.1.5. The Court´s judgement 
In respond to the third question by the referring court, as discussed in detail above, 
the court held that: 
“Pursuant to Article 5(2)(a) and Article 5(2)(b) of Directive 2001/29, 
the possibility for Member States to provide for the exceptions referred 
to in those provisions is subject to fulfilment by those States of their 
obligation to ensure that reproduction rightholders receive fair 
compensation.137 
However, publishers are not among the reproduction rightholders listed 
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in Article 2 of Directive 2001/29.138 
[...] 
It follows from the foregoing that the answer to the third question is that 
Article 5(2)(a) and Article 5(2)(b) of Directive 2001/29 preclude 
national legislation, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, 
which authorises the Member State in question to allocate a part of 
the fair compensation payable to rightholders to the publishers of 
works created by authors, those publishers being under no 
obligation to ensure that the authors benefit, even indirectly, from 
some of the compensation of which they have been deprived.”139 
It is therefore clear that the court was of the same opinion as the academics 
challenging the second part of the AG´s answer to the third question. The CJEU did 
not repeat the conclusion, formulated in the Opinion, that Member States are free to 
establish remuneration for reprography exception specifically for publishers, 
following its decision in Luksan140. 
 
3.1.1.6. Observations and comments 
It addition to other learning from the analysis of the Reprobel case, pertinent for this 
work, it is worth noting that despite the CJEU´s decision (as distinguished from the 
AG´s Opinion in the case) and the academic commentary, the Commission did 
eventually introduce in Article 11 of the draft DSMD publishers right to fair 
compensation, albeit for digital copies and applied without prejudice to any 
remuneration due to the authors and performers (and other rightholders listed in 
Article 2 of the InfoSoc Directive)141, however, with a claim to author´s share in fair 
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compensation where the right was transferred to the publisher142. 
The question raised by HP Belgium v Reprobel is also relevant in Germany, where 
the allocation rule between authors and publishers is not enshrined in the law, but in 
the statute of the relevant collecting society (VG Wort). In a case pending before the 
Federal Supreme Court (Bundesgerichtshof) during the proceeding in Reprobel, one 
individual author has challenged the lawfulness of the practice of VG Wort of 
allocating a portion of the moneys for reprographic uses to the publishers, in 
particular when the author has first mandated VG Wort to collect the money for 
reprography before signing individual publishing contracts. In the first instance, the 
Munich Regional Court143 held that publishers are not entitled to claim a 50% share 
of the money collected by VG Wort, relying inter alia on Luksan144. On 14 December 
2014, the Bundesgerichtshof decided to stay the proceedings until the CJEU had 
delivered its judgment in the HP Belgium v Reprobel case. In April 2016, following 
the Reprobel decision, the Federal Supreme Court held that German publishers are 
not entitled to half the copyright revenues that were traditionally gathered for many 
years by the collection agency VG Wort.145 This stirred a heated discussion, with the 
publishing industry claiming that this may cause bankruptcy of some publishers as in 
total German publishers are expected to return approx. EUR 300 million, collected 
and distributed based on the previous practice. Shortly after (September 14, 2016), 
the Commission introduced its Proposal for the DSM Directive, incl. Articles 11 and 
12. The issue is therefore still to be resolved. 
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3.2. The Proposal for the DSMD 
In September 2016, the European Commission released the Communication from the 
Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and 
Social Committee of the Regions Promoting a fair, efficient and competitive 
European copyright-based economy in the Digital Single Market146 together with the 
Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on copyright 
in the Digital Single Market147. 
The primary focus of the draft DSM Directive is digital environment and cross-border 
uses of content, but it also (one may argue somewhat unsystematically) deals with 
fair remuneration of authors and performers based on their contracts with transferees 
of their rights (i.e. primarily producers and publishers to whom the creators either 
assign – where possible – their rights, or grant licence to exploit their work or 
performance). 
In the Explanatory memorandum opening the DSMD proposal, the Commission 
states that the evolution of digital technologies has changed the way works and other 
protected subject-matter are created, produced, distributed and exploited.148 New 
uses have emerged as well as new actors and new business models. In the digital 
environment, cross-border uses have also intensified and new opportunities for 
consumers to access copyright-protected content have materialised.149 The 
Commission believes that even though the objectives and principles laid down by the 
EU copyright framework remain sound, there is a need to adapt it to these new 
realities. Intervention at EU level is also needed to avoid fragmentation in the Internal 
Market.150 Despite this proclamation, however, instead of rewriting of EU Copyright 
Law, the Commission does exactly what it wanted to avoid - provides some 
piecemeal tweaking in a few specific areas. 
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3.2.1. DSM Strategy and the path to the Draft DSM Directive  
This is the background against which the Digital Single Market Strategy151 was 
adopted in May 2015. DSM Strategy identified the need “to reduce the differences 
between national copyright regimes and allow for wider online access to works by 
users across the EU” and highlighted the importance to enhance cross-border access 
to copyright-protected content services, facilitate new uses in the fields of research 
and education, and clarify the role of online services in the distribution of works and 
other subject-matter.  
In December 2015, the Commission issued a Communication ‘Towards a modern, 
more European copyright framework’152, which outlined targeted actions and a long-
term vision to modernise EU copyright rules. The Proposal for the DSM Directive is 
one of the measures aiming at addressing specific issues identified in that 
Communication.153 
In addition to exceptions and limitations to copyright and neighbouring rights in the 
digital context as well as facilitation of cross-border access to works and other 
subject-matter, the Commission evaluates new business models emerging with 
evolution of digital technologies and strengthening role of the Internet as the main 
marketplace for the distribution and access to copyright-protected content.  
In this new framework, rightholders face difficulties when seeking to license their 
rights and wish to be remunerated for the online distribution of their works. This 
could put at risk the development of European creativity and production of creative 
content. It is therefore necessary to guarantee that authors and rightholders receive a 
fair share of the value that is generated by the use of their works and other subject-
matter.154  
Against this background, the Proposal claims to provide for measures aiming at 
improving the position of rightholders to negotiate and be remunerated for the 
exploitation of their content by online services giving access to user-uploaded 
content. And fair sharing of value is also necessary to ensure the sustainability of the 
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press publications sector, which has been significantly affected by “the shift from 
analogue to digital”. Press publishers are facing difficulties in licensing their 
publications online and obtaining a fair share of the value they generate.155 In order 
to prevent the citizens' limited access to information, the Commission proposes 
introduction of a new right for press publishers aiming at facilitating online licensing 
of their publications, the recoupment of their investment and the enforcement of their 
rights.  
Title IV of the propsed DSMD introduces measures aiming to achieve a well-
functioning marketplace for copyright. Articles 11 and 12 (i) extend the rights 
provided for in Articles 2 and 3(2) of the InfoSoc Directive to publishers of press 
publications for the digital use of their publications and (ii) provide for the option for 
Member States to provide all publishers with the possibility to claim a share in the 
compensation for uses made under an exception.156 Article 13 creates an obligation 
on information society service providers storing and giving access to large amounts 
of works and other subject-matter uploaded by their users to take appropriate and 
proportionate measures to ensure the functioning of agreements concluded with 
rightholders and to prevent the availability on their services of content identified by 
rightholders in cooperation with the service providers. Article 14 requires Member 
States to include transparency obligations to the benefit of authors and performers. 
Article 15, according to the Explanatory Memorandum157, requires Member States to 
establish a contract adjustment mechanism, in support of the obligation provided for 
in Article 14. One would expect it to be the other way round – transparency obligation 
being introduced to support the creators in their claim of additional fair remuneration, 
so it is probably only a matter of formulation of the Explanatory Memorandum. 
Article 16 requires Member States to set up a dispute resolution mechanism for issues 
arising from the application of Articles 14 and 15.158 
The Explanatory Memorandum states159 that “[…] authors and performers often have 
a weak bargaining position in their contractual relationships, when licensing their 
rights.” In order to rectify such status, the Proposal introduces in Article 15 so called 
                                                 
155 Explanatory Memorandum, COM(2016) 593 final, p. 3 
156 Compare to the conclusions of the CJEU and the AG in the Reprobel case discussed above. 
157 Explanatory Memorandum, COM(2016) 593 final, p. 10 
158 Explanatory Memorandum, COM(2016) 593 final, p. 10 




“best-seller” clause, i.e. a claim of author or performer to additional appropriate 
remuneration under specific circumstances. Because transparency on the revenues 
generated by the use of the creators´ works or performances often remains limited, 
which ultimately affects the remuneration of such creators, the Proposal includes 
measures to improve transparency and better balanced contractual relationships 
between authors and performers and those to whom they assign their rights.160  
Overall, the Commission expects the measures proposed in Title IV of the Proposal 
to have - in the medium term - positive impact on the production and availability of 
content and on media pluralism, to the ultimate benefit of consumers.161 It is not 
entirely clear from the Proposal, specifically its Explanatory Memorandum, how 
newly better protected – and remunerated – authors and performers will represent 
“ultimate benefit to the consumers”, however, one may suppose that this expectation 
relates more to the former provisions of Title IV, i.e. Article 11 of the DSMD, 
introducing protection of press publication concerning digital uses including claims 
to fair compensation162 (and thus supporting creativity (and investment?) in news 
publishing sector), and Article 13 dealing with certain uses of protected content by 
online services. 
 
3.2.1.1. Proposal´s fit within existing policy framework 
When assessing consistency of the Proposal with existing policy provisions in the 
policy area it is noted that the DSM Strategy puts forward a range of initiatives with 
the objective of creating an Internal Market for digital content and services.  
In December 2015, a first step has been undertaken by the adoption by the 
Commission of a proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the 
Council on ensuring the cross-border portability of online content services in the 
Internal Market163. This discussed Proposal for the DSM Directive aims at addressing 
several of the targeted actions identified in the Communication ‘Towards a modern, 
more European copyright framework’164. Other actions identified in this 
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Communication are covered by the ‘Proposal for a Regulation of the European 
Parliament and of the Council laying down rules on the exercise of copyright and 
related rights applicable to certain online transmissions of broadcasting 
organisations and retransmissions of television and radio programmes’165, the 
‘Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the 
cross-border exchange between the Union and third countries of accessible format 
copies of certain works and other subject-matter protected by copyright and related 
rights for the benefit of persons who are blind, visually impaired or otherwise print 
disabled’166 and the ‘Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the 
Council on certain permitted uses of works and other subject-matter protected by 
copyright and related rights for the benefit of persons who are blind, visually 
impaired or otherwise print disabled and amending Directive 2001/29/EC on the 
harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information 
society’167, adopted on the same date as the Proposal for the DSM Directive. 
The Proposal is noted to be consistent with the existing EU copyright legal 
framework. It is based upon, and complements the rules laid down in the Database 
Directive 96/9/EC168, InfoSoc Directive 2001/29/EC169, Rental Directive 
2006/115/EC170, Computer Programme Directive 2009/24/EC171, Orphan Works 
Directive 2012/28/EU172 and the CRM Directive 2014/26/EU173. These Directives, 
as well as the Proposal, “contribute to the functioning of the Internal Market, ensure 
a high level of protection for right holders and facilitate the clearance of rights”, and 
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the Proposal also complements Directive 2010/13/EU174 and the proposal175 
amending it.176 
 
3.2.1.2. Creators´remunaration on the Commission´s agenda 
To carry through all of the initiatives within the DSM Strategy is an enormous task 
ahead of the Commission and is certainly commendable. The connection between 
enforcement of this agenda and the need for EU-wide harmonisation of “fair 
additional remuneration” (as introduced in Article 15 of the DSMD Proposal) is, 
nevertheless, still not evident.  
It is only when looking in detail at the text of the DSM Strategy177 that one finds 
some connection to the issue of remuneration. Specifically, question of remuneration 
is mentioned in its Subsection 2.4. Better access to digital content - A modern, more 
European copyright framework, when it states that “[M]easures to safeguard fair 
remuneration of creators also need to be considered in order to encourage the future 
generation of content”. Further in Subsection 3.3. A fit for purpose regulatory 
environment for platforms and intermediaries (in section addressing Role of online 
platforms) it is stated that “[A]lthough their impact depends on the types of platform 
concerned and their market power, some platforms can control access to online 
markets and can exercise significant influence over how various players in the market 
are remunerated. This has led to a number of concerns over the growing market 
power of some platforms. These include a lack of transparency as to how they use the 
information they acquire, their strong bargaining power compared to that of their 
clients, which may be reflected in their terms and conditions (particularly for SMEs), 
promotion of their own services to the disadvantage of competitors, and non-
transparent pricing policies, or restrictions on pricing and sale conditions.” 
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Later on, in the Press Release dated December 9, 2015178 and accompanying the 
Communication  ‘Towards a modern, more European copyright framework’179, it is 
stated that “[O]verall, the Commission wants to make sure that Europeans can 
access a wide legal offer of content, while ensuring that authors and other rights 
holders are better protected and fairly remunerated. The key sectors of education, 
culture, research and innovation will also benefit from a more modern and European 
framework.” Further on, in the same document, when discussing creation of a fairer 
marketplace, it is assured that the Commission will assess if the online use of 
copyright-protected works, resulting from the investment of creators and creative 
industries, is properly authorised and remunerated through licences. The text further 
assures that the Commission will also analyse whether solutions are needed at EU 
level to increase legal certainty, transparency and balance in the system that governs 
the remuneration of authors and performers in the EU, taking EU and national 
competences into account.  
In the 2015 SAA180 White Paper181, it is stated that “To create an equitable European 
internal market it is essential that current disparities and unfair practices are addressed 
– and solutions found to ensure that authors of audiovisual works are fairly 
remunerated whenever and wherever their films and programmes are screened, 
distributed, transmitted and accessed.”182 The SAA represents a fairly strong lobby 
organisation with frequent meetings with the Commission. They could be one of the 
forces behind the inclusion of Chapter 3 of the DSMD Proposal. While the Draft as 
eventually introduced may present a compromise to what they want to achieve, in 
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180 The Society of Audiovisual Authors (SAA) was established in 2010 by European collective 
management organisations (CMOs) to represent the interests of their audiovisual author 
members and, in particular, screenwriters and directors. The establishment of SAA was 
prompted by a perceived need to enforce the legal position of writers and directors and to fight 
for a fair, transparent and harmonised system to remunerate European audiovisual authors for 
the digital use of their work. Such a system should ensure that all authors are fairly remunerated 
in line with the success of their films and programmes and, at the same time, allow for easy 
distribution of, and access to, works. This. In their view can be achieved by securing an 
unwaivable right of authors to remuneration for their online rights, based on revenues generated 
from online distribution and collected from the final distributor. This entitlement should exist 
even when exclusive rights have been transferred and would secure a financial reward for 
authors proportional to the actual exploitation of the works. See the SAA White Paper 2015, p. 
3. 
181 Audiovisual Authors’ Rights and Remuneration in Europe. SAA White Paper (2nd edn., Society 
of Audiovisual Authors, 2015) 




July 2017 their aim was getting closer to being achieved by the votes of the European 
Parliament´s Industry and Culture Committees (see in details in Chapter 6). 
Reading the documents and assertions above, one gets more and more the impression 
that the Commission wished to address the issue of overall fair compensation for 
authors and performers, with special emphasis on improving the situation with 
regards to remuneration for online uses. As such, the fact that the actual provision of 
Article 15 DSMD is drafted in a way that is traditionally in national legislations used 
only for a “bestseller” clause, not generally fair/equitable remuneration, seems to be 
less confusing. That is, if one supposes that the Commission wishes to right all 
wrongs related to adequate remuneration of authors only retrospectively and only in 
case works that become an actual best seller. But then a sardonic question may come 
to mind: Are only authors of best-selling works entitled to fair remuneration? It will 
be argued later that the Commission must have intended to provide protection to all 
authors and performers when it comes to their economic interests. It will also be 
argued that Article 15 should have been phrased slightly differently, taking example 
from some of the national regulation on this topic discussed later in Chapter 4. Such 
amendment, after all, was also frequently suggested by the MEPs and members of 
committees in the EU, discussing the Proposal. Details on the amendment proposals 
are provided in Subchapter 5.2. 
When quarrying further into the Communication ‘Towards a modern, more European 
copyright framework’183, some additional explanation is provided under the 
discussion related to the achieving a well-functioning marketplace for copyright. 
The Commission´s plan to achieve a well-functioning marketplace for copyright 
through remuneration for creators  
The Commission has asked a question how should authors and performers be 
provided additional protection through guaranteed remuneration for the use of their 
creations? It can be agreed that one precondition for a well-functioning market place 
for copyright is the possibility for right holders to license and be paid for the use of 
their content, including content distributed online.184 The Commission argues that the 
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production of rich and diverse creative content and innovative online services are 
equally important, and that both — creative content and online services — are 
significant for growth and jobs and the overall success of the internet economy. 
There is a growing concern though about whether the current EU copyright rules 
make sure that the value generated by some of the new forms of online content 
distribution is fairly shared, especially where right holders cannot set licensing terms 
and negotiate on a fair basis with potential users.  
According to the Commission, this situation is not compatible with the Digital Single 
Market’s ambition to deliver opportunities for all and to recognise the value of 
content and of the investment that goes into it. It also means the playing field is not 
levelled for different market players engaging in equivalent forms of distribution.  
There are both legal and market-related reasons (including the relative market power 
of the parties involved) for such unequality. From a copyright perspective, an 
important aspect is the definition of the rights of communication to the public and of 
making available as these rights govern the use of copyright-protected content in 
digital context. Their definition (which has proven to be extremly difficult and 
generates plethora of questions being referred to the CJEU for preliminary rulings) 
therefore determines what constitutes an act on the internet over which creators and 
the creative industries can claim rights and can negotiate licences and remuneration.  
In the Communication ‘Towards a modern, more European copyright framework’, 
Section 4 - Achieving a well-functioning marketplace for copyright, the Commission 
discusses how these questions create uncertainty in the market and put into question 
the ability of these rights to transpose into the online world the basic principle of 
copyright that acts of exploitation need to be authorised and remunerated. Such lack 
of clarity on the definition of these rights can also generate uncertainty for ordinary 
internet users. It also raises questions whether, for example,  news aggregators’ 
specific right should be introduced. The Communication also points out that 
platforms also consider that they are not engaging in copyright-relevant acts at all, or 




Directive.185 Such thinking prompted a debate on the scope of this exemption and its 
application to the fast-evolving roles and activities of new players, and on whether 
these go beyond simple hosting or mere conduit of content. 
All these concernes are subsequently addressed in the Proposal for the DSMD. They 
are not, however, relevant for the debate on Article 15 of the DSMD. It is only in the 
last paragraph of Section 4 of the Communication (Achieving a well-functioning 
marketplace for copyright) that it is stated: “[A]nother relevant issue is fair 
remuneration of authors and performers, who can be particularly affected by 
differences in bargaining power when licensing or transferring their rights. 
Mechanisms which stakeholders raise in this context include the regulation of certain 
contractual practices, unwaivable remuneration rights, collective bargaining and 
collective management of rights.” Yet again, this seems like an enormous mental leap 
from discussing the need to secure appropriate remuneration for each use within 
digital context (generation of any value/revenue permitting)  and what in the end 
came out from the Commission´s endeavours in Article 15 as a “best-seller clause”.  
Possibly, the underlying rationale for the best-seller clause in Article 15 of the draft 
DSM Directive (and its accompanying Articles 14 and 16) is that once (through the 
other measures adopted on the EU level within the DSM Strategy) it is secured that 
value is shared for all uses which generate any revenue fairly with the relevant 
stakeholders (but primarily the creators who – as opose to their transferees – do not 
have the bargaining strength to achive such result without the legislator´s help), such 
creators have a “statutory” claim with their (first) transferees (or their sub-
transferees) that enables them to participate addequately on any value generated by 
use of their works or performances. Such claim would be equally applicable for share 
in remuneration for online uses as well as for “traditional” revenue sources (e.g. sale 
of books, DVDs, etc.).  If that is the rationalle though, it has not been communicated 
adequately by the Commission (for example in the Explanatory Memorandum to the 
Propsed DSMD) and it is - as discussed below in this work – questionable if the 
objective is achievable through the current wording of Article 15 DSMD. After all, 
even in jurisdictions with very detailed copyright contract law provisions, such as 
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Germany, it may be difficult to determine who should pay the equitable remuneration, 
who generates it, what is in fact equitable in given scenario and industry for given 
form of use, etc. Given the complexities and uncertainties pertaining to value flow in 
these sectors, any legislator should aim to be as clear and comprehensive as possible. 
In the concluding remarks of Section 4 of the Communication186, it is stated that: 
 “The Commission is reflecting and consulting187 on the different factors 
around the sharing of the value created by new forms of online 
distribution of copyright-protected works among the various market 
players. The Commission will consider measures in this area by spring 
2016. The objective will be to ensure that the players that contribute to 
generating such value have the ability to fully ascertain their rights, thus 
contributing to a fair allocation of this value and to the adequate 
remuneration of copyright-protected content for online uses.  
In this context, the Commission will examine whether action is needed 
on the definition of the rights of ‘communication to the public’ and of 
‘making available’. It will also consider whether any action specific to 
news aggregators is needed, including intervening on rights. The role of 
alternative dispute resolution mechanisms will also be assessed. The 
Commission will take into account the different factors that influence 
this situation beyond copyright law, to ensure consistent and effective 
policy responses. Initiatives in this area will be consistent with the 
Commission's work on online platforms as part of the digital single 
market strategy. 
The Commission will also consider whether solutions at EU level are 
required to increase legal certainty, transparency and balance in the 
system that governs the remuneration of authors and performers in 
the EU, taking national competences into account.” 
The Proposal deals with all the issues outlined in the 2015 Communication. The first 
part of the problem is not subject of this discussion and it will be argued below that 
while such initiative is laudable and welcome, the part on remuneration of authors 
and performers could have been handled differently in order achieve its designated 
objective.  
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3.2.1.3. Consistency with other EU policies and legal basis for adoption of 
the DSMD 
The Proposal, as stated in its Explanatory Memorandum, would facilitate education 
and research, improve dissemination of European cultures and positively impact 
cultural diversity. The prposed DSM Directive is therefore consistent with Articles 
165, 167 and 179 of the TFEU. Furthermore, the Proposal contributes to promoting 
the interests of consumers, in accordance with the EU policies in the field of 
consumer protection and Article 169 TFEU, by allowing a wider access to and use of 
copyright-protected content. 188 
The Proposal is based on Article 114 TFEU, which confers on the EU the power to 
adopt measures which have as their object the establishment and functioning of the 
Internal Market. It is quite unquestionable that the Proposal has as its main objective 
functioning of the Internal Market with digital content and related issues. 
 
3.2.1.4. Subsidiarity (for non-exclusive competence) and proportionality 
The EU does not have an exclusive competence over all the issues dealt with in the 
Draft DSMD though. Specifically, the contract laws governing remuneration of 
authors and performes would normally be out of scope. But the Propsal states that 
authors and performers should enjoy in all Member States the high level of protection 
established by EU legislation. In order to do so and to prevent discrepancies across 
Member States, it is necessary to set an EU common approach to transparency 
requirements and mechanisms allowing for the adjustment of contracts in certain 
cases as well as for the resolution of disputes.189 
The Proposal is claimed to be proportionate as it will not affect retroactively any acts 
undertaken or rights acquired before the date of transposition, and the transparency 
obligation contained in the proposal only aims at rebalancing contractual 
relationships between creators and their contractual counterparts while respecting 
contractual freedom.190 
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3.2.1.5. Stakeholder consultations and collection and use of expertise 
On the path towards the publication of the Proposal, several public consultations were 
held by the Commission. The consultation on the review of the EU copyright rules 
carried out between December 5, 2013 and March 5, 2014191 provided the 
Commission with an overview of stakeholders' views on the review of the EU 
copyright rules, including on exceptions and limitations and on the remuneration of 
authors and performers.  
Later, the public consultation carried out between September 24, 2015 and January 
6, 2016 on the regulatory environment for platforms, online intermediaries, data and 
cloud computing and the collaborative economy192 supplied evidence and views from 
all stakeholders on the role of intermediaries in the online distribution of works and 
other subject-matter. Finally, a public consultation was held between the March 23, 
2016 and June 15, 2016 on the role of publishers in the copyright value chain and on 
the 'panorama exception'. This consultation allowed collecting views notably on the 
possible introduction in EU law of a new related right for publishers. In addition, 
between 2014 and 2016, the Commission had discussions with the relevant 
stakeholders on the different topics addressed by the proposal. 
More importantly, legal193 and economic194 studies have been conducted on the 
application of the InfoSoc Directive, on the economic impacts of adapting some 
                                                 
191 Reports on the responses to the consultation available on:  
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/consultations/2013/copyright-
rules/docs/contributions/consultation-report_en.pdf  
192 First results available on https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/news/first-brief-results-
public-consultation-regulatory-environment-platforms-online-intermediaries  
193 Study on the application of Directive 2001/29/EC on copyright and related rights in the 
information society: http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/copyright/studies/index_en.htm; Study 
on the legal framework of text and data mining: 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/copyright/docs/studies/1403_study2_en.pdf; Study on the 
making available right and its relationship with the reproduction right in cross-border digital 
transmissions: http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/copyright/docs/studies/141219-study_en.pdf; 
Study on the remuneration of authors and performers for the use of their works and the fixation 
of their performances: https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/news/commission-gathers-
evidence-remuneration-authors-and-performers-use-their-works-and-fixations; Study on the 
remuneration of authors of books and scientific journals, translators, journalists and visual 
artists for the use of their works: [hyperlink to be included – publication pending] 
194 Study “Assessing the economic impacts of adapting certain limitations and exceptions to 
copyright and related rights in the EU” : 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/copyright/docs/studies/131001-study_en.pdf and “Assessing 
the economic impacts of adapting certain limitations and exceptions to copyright and related 




exceptions and limitations, on the legal framework of text and data mining and on the 
remuneration of authors and performers. Unfortunately, the first economic study 
listed below does not consider remuneration of rightholder at all; the second one 
considers remuneration for uses falling under exceptions. Remuneration for contract 
based uses are not assessed in these studies. 
 
3.2.1.6. Impact assessment 
An impact assessment was carried out for this proposal (hereafter as the “Impact 
Assessment”)195. The Impact Assessment examines the baseline scenarios, policy 
options and their impacts for eight topics regrouped under three chapters, namely (i) 
ensuring wider access to content, (ii) adapting exceptions to digital and cross-border 
environment and (iii) achieving a well-functioning marketplace for copyright. The 
impact on the different stakeholders was analysed for each policy option. As regards 
fair remuneration in contracts of authors and performers, these options were 
considered:  
• Option 1 consisted in providing a recommendation to Member States and 
organising a stakeholder dialogue. This option was rejected since it would not be 
efficient enough; 
• Option 2 foresaw the introduction of transparency obligations on the 
contractual counterparts of creators.  
• Option 3 proposed on top of Option 2 the introduction of a remuneration 
adjustment mechanism and a dispute resolution mechanism.196  
It was Option 3 that was chosen since Option 2 would not have provided enforcement 
means to creators to support the transparency obligation. 
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The Impact Assessment mentiones under a driver called “weaker bargaining power 
of athors and performers in contractual negotiations” that the main underlying cause 
of this problem is related to a market failure: there is a natural imbalance in bargaining 
power in the contractual relationships, favouring the counterparty of the creator, 
partly due to the existing information asymmetry. The IA states that the difference in 
bargaining power can also create a "take it or leave it" situation for creators and 
therefore full “buy-outs” using catch-all language that covers any mode of 
exploitation without any obligation to report to the creator.197  
By the way this argument is constructed, it seems that the proposition is that by 
solving the “information asymmetry”, the balance of bargaining powers will be 
achieved. Ergo, by enacting the Transparency obligation, bargaining powers will be 
equal. However, the imbalance in negotiating positions happens way before the 
creator needs to have access to information about the extent of uses and revenues 
generated. The creator needs to strengthen their bargaining position when negotiation 
about the contract based on which the sufficient information is provided is taking 
place. Not after. 
The Impact Assessment provides a figure depicting the objectives of the Proposal 
with respect to “well-functioning market place”, provided below as Figure 3.2.1.6.  
 
Figure 3.2.1.6.: Objectives to ensure well-functioning digital market place 
 
                                                 




3.2.1.7. Cost assessment 
It was presented, when seeking simplification of existing models, that the sought after 
mechanisms aiming to improve licensing practices are likely to reduce transaction 
costs and increase licensing revenues for rightholders. SMEs in the fields (producers, 
distributors, publishers, etc.) as well as other stakeholders (such as VOD platforms) 
would be positively affected. The Proposal also includes several measures 
(transparency obligation on rightholders' counterparts, introduction of a new right for 
press publishers and obligation on some online services) that would improve the 
bargaining position of rightholders and the control they have on the use of their works 
and other subject-matter. The discussed mechanisms are expected to have a positive 
impact on rightholders' revenues. 
The Proposal includes new obligations on some online services and on those to which 
authors and performers transfer their rights which may impose additional costs. It is 
assertained in the Explanatory Memorandum198 of the Proposal that the costs would 
remain proportionate and that, when necessary, some actors would not be subject to 
the obligation. For instance, the transparency obligation will not apply when the 
administrative costs it implies are disproportionate in view of the generated revenues. 
As for the obligation on online services, it only applies to information society services 
storing and giving access to large amounts of copyright-protected content uploaded 
by their users. 
The Proposal foresees the obligation for Member States to implement negotiation and 
dispute resolution mechanisms, which implies compliance costs for Member States. 
In some cases, however, MSs could rely on existing structures thus limiting the costs.  
The Memorandum claims that the Proposal “ensures a balanced bargaining position 
between all actors in the digital environment.” In the light of the below debate, this 
claim seems to be somewhat bold. 
 
                                                 




3.2.1.8. Fundamental rights and the Proposal 
By improving the bargaining position of authors and performers and the control 
rightholders have on the use of their copyright-protected content, the proposal will 
have a positive impact on copyright as a property right, protected under Article 17 of 
the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (‘the Charter’). Such 
positive impact should be reinforced by the measures improving licensing practices 
(as contained in the fourth title of the Proposal) and thus ultimately improving 
rightholders' revenues.  On the other hand, new exceptions that reduce to some extent 
the rightholders' monopoly are justified by other public interest objectives. These 
exceptions are likely to have a positive impact on the right to education and on 
cultural diversity. These two public interests are deemed to be reasonably balanced 






3.2.2. The Proposal 
3.2.2.1.Subject matter and scope of the Proposal 
The Proposal lays down the subject matter and scope of the regulation by stipulating 
in Article 1 (1) that the (DSM) “Directive lays down rules which aim at further 
harmonising the Union law applicable to copyright and related rights in the 
framework of the Internal Market, taking into account in particular digital and cross-
border uses of protected content. It also lays down rules on exceptions and 
limitations, on the facilitation of licences as well as rules aiming at ensuring a well-
functioning marketplace for the exploitation of works and other subject-matter.”  
Except in the cases referred to in Article 6 of the DSMD199, the Draft DSM Directive 
leaves intact and in no way affects existing rules laid down in the Directives currently 
in force in the area of copyright, in particular Directives 96/9/EC (Database 
Directive), 2001/29/EC (InfoSoc Directive), 2006/115/EC (Rental Directive), 
2009/24/EC (Computer Programme Directive), 2012/28/EU (Orphan Works 
Directive) and 2014/26/EU (CRM Directive).200 
The objectives of the Draft DSM Directive, namely the modernisation of certain 
aspects of the European Union copyright framework to take account of technological 
developments and new channels of distribution of protected content in the Internal 
Market, cannot be sufficiently achieved by Member States but can rather, by reason 
of their scale, effects and cross-border dimension, be better achieved at EU level. 
Therefore, the EU adopts measures in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity 
as set out in Article 5 of the Treaty on European Union. In accordance with the 
principle of proportionality, as set out in that Article, the Draft DSM Directive does 
not go beyond what is necessary in order to achieve those objectives.201 
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3.2.2.2. Chapter 3 of the Propsed DSM Directive - Fair remuneration in 
contracts of authors and performers 
Title IV of the Proposal (Measures to achieve a well-functioning marketplace for 
copyright) provides in its Chapter 3 (Articles 14 – 16) provisions on fair remuneration 
in contracts of authors and performers. Proposed Article 15, the focal point of this 
thesis, introduces so called ´contract adjustment mechanism´, therefore the proposed 
Articles 14 – 16 will not be introduced chronologically here below. The provision of 
biggest interest here will be addressed first. 
Contract adjustment mechanism 
The focal point of this thesis and its hypothesis is provision of Article 15 of the Draft 
DSMD.  It stipulates that:  
“Member States shall ensure that authors and performers are entitled to request 
additional, appropriate remuneration from the party with whom they entered 
into a contract for the exploitation of the rights when the remuneration 
originally agreed is disproportionately low compared to the subsequent relevant 
revenues and benefits derived from the exploitation of the works or 
performances.” 202 
 
Recital (42) of the Draft DSMD states that certain contracts for the exploitation of 
rights harmonised at EU level203 are of long duration, offering few possibilities for 
authors and performers to renegotiate them with their contractual counterparts or their 
successors in title.204 Therefore, without prejudice to the law applicable to contracts 
in Member States, there should be a remuneration adjustment mechanism for cases 
where the remuneration originally agreed under a transfer of rights is 
disproportionately low compared to the relevant revenues and the benefits derived 
from the exploitation of the work or the fixation of the performance, including in light 
of the transparency ensured by this Directive.205 The assessment of the situation 
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should take account of the specific circumstances of each case as well as of the 
specificities and practices of the different content sectors.206 Where the parties do not 
agree on the adjustment of the remuneration, the author or performer should be 
entitled to bring a claim before a court or other competent authority.207 
Triggered presumably by the information provided under the transparency 
arrangement as described below, this is clearly of great potential significance (and 
cost) to publishers, as commented by Paul Herbert208. He asks many good questions 
which will be further discussed in the analytical Chapter 5: “Would an author’s 
royalties which are paid on a ratchet according to sales be vulnerable to being 
disproportionately low? Again it may be that these conventional arrangements are not 
sufficiently granular for the purposes of the EC’s proposals. Or would they only apply 
where the author has received a fixed fee rather than a royalty based payment? In any 
event they are certainly at variance with the UK’s long established freedom of 
contract principle. They also create many potential uncertainties, not least if the 
licensee has sold on the rights and no longer benefits from them. Would the right then 
attach to the sub-licensees?”209. Similar concerns were raised in Germany when the 
provisions on the strengthening of bargaining position of creators were being 
adopted. Unfortunately, while Germany does have very detailed regulation on 
copyright contract law, answers to all these questions are not known yet. Partially 
due to short time passed since the German legislation´s adoption and partially due to 
lack of reliable studies on the regulation´s impact. 
 
Transparency obligation 
In order to achieve fair remuneration in contracts of authors and performers, the 
Commission introduces in Article 14 of the Draft DSMD so called ´transparency 
obligation´, i.e. an obligation imposed on the transferees of rights to provide 
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information necessary for the creators to assess what may constitute, in the given 
case, fair remuneration.210 
The Proposal stipulates that Member States must ensure that authors and performers 
receive on a regular basis (and taking into account the specificities of each sector) 
timely, adequate and sufficient information on the exploitation of their works and 
performances from those to whom they have licensed or transferred their rights, 
notably as regards modes of exploitation, revenues generated and remuneration 
due.211 
Such obligation should be proportionate and effective and must ensure an appropriate 
level of transparency in every sector. However, in those cases where the 
administrative burden resulting from the obligation would be disproportionate in 
view of the revenues generated by the exploitation of the work or performance, such 
obligation may be adjusted by the Member States, provided that the obligation 
remains effective and ensures an appropriate level of transparency.212 Member States 
may also decide that such obligation does not apply when the contribution of the 
author or performer is not significant having regard to the overall work or 
performance.213 How does one determine whether the contribution of the creator is 
or is not significant without first employing a judiciary or arbitrary assessment is not 
explained. Or, are the transferees themselves allowed to assess whether such 
contribution is insignificant and in such case refuse to provide the information?  
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by Directive 2014/26/EU.” 
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Where a transparency obligation is imposed on the collective management 
organisations according to the CRM Directive214, Article 14 of the Draft DSMD will 
not apply and the CRM Directive will take precedence.215 
The Proposal stipulates that authors and performers need information to assess the 
economic value of their rights; this is especially the case where the creators transfer 
their rights in return for remuneration.216 As authors and performers tend to be in a 
weaker contractual position when they transfer their rights, they need information to 
assess the continued economic value of their rights, compared to the remuneration 
received for their transfer, but they often face a lack of transparency. Therefore, the 
sharing of adequate information by their contractual counterparts or their successors 
in title is important for the transparency and balance in the system that governs the 
remuneration of authors and performers.217 
When implementing transparency obligations, the specificities of different content 
sectors and of the rights of the authors and performers in each sector should be 
considered.218 The Commission suggests that the Member States should consult all 
relevant stakeholders as that should help determine sector-specific requirements. 
Recital (41) also admits that collective bargaining should be considered as an option 
to reach an agreement between the relevant stakeholders regarding transparency. To 
enable the adaptation of current reporting practices to the transparency obligations, a 
transitional period of additional 12 months is provided for219.  
Dispute resolution mechanism 
Article 16220 of the draft DSMD stipulates that Member States shall secure that 
disputes concerning the transparency obligation under Article 14 and the contract 
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adjustment mechanism under Article 15 may be submitted to a voluntary, alternative 
dispute resolution procedure.221 
Authors and performers are often reluctant to enforce their rights against their 
contractual partners before a court or tribunal. The Commission therefore feels that 
Member States should provide for an alternative dispute resolution procedure that 
addresses claims related to obligations of transparency and the contract adjustment 
mechanism as introduced in Articles 14 and 15 of the Draft DSMD.222 
While the provision of Article 15 is designed as a right to make a request, some 
commentators argue223 that Commission intends it to take this seriously since 
Member States would also be required to create this dispute resolution mechanism to 
deal with claims for additional fair remuneration. Equivalent provisions are already 
in force in Germany and the Netherlands and it seems to those commentators that the 
Commission in seeking to roll them out on a wider basis. 
 
3.2.2.3. Application and transposition provisions 
As far as transposition of the Draft DSMD is concerned, Member States will need to 
bring into force the laws, regulations and administrative provisions necessary to 
comply with the DSMD´s provisions within 12 months after its entry into force, 
which is 20 days after its publication in the Official Journal.224 This seems to be quite 
a short period given the document´s controversy and split of positions in general.225 
More importantly, Member States are often given longer period for adjustment; 
usually the more technically complex to transpose a Directive or the more onerous 
on various stakeholders to comply, the longer period provided.226 It the case of 
DSMD, one could argue the issue is more on the ´very complex´ side of the scale. 
                                                 
221 Article 16 Draft DSMD, COM(2016) 593 final 
222 Recital (43), Draft DSMD, COM(2016) 593 final 
223 Paul Herbert, ´EC Proposals for a directive on copyright in the digital single market. 
Implications for book publishers.´ <http://gdknowledge.co.uk/ec-proposals-for-a-directive-on-
copyright-in-the-digital-single-market/>, accessed June 2017 
224 Article 21 (1) Draft DSMD, COM(2016) 593 final 
225 As discussed for example in Ed Baden-Powell, Karim Amijee, ´European Commission proposal 
to modernise copyright´, Ent. L.R. 2017, 28(1), 9-12, 11 or Ted Shapiro, ´Legislative Comment: 
EU copyright will never be the same: a comment on the proposed Directive on copyright for the 
digital single market (DSM)´, E.I.P.R. 2016, 38(12), 771-776 
226 Within the more recent issues in copyright law field it was, for example, approximately 18 




The DSMD will apply in respect of all works and other subject-matter which are 
protected by the Member States' legislation in the field of copyright on or after 
transposition deadline227 but without prejudice to any acts concluded and rights 
acquired before such date228. Therefore, in order to maintain legal certainty, 
provisions of the DSMD (incl. Article 15) will not apply retrospectively for works 
and performances (and dealings with them) that are out of copyright protection, but 
creators can rely on the protection provided through Title IV, Chapter 3 of the DSMD 
as regards new contracts for exploitation of works and performances that are still 
protected. With respect to contracts concluded prior to the effective date of the 
DSMD, Article 18 (3) should be read as meaning that such exploitation contracts 
cannot be challenged. 
The Transitional Provision stipulates that agreements for the transfer of rights of 
creators shall be subject to the transparency obligation in Article 14 as from one year 
after the transposition deadline.229 In addition, the obligation does not apply to 
agreements concluded with collective management organisations as those are already 
subject to (stricter) transparency obligations under CRM Directive.230 
 
  
                                                 
Database Directive (Directive 96/9/EC); approximately 24 months for the CRM Directive 
(Directive 2014/26/EU) and the Orphan Works Directive (Directive 2012/28/EU); and even 
around 50 months for the Resale Right Directive (Directive 2001/84/EC). 
227 Article 18 (1) Draft DSMD, COM(2016) 593 final 
228 Article 18 (3) Draft DSMD, COM(2016) 593 final 
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3.2.3. Conclusion to Chapter 3.2 
Since this chapter primarily focuses on Title IV of the Proposal (Measures to achieve 
a well-functioning marketplace for copyright provides in its Chapter 3 (Articles 14 – 
16) and as such does not provide sufficient overview of the overall impact of the 
Proposal, not more than the issue of the Contract adjustment mechanism should be 
evaluated. There is more commentary and overview of the acceptation of the draft 
provided in Chapter 5, but just one comment for all is mentioned. 
The 2014 Creators´ Contracts Study231 stipulates that so-called “best seller clauses” 
should in principle benefit the authors, but in practice these clauses are not very useful 
as judges are often reluctant to modify contracts and prefer to respect the principle of 
contractual freedom of the parties as they wish to avoid creating legal uncertainties. 
Another factor that works against actual application of these clauses is the fact that 
authors are hesitant to start legal proceedings before the courts, as they are afraid of 
damaging their relations with the transferee. “232 
Therefore, given that it has been admitted that best-seller clauses do not work that 
well, and seeing that in the current version of the Proposal there is nothing more to 
secure fair contract-based remuneration for creators, this brings some scepticism 
about whether the Draft DSMD will fulfil its goal. 
As already mentioned, more resentment, however, is focused on other provisions than 
the “best-seller” clause anyway. Commentators often question the EU´s competence 
to introduce the publishers’ right or proportionality of the proposed measures.233 
It seems there is a lot of debate and work to be done ahead of us on all the fronts.
                                                 
231 Described below in more detail 
232 The 2014 Creators´ Contract Study, p.40 
233 Ana Ramalho, ´Beyond the cover story - an enquiry into the EU competence to introduce a right 
for publishers, IIC 2017, 48(1), 71-91, p. 89 
3.3. Studies addressing copyright and contract law, and remuneration in the EU 
Many studies have been conducted in the past few years on the interplay between 
copyright and contract law, economic aspects of copyright law, remuneration of creators 
in various sectors. The four below mentioned studies are chosen due to several factors: 
they have been conducted relatively recently, they include various Member States (and 
more) and thus represent a wider sample for study than just the three jurisdictions 
examined in more detail in this thesis, and they have been commissioned (except for the 
first one) by the European bodies in preparation (or at least expectation thereof) of the 
documents presented as part of the Digital Single Market Strategy, mainly the draft DSM 
Directive.  
The goal here is not to repeat all the analysis and conclusions made in those studies but 
to choose those parts which are most relevant for the present analysis and compare them 
(in a hindsight) to the “final” provisions (in as much as they can be final at this stage of 
the European legislative process) of the Proposal. Many of the aspects discussed in those 
studies were eventually reflected in some of the other documents forming the DSM 
Strategy. In the below discussion, these aspects are not evaluated due to limited scope 
and length of this thesis, although it may bring further interesting realisations.  
 
3.3.1. The  2010 SABIP Study 
The relationship between copyright and contract law was evaluated in quite a detail in a 
study called “Relationship between Copyright and Contract Law”234, a research 
commissioned by the Strategic Advisory Board for Intellectual Property Policy 
(SABIP)235 in 2010 and carried out by a group of copyright and economics academics236. 
While there may be some bias present in the study, it has been chosen to be discussed 
here to provide some background information, despite not directly affecting the 
preparation of the DSMD, because it was conducted in cooperation with experts in 
                                                 
234 Further in this sub-chapter the „SABIP Study“ or where context evident, the “Study”. 
235 A body providing the UK Government with strategic, independent and evidence-based advice on 
intellectual property policy. The body only stayed in existence between 2008 and July 2010 when its 
responsibilities were transferred to the Intellectual Property Office. Despite some reservations 
against their work, the SABIP´s main contribution to the field laid in steering the debate regarding 
the interface between IP in practice and the policy considerations that should drive it in future; 
claiming IP reform should be evidence-based. As repeated many times in this thesis, hard evidence 
is very scarce to back or counter any claims made in this thesis 
236 Martin Kretschmer, Professor of Information Jurisprudence, Director, Centre for Intellectual 
Property Policy & Management, Bournemouth University; Estelle Derclaye, Associate Professor & 
Reader in Intellectual Property Law, School of Law, University of Nottingham; Marcella Favale, 
Postdoctoral researcher, University of Nottingham; Richard Watt, Associate Professor, Department 
of Economics, Canterbury University (NZ) 
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economics, which provides additional dimension to its findings. The research primarily 
deals with English law. In the national Chapter 4.3. some finding of this Study are also 
mentioned in the context of applicable copyright law. 
The Study was conducted with the aim to address the supply-and-demand-side issues in 
creative industries237. On the supply side, policy concerns include whether copyright law 
delivers the frequently proclaimed goal of securing financial independence of creators.238 
But the complaints that they fail to benefit from the dramatic increase of availability of 
digital forms of copyright materials come from both creators and producers.239 On the 
demand side, the issue of copyright exceptions and their policy justification has become 
central to a number of reviews and consultations dealing with digital content. Are 
exceptions based on user needs or market failure? Do exceptions require financial 
compensation? Can exceptions be contracted out by licence agreements? In addition to 
creators´ contracts, the Study also looks at users contracts and all these issues are to some 
extents addressed by the Draft DSMD. In the following paragraphs, only the conclusions 
relevant for this thesis – creators´ contracts with their transferees - will be addressed.  
The Study found that under the standard economic conception of property rights, it is 
copyright law that allows contracts to be written: copyright law defines the characteristics 
of the work and the property rights in the work – the contract space. The core 
methodological problem was found to lie in how to conceptually distinguish the role of 
statutory copyright in contractual arrangements. The study worked with two simple 
examples. In one, a literary author assigned in a typical contract the copyright in a work 
to a publisher, against an advance and a royalty on copies sold. In the other example, a 
professional footballer is bound by a typical contract to play exclusively for the club 
against a signing-on fee and salary payments that depend on appearances and success. 
The former is a typical copyright contract, the latter a contract not based on a right defined 
by statute. Yet, their commercial features look a lot like each other.240 
                                                 
237 The SABIP Study, p. 2 
238 Such as stated in Recital 11 of the InfoSoc Directive ‘A rigorous, effective system for the protection 
of copyright and related rights is one of the main ways of ensuring that European cultural creativity 
and production receive the necessary resources and of safeguarding the independence and dignity 
of artistic creators and performers.’ 
239 In a survey of 25,000 British and German literary and audio-visual writers conducted in 2006, only 
14.7% of UK authors and 9.2% of German authors claim to have received specific payments for 
Internet uses of their works. For audio-visual authors the figures are even lower (UK: 11.1%, 
Germany: 6.9%). See M. Kretschmer, P. Hardwick, Authors’ Earnings from Copyright and Non-
Copyright Sources: A Survey of 25,000 British and German Writers, Report published by 
Bournemouth University, UK; Centre for Intellectual Property Policy & Management (CIPPM); 
(216pp) December 2007, p. 32. 
240 The 2010 SABIP Study, p. 3 
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Looking at copyright contract through economics optics, one would expect copyright law 
to affect contracts, depending on time preferences; risk, and risk aversion; outside and 
inside options; and the extent of asymmetric information between the parties - but there 
is no evidence that this is empirically the case. The important finding in the Study 
therefore is that a major research gap is how a change in copyright law will affect the 
bargaining outcome between parties contracting over material protected by copyright 
law241. Will the proposals to change the shape of European copyright law have the 
requested effect? Will they solve the imbalance in bargaining power? It does not seem 
we have the answer to this question yet. The changes to EU copyright law were proposed 
irrespective of the economists’ criticism and it remains to be seen “who was right”? 
Creator contracts - contract bargaining 
Cultural markets are winner-take-all markets. They are very risky for both creators and 
investors. The data obtained for the Study indicate that the top 10% of creators receive a 
disproportionally large share of total income in the creative professions (for literary 
authors about 60-70% of total income; for composers/songwriters about 80% of total 
income).  For most other creators, ‘portfolio lives’ are typical. That means that about two 
thirds of professional creators have earnings from a second job and the income of creators 
is overall well below the national242 median income. “Unsurprisingly, the bargaining 
outcome over rights is tilted towards bestsellers. Creators with a track record of success 
are able to negotiate contracts that preserve their interests. For most others, in particular 
new entrants to the entertainment industries, assignment of rights is common.”243  The 
Study thus confirms the premise on which this thesis is based – at the beginning of their 
creative (and bargaining) cycle, creators are most vulnerable and need most support. 
However, the Study claims that mechanisms of collective bargaining (such as through 
unions, professional associations and collecting societies) seem to have a greater effect 
than statutory (ownership) rights because the latter, typically, will be varied and/or 
transacted by contract. This would back up the view that, as English law stands now, 
copyright law (specifically the statutory part, dealing mainly with transfers and 
ownership) does not provide any support for “new-joiners” of the creative sphere. Later, 
in relation to the UK, there are some suggestions provided how this could be dealt with 
within common law or equity. And if the DSMD still gets to form part of the English law 
                                                 
241 Ibid 
242 The Study was conducted in the UK, for the purposes of UK Government. Therefore any reference 
to national etc. has to be read correspondingly. 
243 The 2010 SABIP Study, p. 4 
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(if transposed before Brexit244 and through Great Repeal Bill incorporated into English 
law, or Brexit for some reason does not take place) the proposed “best-seller” clause may 
provide some help. 
Creator contracts - current range of regulatory tools 
The Study identifies several regulatory tools in regulation of copyright contracts in other 
jurisdictions that attempt to balance the bargaining powers of the parties. The provisions 
identified relate to ownership; requirements of form; scope of rights transferred; rights to 
remuneration; effects on third parties; revision and termination; and unfair contracts. 
More or less identical tools were recognized in the other studies discussed later.  The 
Study then in detail provides several methodological suggestions how regulatory tools 
could be assessed if there was a policy decision taken to adjust the bargaining outcome 
between creators and investors. The options identified included intervening in situations 
of non-exploitation; strengthening rights that cannot be transferred (such as the right to 
be credited as the author); and privileging instruments of collective bargaining, etc. It 
was noted that regulating contracts would create potential inefficiencies.245 Given that 
this Study was provided to the Government in 2010 and the law in this respect has not 
changed, it is safe to say that balancing bargaining powers through regulatory tools did 
not become a priority. Now the Government will have to deal with the issue due to the 
Commission’s Proposal. One can expect reluctance with its transposition, similarly as 
was the case with remuneration for private copying. 
The Study also examined effects of certain rules on creators’ contract in the UK. 
Systematically, it makes more sense to deal with these issues in the chapter specific to 
English law. The effect of rules on first ownership, on moral rights, on rights to 
remuneration, and rules on reversionary term have on creators´ contracts is therefore 
explored in Chapter 4.3. 
In the section dedicated to Research gap II: Normative aims of contractual regulation, the 
Study also looked into the notion of Fairness from the economic point of view. It states 
“that economists regard copyright law in terms of its ‘efficiency’ effects in providing an 
incentive to increase creative output rather than in terms of equity. There may not be an 
inherent clash between these views but economics has a much less developed view of 
                                                 
244 The draft DSMD has by the time of submission of this work gone through the first stage at the 
European Parliament and is now with the Council of Ministers. If the Council finds the proposals 
unobjectionable the Directive is likely to become effective within the two year notice period which 
the UK is required to give in order to achieve Brexit. However, it will still be for the UK to decide 
whether or not it wishes to implement the Directive by means of enacting domestic legislation. 
245 The 2010 SABIP Study, p. 5 
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fairness than of efficiency. On the specific notion of fairness that is often invoked in 
policy discussion about creator and user contracts, there are a number of questions that 
need to be explored, relating to economic, legal and moral notions of fairness. How 
should ‘fairness’ be defined for the context of copyright contracts? Are existing contracts 
really ‘unfair’? Do alternative contracts, within the current copyright law, exist that 
would be perceived as being ‘fairer’? If they do exist, do those contracts sacrifice 
efficiency? To what extent does any perceived ‘unfairness’ depend upon copyright law? 
Can copyright law be altered in order that the balance of bargaining positions be changed 
and the resulting contracts are ‘fair’?”246 As evident, for economists the balance of 
bargaining power is more about efficiency than fairness. But the argumentation of the 
European legislator goes along the line that if copyright contracts are not induced to be 
fairer, they will – mid to long-term – seize to be efficient either as there will not be 
sufficient incentive to create and put the content “out there”. It is safe to say that everyone 
would be satisfied in copyright transfer contracts were both, fair and efficient.  
  
3.3.2. 2014 Creators´ Contracts Study 
“Contractual arrangements applicable to creators: Law and practice of selected Member 
States“247 is a study requested by the European Parliament's Committee on Legal Affairs 
and the manuscript was completed and presented by the European Parliament´s 
Directorate General for Internal Policies (Policy Department C: Citizens´ Rights and 
Constitutional Affairs, Legal Affairs) in January 2014 (herein after as the “2014 Creators´ 
Contracts Study“, or the „Study“ in this specific sub-chapter). The Study was conducted 
by a group of academics led by Séverine Dusollier, CRIDS (University of Namur), with 
national reports contributors being copyright specialists from seven EU Member States. 
The resulting report discusses the legal framework applicable to copyright contracts as 
well as the practices in artistic sectors in Belgium, France, Germany, Hungary, Poland, 
Spain, Sweden, and the UK. The authors conducted a careful revision of the copyright 
provisions, contractual law principles and case law in these 8 Member States.  These 
provisions and principles are presented together with a more specific analysis of a set of 
issues such as collective bargaining, digital exploitation, imbalanced contracts, and 
reversion rights, etc. A set of recommendations aiming at improving the level of fairness 
in copyright contracts is proposed at the end of the Study. While the Study´s primary 
                                                 
246 The 2010 SABIP Study, p. 9 
247 The document is available at: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/studies (accessed July 2017) 
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focus is not remuneration, its relevance for this thesis due to the focus on „fairness in 
copyright contracts“ is undisputable. This study has been accepted as helpful also by the 
practitioners because not only it shows the various problems in the framework of digital 
exploitation, but also illustrates the legal difference in the individual Member States 
handling with this topic.248 
Objective of the Study 
After creation of a work, an author will transfer copyright over the work to a publisher or 
producer to exploit the work commercially and thus secure the author access to the 
market.  While such contracts can contribute to securing financial autonomy of creators, 
granting them some remuneration, if imbalanced in favour of the undertakings exploiting 
the works, such contracts may fail to provide a fair share in the financial return deriving 
from the exploitation of the work. The Study evaluates the rules and legal provisions 
applicable in the European Union that intend to protect creators in their contractual 
dealings. European harmonisation on legal provisions related to creators’ contracts had 
not been under way at the time of the Study249, the matter has been left to national laws 
which differ enormously, from very detailed provisions to non-existent ones. This is 
discussed in more detail in the national chapters in Chapter 4. Before analysing the 
relevant national legal provisions offering protection to creators, including both specific 
provisions of national copyright laws and the general principles of contract law, the Study 
considers the context of the exploitations of works and of the contractual relationships 
pertaining thereto. Part of the Study is devoted to the analysis of some specific issues 
where the author might appear to lack protection and assesses the efficiency of the legal 
protection in practice in particular contexts. These issues include digital exploitation, 
rights reversion, imbalance between the waived rights and envisaged exploitation, 
contractual waiving of rights to remuneration, collective management of transferred 
rights in audiovisual works, dual licensing. These issues are not specifically examined in 
this thesis but are reflected in the conclusions and recommendation of the 2014 Creators´ 
Contracts Study and through that also affect the findings of this work. 
The Study emphasises that copyright contract concluded between the creator and the 
transferee will govern their relation all the way from the negotiation of the contract to its 
                                                 
248 Study of the European Parliament on the Protection of Creator's Rights in a Changing Environment´, 
White & Case, accessible at <www.whitecase.com/ publications/article/study-european-parliament-
protection-creators-rights-changing-environment>, published 26 February 2016, accessed June 2017 
249 The first attempt to do so is by way of the draft DSM Directive and only to the extent as relates to 
transparency obligation and fair additional remuneration, which does not seem to be sufficient. 
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execution and termination. Protection of creators is necessary at each stage of the 
contract: during the negotiation, to counterbalance her weaker position and lack of 
information; during the exploitation of the work, to guarantee the creator his/her fair 
remuneration and control over the enforcement of the contract, if needed; in the 
termination of the contract, to enable the author to get out of an unfair deal.250 
The authors of the Study point out that throughout all these stages of the contract’s life, 
remuneration of the author should have a prominent importance. The Study, however, 
also acknowledges, that whether the creator effectively gets a fair share of the revenues 
of his/her work along the whole value chain will strongly depend on elements other than 
the first contract. The first transferee of the copyright will enter into contractual 
relationships with subsequent exploiters (broadcasters, retailers, on-line platforms, video-
on-demand providers, etc.), in which authors will have no say. This is further impacted 
by the intervention of collective management organisations which will also try and secure 
some fair remuneration for their authors in some modes of exploitation. The balance 
achieved in the contract between creators and publishers or producers should be 
considered in this bigger context. 
The Study then examines in detail legal provisions protecting the author in copyright 
contracts. Specifically, the Study examined in the context of national laws of the 7 
countries (i) restrictions related to the form of transfer of rights, (ii) form requirements, 
(iii) determination of the scope of rights, (iv) determination of remuneration, (v) 
obligations of the parties251, (vi) interpretation of contracts, (vii) Termination of contract, 
(viii) transfer of contracts, (ix) rules applying to some types of contracts252, and (x) 
specific types of contracts253. Specifics of these measures are explained for most of them 
above, in the Contextual Chapter 2.  
The Study emphasises, that there is lack of harmonisation and great disparities in the 
application of the existing rules, from legal regimes with very detailed provisions to 
regimes favouring higher degree of contractual freedom. In relation to rules on 
remuneration, the Study emphasises that it is essential to provide some fair participation 
                                                 
250 The 2014 Creators´ Contracts Study, p. 7 
251 An obligation to exploit the work is sometimes imposed to the transferee, but not always or in all 
types of contracts. 
252 examined specific rules of Member States for works created under employment and for commissioned 
works that are less favourable towards the author and give employers and commissioners more rights 
to exploit the works created by their employees. 
253 publishing contracts or contracts of production of audio-visual work, are regulated by more specific 
contractual provisions where the rights and obligations of the author and transferee have been 
detailed more precisely in the law 
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of the author in the revenues of his/her creation, however, it is also noted that while such 
rules exist in many countries, they sometimes do not prove efficient in practice to secure 
fair remuneration to creators. This is the case of the Czech Republic, for example, as 
explained later. Czech copyright law has several measures discussed above implemented 
but in reality they do not secure sufficient protection for creators. 
Authors of the Study also evaluated some general principles of contract law, such as the 
principles of good faith, fairness and equity; usages; rules of interpretation;  defect of 
consent and other conditions for the formation of contract; legal provisions on unfair 
terms; undue influence, unconscionability, and restraint of trade; and revision of contract 
given unforeseen circumstances and concluded that specific protective rules, that take 
adequate consideration of the contractual position of creators, should be preferred over 
general contractual principles not tailored to address the creators' need of protection.254 
Collective agreements as another tool to protect creators were also considered, 
specifically looking at German and French models, and it was concluded that collective 
negotiations and agreements have many assets, as they can help all creators to get a 
balanced bargain when transferring their rights, but there is one – important though -  
limit: they cannot determine the remuneration due to the creator or the tariffs for the 
exploitation of works, as this might be against competition law. 
This examination, as well as discussion over specific legal issues, such as digital 
exploitation, rights reversion, imbalance between scope of waiving and exploitation, 
contractual waiving of rights to remuneration, transfer of rights in audiovisual works and 
collective management, and dual licensing, led the authors of the Study to the following 
conclusions and recommendations. 
The overall, rather alarming but surely not surprising, conclusion is that the existing 
contractual protection of creators, as included in copyright law and, indirectly, in general 
contract law, appears to be insufficient or ineffective to secure a fair remuneration to 
creators or address some unfair contractual provisions. 
Considering all aspects, including new emerging issues, such as the increasingly dynamic 
markets for exploitation, notably digital markets, and the fact that the contract between 
the publisher/producer and the creator is only but one element in a web of contractual 
relationships and revenues streams, the team suggested that the following issues are 
addressed by the European institutions in search for a harmonised approach to balancing 
                                                 
254 The 2014 Creators´ Contracts Study, p. 10 
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bargaining powers and securing fair remuneration to creators even in changing, digital 
driven, environment. 
For the avoidance of losing some meaning in summarising and paraphrasing the 
recommendations, the text is provided in verbatim below: 
“In conclusion, the following recommendations are made by the present study:255 
1. The real contractual nature of copyright contracts should be restored: authors 
agree on some reciprocal bargain in which effective exploitation and fair 
remuneration are the counterparts for the transfer of copyright. This 
contractual bargain would justify: 
i. The imposition of minimal formalities in contracts transferring 
copyright, such as written form and the mandatory determination of the 
exact scope of the transfer and of the due remuneration. 
ii. The imposition of an obligation of exploitation for each mode of 
exploitation that has been transferred, allowing authors to get their 
rights back for any mode of exploitation not pursued by the publisher 
or producer. 
iii. Reporting obligations, that is, the obligation to detail on a regular 
basis the modes of exploitation undertaken and the revenues yielded by 
all exploitations, imposed on first transferees but also on other content 
providers and exploiters in order to enable the author to have a broader 
understanding of the financial flows related to her work and her actual 
share in its economic exploitation. 
iv. The introduction of an unfair terms model in copyright law to balance 
the contractual bargain between the creator and the transferee. By 
analogy to consumer protection, such a scheme would preclude “black” 
terms (determined in the law) as well as any provision causing a 
significant imbalance in the parties' rights and obligations arising under 
the contract to the detriment of the author. 
2. Authors deserve some fair remuneration for all exploitations made of their 
works, which would justify: 
i. The drafting of an economic study on the remuneration of authors as 
well as further research on the impact on competition law on the 
admissibility of collective agreements. 
ii. The imposition of the determination of a fair remuneration of the 
author in the contract for each mode of exploitation, clarifying its mode 
of calculation and, if proportional, the types of revenues on which it will 
be based. 
iii. Obligations of transparency and reporting of financial streams and 
revenues related to the exploitation of works. 
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114 
 
iv. A principle of unwaivability of the right to equitable remuneration 
or fair compensation. 
v. The enactment of other unwaivable rights to remuneration, notably 
for some kinds of digital exploitations. 
3. The dynamic process of copyright contracts should guide the protection of 
authors in copyright law, in order to effectively protect the author at all stages 
of the contractual process (from the negotiation, exercise, enforcement, to the 
termination of contract). That would justify: 
i. The validity of transfer of rights for unknown forms of exploitation, 
upon the condition of a fair remuneration of authors and with the 
possibility of rights reversion. 
ii. The limitation in time of contracts transferring copyright from an 
author to a publisher or producer, including the possibility of some 
renegotiation or clause of revision (for the author) in consideration of 
the evolution of the modes of exploitation, of business models or models 
of consumption of works. 
iii. A general principle of reversion of the rights transferred to enable the 
authors to terminate a contract, namely in case of lack of exploitation, 
lack of payment of the remuneration foreseen as well as lack of regular 
reporting. 
iv. Some manoeuvre for dual licensing to enable authors to develop non- 
commercial exploitation. 
v. Fostering a European dialogue among stakeholders towards more 
flexible contracts and exchange of best practices. 
4. The protection of authors regarding their contractual relationships could 
further rely on collective agreements, management and enforcement: 
i. Collective agreements or model contracts should be encouraged to 
secure a fair protection and remuneration of authors in individual 
contracts. 
ii. Collective actions should be allowed, namely by representatives of the 
authors, to act on a collective basis, particularly in the case of adhesion 
contracts, including by setting up collective mechanisms of alternative 
dispute resolution and mediation procedures. 
iii. Education and awareness of creators should be developed to better 
inform authors and enhance their bargaining position.” 
 
After having introduced the provisions of the Draft DSMD in the previous subchapter, it 
is evident that not all the recommendations could the European legislator take into 
account. Some of them may have been addressed in the other proposals resulting from 
the roll-out of the DSM Strategy, but there are some that – if implemented – should have 
formed part of the DSMD agenda. The emphases on this omission is given here, because 
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in the concluding chapter of this thesis it is argued that some of these measures should 
have been introduced by the Proposal to achieve its goal – fair remuneration for creators 
for overall exploitation of their creations in “digital-driven” environment. 
From the above introduced recommendations, the reporting obligation set out in point 
1.iii and 2.iii has been introduced in the Proposal (Article 14). The Commission also 
conducted economic studies on the remuneration of authors as suggested in point 2.i 
(discussed further below), and provided for a dispute resolution mechanism (Article 16 
DSMD). The most important recommendation relating to “fair remuneration for all 
exploitations made” (point 2. above) made, i.e. to impose a determination of a fair 
remuneration of the author in contract for each mode of exploitation (2.ii) has not been 
introduced. Instead, an obligation to introduce a bestseller clause has been imposed on 
Member States. Neither of the other measures that could have supported creators in their 
negotiations has been adopted. Principle of reversion or a limitation in time with 
possibility to renegotiate256 would have been also helpful. 
Many of these tools already exist in Germany, which arguably, is the most advanced 
jurisdiction in terms of strengthening creators´ bargaining position. In the conclusions 
therefore it is suggested that more example should be taken from the German copyright 
legislation if the goal set by the Commission truly is to be achieved. 
 
3.3.3. The 2015 EU Remuneration Study 
“Remuneration of authors and performers for the use of their works and the fixations of 
their performances”, is a study prepared for the European Commission DG 
Communications Networks, Content & Technology by Europe Economics and Lucie 
Guibault, Olivia Salamanca and Stef van Gompel at the Institute of Information Law 
(Instituut voor Informatierecht) of the University of Amsterdam257 (hereafter in this 
subchapter only as the “Study”) for the purposes of the Digital Single Market agenda 
(part of) evaluation in 2015. 
The Study analysed the current situation regarding the level of remuneration paid to 
authors and performers in the music and audio-visual (AV) sectors and compared, from 
                                                 
256 Introduced recently in Germany in relation to exclusive exploitation contracts and discussed in more 
detail below. 
257 European Union (2015), Internal identification: Contract number MARKT/2013/080/D; SMART 
2015/0093, ISBN 978-92-79-47162-9 (the “2015 EU Remuneration Study”) 
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both a legal258 and economic perspective, the existing national systems of remuneration 
for authors and performers and identified the relative advantages and disadvantages of 
those systems for them. Moreover, it also explored the need to harmonise mechanisms 
affecting the remuneration of authors and performers, and to identify which ones are the 
best suited to achieve this. The Study also examined potential impact of such models on 
distribution models and on the functioning of the Internal Market. In its conclusion, the 
Study outlines a series of policy recommendations based on the analysis conducted. 
These recommendations will now be examined in the light of the final Proposal of the 
DSMD and it will be discussed whether the Commission took those recommendations on 
board and to what extent. Before that, some of the analysis made in the Study is discussed 
below. 
The Study focused specifically on lyricists, composers, songwriters (lyricist and 
composer) as authors within the music industry and at both, featured artists and session 
musicians representing performers in the sector. In relation to the AV sector, the authors 
of the Study considered remuneration of principal directors, screenwriters, composers of 
music for film or television (authors), as well as TV and film actors. Therefore, the 
“sample” of creators considered is considerable large and should therefore provide a 
useful data259. 
                                                 
258 The current legal framework was analysed through the “eyes” of a mixture of scholars and practising 
lawyers in each of the ten countries under study (Denmark, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, 
Lithuania, Poland, Spain, UK and the US). The countries were chosen to reflect differences in 
regulatory approaches and existing regional idiosyncrasies and the team prepared a questionnaire 
focused on legal framework of each country from both a contract law (lex generalis) and copyright 
law (lex specialis) perspective. It also focused on the actual contractual practice in each country and 
whether such practice was aligned or not with the law.  
  The study looked into the remuneration regulation and practice in the UK and Germany, both 
jurisdictions under scrutiny of this thesis and thus the outcome appears to be particularly relevant. 
Czech Republic was not considered, however, Hungarian copyright and contract law and practice 
formed part of the analysis. Since – as explained later in the national chapter – the legal history and 
tradition in Hungary is very similar to the one in the Czech Republic, including the fact that 
Hungary is also one of the few MS adhering to the so-called quasi-dualistic doctrine of author´s 
rights, the conclusions achieved in relation to Hungary can be applicable to large extent for Czech 
copyright law and practice as well. 
259 Authors of the Study, however, pointed out (p. 7 of the Study) that in search for primary data on 
remuneration, contract terms, and characteristics of creators, they developed an online survey in 
consultation with DG Internal Market which was uploaded onto the EU Survey platform and was 
distributed to authors and performers in the 9 EU Member States studied via CRMOs and unions 
which offered to assist in the research. Despite all efforts to obtain useable data, the data was not in 
the end representative of all authors and performers in the countries covered by this study, there was 
a significant scope for bias in the responses and it was observed by the Study team that there were 
missing values and a lack of internal consistency in a number of responses. A similar lack of 
consistent findings was deemed apparent also in the econometric analysis. As such the team did not 
rely on the collected data when defining their policy recommendations. 
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The Study concludes260 that copyright (author´s rights) and related rights have been 
relatively well harmonised in European law and that all the Member States considered in 
the Study grant authors an exclusive, transferable (to various degree) right of 
reproduction, a right of communication to the public, including the right of making 
available, and a distribution right; all in conformity with the InfoSoc Directive.261 The 
Study also provides some insight into the nature and implications of exclusive rights 
versus the so-called remuneration rights.  
One very important conclusion of the Study is that it “appears that the general provisions 
of contract law play a very limited role in granting support to authors and performers in 
the negotiation of exploitation agreements and the determination of the level of 
remuneration”.262 General contract law in each of the countries may affect the way a 
contract is interpreted or executed, but it generally does not influence the outcome of the 
negotiation on the transfer of rights or on the remuneration that is due for such transfer 
or the uses of the work or fixed performance agreed. But the Study confirms that because 
authors and performers are traditionally seen as the weaker party to contractual 
negotiations, some Member States263 have implemented in their copyright legislation 
several mandatory provisions on the formation, execution and interpretation of authors’ 
and performers’ contracts. Within the Member States, there is a whole scale of variations 
between such protective solutions and full contractual freedom. 
The differences also exist outside the strictly legal framework. Authors and performers 
often organise themselves into unions or freelance associations where enabled by local 
regulation. These unions and associations frequently negotiate model exploitation 
contracts with representatives of the industry. However, these trade unions and 
associations of authors and performers have not been set up in all Member States. And 
even where they have been set up, the form and the degree of collective action differ. The 
unions and associations play different roles in the negotiation as well as enforcement of 
creators´ contracts. 
                                                 
260 The 2015 EU Remuneration Study, at p. 4 
261 Some differences in the national implementation of the EU acquis, particularly with respect to the 
existence or the exercise of the rights conferred on authors and performers under the Rental 
Directive and the Satellite and Cable Directive, as well as with respect to certain performers’ rights 
under the InfoSoc Directive can be tracked, but the variations in legislation can be attributed to the 
options left in the acquis for the implementation of EU law by the MSs.  However, some differences 
are the result of conscious decisions on the part of the national legislator to go beyond the minimum 
harmonisation in the acquis. 
262 The 2015 EU Remuneration Study, at p. 4 
263 France, Germany and Spain to be named out of those addressed in the Study 
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CRMOs can also – to some extent - play a role in establishing the level of remuneration 
received by authors and performers, but the importance of this role differs by right holder, 
sector and Member State.264 In general though, CRMOs are deemed to operate in the 
interest of their members, e.g. authors, performers. However, as with any “blended” 
solution, tariffs or T&Cs arranged by the CRMOs may not always, in specific cases, be 
as good (and fair) as the arrangement the creator could have secured based on individual 
licensing. 
There is a whole range of mechanisms available in contract or copyright law to provide 
support to authors and performers, with a various degree of impact on remuneration. for 
authors and performers. The Study outlines the following principal legal elements to be 
taken account of: (i) the structure of the rights conferred by the law (i.e. the ownership 
and the nature of the rights – exclusive or remuneration rights); (ii) the existence of 
statutory provisions to protect authors and performers as weaker parties to a contract; and 
(iii) the use of collective bargaining and role of trade unions and associations.265 
As explained in Chapter 2.3 with regards to stakeholder mapping, supply chains and 
payment flows in the music and AV sectors involve a number of players. They will, in 
addition, vary by types of authors and performers and across Member States. 
Nevertheless, two important insights for the determination of authors’ and performers’ 
remuneration have been provided by the Study. Firstly, in most cases the level of 
remuneration that authors and performers earn depends on the contract negotiated with 
their “first transferee”, i.e. the publisher or producer, in exchange for a transfer of their 
exclusive rights. The second realisation is that the complexity of supply chains and the 
associated payment flows is more often than not very difficult for creators to fully 
understand. It makes it difficult to grasp adequately the sources of and rights associated 
with the remuneration they receive.266 This is a common theme mentioned in many of the 
relevant studies and, more importantly, addressed, to certain extent, in the Proposal. The 
Commission aims to improve the visibility over the payment flows by introducing the 
transparency obligation into the draft DSMD267. It is, however, argued later in this work 
that in order to help the creators to get better oriented in the supply chains (or better yet, 
shift this burden onto the first transferees, who are better equipped to do so), Article 15 
of the Proposal (the Contract adjustment mechanism) should be amended in order to 
                                                 
264 The 2015 EU Remuneration Study, at p. 4 
265 The 2015 EU Remuneration Study, at p. 5 
266 The 2015 EU Remuneration Study, at p. 5 
267 Article 14 of the Proposal, discussed in more detail above. 
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enable the creators to request (additional) fair remuneration from their first transferees 
for any uses of their creations exploited through contracts concluded at any point 
throughout the supply chain. 
The level of remuneration of authors and performers will also depend on additional 
factors. A simplified chart was introduced by the Study, representing an overview of the 
process by which remuneration received by authors and performers is determined, and 
which identifies the key influences on their remuneration (expectations for the value of 
the work, bargaining power, the contractual expectations or norms, and the legal 
framework in place). Emphasis of each of these influences will always depend on the 
legal framework of given Member State, such as rules on the form of payment, 
availability of collective bargaining, exclusive/non-exclusive nature of rights, 
waivable/non-waivable character of rights, and rules on transfers of rights. Below is the 
figure reproduced exactly as provided in the Study. 
 











Source: Europe Economics. 
 
                                                 




The following three key findings were presented in the Study (not relying on the primary 
data obtained through the on-line survey due to its inconsistency).269 
Transparency 
The Study concluded that there is a lack of transparency of the remuneration 
arrangements in the contracts of authors and performers in relation to the rights 
transferred. They found the payment flows in the music industry particularly complex 
and emphasise that the differences in the national implementation of the cable 
retransmission right, the right of making available and the rental right pose noticeable 
cross-border transparency problems. According to the Study, the absence of information 
on which to base an estimate of likely earnings in different Member States undermines 
the ability of authors and performers to effectively exercise their freedom of movement 
across jurisdictions and has an adverse effect on the functioning of the Internal Market. 
There is a clear trace of attempt to tackle this issue with the Draft DSMD, as described 
below, mainly through its proposed Article 14. 
Scope of transfer 
It is undisputable that many authors and performers (such as those new to the industry) 
are in a weaker bargaining position than others. Problems arise if they get locked into 
long-lasting agreements with unfavourable terms, especially if later on they become 
successful. The development of new modes of exploitation plays important factor. In 
order to help creators, prevent these unfavourable situations, some Member States 
regulate the transfer of rights relating to forms of exploitation that are unknown or 
unforeseeable at the time the contract was concluded, as well as the transfer of rights 
relating to future works and performances. This is similarly non-harmonized though as 
the rest of the topics discussed. It is therefore interesting to see that, despite several 
indications in the studies available to the Commission, including this Study, that this is 
one of the reasons why the bargaining positions of creators across the EU differ so much 
(and as a result their remuneration negotiation options vary), the Commission did not 
chose to address this area in the Proposal. Whether this was because of the Commission´s 
conviction that this specific challenge does not impact the free market with creative 
content, or, because of acknowledgement that opening this issue would have to lead to 
opening plethora of other connected issues, remains to be discussed later. 
                                                 
269 The 2015 EU Remuneration Study, at p. 8 
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Role of trade unions and freelance associations 
As will also be demonstrated later in Chapter 4 in the national chapters, in some Member 
States collective action by trade unions and associations (or CRMOs) play an important 
role (especially for authors and performers in the audio-visual sector). Unions and 
associations provide support with negotiation of remuneration agreements (directly or 
through involvement in preparing and promoting model contracts), and can also help 
enforcing agreements. The problem is that unions and associations of authors and 
performers do not exist in all Member States. Or, somewhere they have been set up only 
for some categories of authors and performers. Yet again, this issue not only has not been 
addressed in the Proposal by, for example, introducing provisions like those present in 
German copyright law (discussed below), but there is even a lack of reference to already 
achieved agreements in the remuneration provision (“Contract adjustment mechanism”) 
of the Draft DSMD, which can make the provision problematic for interpretation even 
before being adopted. 
Policy recommendations 
The team preparing the Study developed five principal policy recommendations. They 
suggested that for some of the issues identified, an EU-wide approach may be needed.270 
This would apply mainly where there is a specific Internal Market issue. For the other 
recommendations, policy intervention at the national level may also be effective. 
The suggested Policy options outlined by the Study are: 
• Policy 1: Specify remuneration for individual modes of exploitation in the contracts 
of authors and performers. 
• Policy 2: Improve the cross-border transparency of the national systems. 
• Policy 3: Limit the scope for transferring rights for future works and performances 
and future modes of exploitation. 
• Policy 4: Create a more conducive environment to support the role of trade unions, 
freelance associations and CRMOs when they fulfil similar functions. 
• Policy 5: Facilitate the exercise of the right of making available. This policy option 
effectively represents a fall-back in the event that the other policies fail to protect 
authors and performers sufficiently and is broken down into three possibilities: 
▪ Voluntary collective management of the right of making available. 
                                                 
270 The 2015 EU Remuneration Study, at p. 9 
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▪ Unwaivable right to obtain equitable remuneration from the 
producer/publisher. 
▪ Unwaivable right to equitable remuneration administered by a CRMO. 
The Study further suggest that a full impact assessment is conducted on any policies 
considered (to properly assess the costs and benefits of different options and the potential 
for unintended consequences that may distort the market). Impact Assessment conducted 
in relation to the Draft DSMD is discussed in detail below in this Chapter 3. 
Based on the initial high-level evaluation, the Study further recommends considering in 
more detail the Policy options 1 to 3.  
Option 1, harmonised requirement for the specification of remuneration for individual 
modes of exploitation in the contracts of authors and performers, has not been specifically 
reflected in the Draft DSMD. The Proposal does not envisage a requirement of the 
provision of written contracts to have remuneration for individual rights broken down by 
mode of exploitation. 
Policy option 2, relating to the ability of authors and performers to understand whether 
or not they are likely to be better off by working in a different country, has – to some 
extent – been addressed in the Proposal by way of Article 14 DSMD, addressing the 
Transparency obligations. 
Policy option 3 suggests harmonised limits on the scope for transferring rights for future 
works and performances and future modes of exploitation. This option relating to the 
ability of authors and performers to limit the scope of any rights transfer so as to prevent 
them being locked into less beneficial contracts for long periods has not been addressed 
either by the Commission in the DSMD proposal. Provisions such as these, however, 
represent one of the most frequent, and arguably effective, provisions on strengthening 
the position of creators in their contract negotiations. It is demonstrated later in the 
German national chapter how these provisions can help creators deflect the producers’ 
and publishers´ attempts to obtain all the possible rights for their benefit (and ideally for 
a relatively low lump sum). 
The Study recommended conducting more detailed research to understand fully the 
impact of Policy options 4 and 5 would have on the remuneration of authors and 
performers.  
The Study emphasises a remark that also seems to be a common theme throughout the 
studies conducted on the interplay between copyright law, contract law and remuneration 
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standards – a need to consider the relevance of any policy proposal for the different types 
of authors and performers and the different industries. In addition, the conclusion of the 
Executive Summary of the Study271 suggests that consideration must be given to 
countries where similar practices are already in place so that the design of the policy does 
not entail unnecessary and potentially costly changes. 
Arguably, this consideration is given to those practices by way of relatively vague 
language of the proposed articles of the draft DSMD so that the current laws and practices 
in Member States where any mechanism is in place do not need to be changed; such MSs 
will simply notify the Commission of compliance with the said provisions.  Still, it is 
argued later in the concluding chapter that some adjustment of the wording may be 
advisable. 
 
3.3.4. The 2016 Print Remuneration Study 
In September 30, 2016 the Commission made public another “remuneration study”, 
called “Commission study on remuneration of authors of books and scientific journals, 
translators, journalists and visual artists for the use of their works”272, which is a follow-
up study to the 2015 EU Remuneration Study on the remuneration of authors in the music 
and audio-visual sector discussed in detail above (hereafter the “2016 Print Remuneration 
Study” or the “Study” in this sub-chapter). The Study looks at the remuneration paid to 
authors in the print sector in ten EU countries273. The Commission is looking for evidence 
on whether, and to what extent, the differences that exist amongst the Member States' 
legislative frameworks affect levels of remuneration and the functioning of the Internal 
Market. Equally as the previous study, the 2016 Print Remuneration Study concluded that 
the issue of authors' remuneration, and more broadly the copyright contracts establishing 
this remuneration, is largely governed by national laws of the Member States. As the 
                                                 
271 The 2015 EU Remuneration Study, at p. 9 
272 European Commission DG Communications Networks, Content & Technology by Europe 
Economics and Lucie Guibault, Olivia Salamanca at the Institute of Information Law (Instituut voor 
Informatierecht) of the University of Amsterdam, European Union (2016), Internal identification: 
Contract number MARKT/2014/088/D1/ST/OP; ISBN 978-92-79-54131-5  (the “2016 Print 
Remuneration Study”), in full available here: 
http://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/dae/document.cfm?action=display&doc_id=17026, executive 
summary available here: 
http://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/dae/document.cfm?action=display&doc_id=17027 (both accessed 
July 2017) 




Commission reminds us, fair remuneration of individual creators – authors and 
performers – is part of the Commission's Digital Single Market Strategy. 
The Study, conducted for the Commission by Europe Economics Ltd and the Institute for 
Information Law at the University of Amsterdam, compares, from legal and economic 
perspectives, the existing national systems affecting the remuneration for authors and 
performers and identifies the relative advantages and disadvantages of those systems for 
them.  
Key findings relate to three areas of copyright and contract laws: (i) obligations on the 
scope of the transfer, (ii) formalities, obligations and corrective measures, and (iii) model 
contracts and collective bargaining agreements. 
Obligations on the scope of transfer 
“The protective measure with the greatest positive effect on the contractual position and 
the remuneration of authors relates to the obligation imposed on those to whom the rights 
are transferred to specify the scope of the transfer (in geographical scope, duration and 
modes of exploitation) together with the corresponding remuneration. This requirement 
would ensure greater transparency, strengthen the position of the author and promote 
more effective competition.”274 
Formalities, obligations and corrective measures 
“An array of other measures exist in the laws of the Member States that relate either to 
the requirement of formalities at the time of formation of the contract, or to obligations 
regarding the execution (e.g. “non-usus” or “best-seller” clauses) and the termination of 
the contract. These measures also contribute to strengthening the position of authors in 
their contractual relationships.”275 
Model contracts and collective bargaining agreements 
“The use of model contracts developed as a result of negotiations between 
representatives, and collective bargaining agreements (including by CRMOs), was also 
identified as having a potentially significant impact on remuneration. The study outlines 
a series of policy options where intervention at EU or national level may be effective. 
The first policy option is the specification of individual modes of exploitation and the 
respective remuneration by introducing certain binding, legal requirements such as the 
requirement for written contracts (dependant on MS contract legislation), specifying 
                                                 
274 The 2016 Print Remuneration Study, at p. 6 
275 The 2016 Print Remuneration Study, at p. 7 
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which rights and modes of exploitation are being transferred, specifying the level and 
type of remuneration attached to each mode of exploitation and a reporting obligation 
vis-à-vis the author. The focus of this policy option is to increase transparency regarding 
the scope of transfer of rights, the modes of exploitation and the terms of payment which 
should in turn help to reduce the information problem faced by authors and could thereby 
improve their bargaining position. Other policy recommendations include limiting the 
scope for transferring rights for future modes of exploitation and future works and 
exploring issues related to potentially allowing economically dependent freelancers to 
claim employee status and rights.”276 
While the issue of transparency is addressed in the Proposal, the limitation of scope of 
transfer has not been covered by the text of the DSMD. As explained later in relation to 
the German chapter, such limitation is one of the very important measures available to 
creators. At the beginning of their carrier, when they are inclined to accept a “bad deal”, 
at least they would not be able to give away rights which do not even exist yet at the point 
of the conclusion of the negotiations. In Czech civil law, as surely is the case in most civil 
law jurisdictions, there is a principle that “one cannot transfer more (rights) than they in 
fact have”. Any such transfer would be null and void from the outset. Adopting similar 
approach into the copyright contract rules across Europe may help strengthen the 
creators´ position in their bargaining. Pressure from their first contract partners to transfer 
“everything” would not be very fruitfully as such transfers would be null and void. 
The Study emphasises that the inconsistencies in the laws governing contractual 
arrangements between authors create the risk of segmenting the Internal Market. Authors 
who operate in multiple Member States may be at a disadvantage in Member States where 
the legal framework provides them with less certainty and confidence as to their 
bargaining position and contractual rights than in others, with authors based in those 
Member States, and likely to be more familiar with the practical outworking of such rules, 
having an advantage.  
In addition, the Study admits, the presence of different legal frameworks provides 
publishers with scope for “jurisdiction shopping” when choosing the country’s laws 
under which authors’ contracts are to be enforced. The Study than warns that this may 
tend to create scope for regulatory arbitrage. This is exactly an argument made later in 
this thesis in relation to German legislation.  
                                                 
276 The 2016 Print Remuneration Study, at p. 7 
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It is quite unfortunate that this Study was not available sooner to the Commission; that 
is, before the Proposal for the DSMD was made public. Clearly, some of the key findings 
might have impacted the final wording of Articles 14 and 15 in a way that is suggested 
in the concluding chapter of this thesis. On the other hand, it may be possible that the 
Commission was already aware of the needs for improvement (after all, the numerous 
preceding studies providing very similar conclusions were available when the Proposal 
was being drafted) but for reasons not allowed to be publicly conceded decided not to 
reflect the findings in the wording of the DSMD Proposal. Reasons can vary from strong 
lobby of certain interest groups, need of compromise within the European structures, to 
lack of law-making competence and willingness to interfere with national contract laws, 
accompanied by the reluctance of national legislators to allow the EU to enter this zone. 
This, after all has been the reasoning behind many previous attempts to harmonize 
(copyright) contract law and can be found in the conclusions of studies conducted on this 
topic in the past.277 
 
3.3.5. Conclusion to Chpater 3.3 
There are some more studies and reports created in the past 15 years that touch upon 
some of the issues addressed in this thesis. But the above discussed ones were chosen 
because they are either most up-to-date, primarily cover the main area of this work – how 
to improve creators´ bargaining positions so that they achieve fair reward, or were created 
as part of the DSM Strategy analysis, which makes them particularly relevant for this 
work. 
The conclusions from each of the studies are considered when proposing the amendments 
of Article 15 DSMD in the final chapter. 
 
                                                 
277 See for example the L. Guibault, P.B. Hugenholtz: Study on the Conditions Applicable to Contracts 
Relating to Intellectual Property in the European Union, Study commissioned by European 




















4.1.1.1.Historical background and justification 
Introduction 
Germany follows a civil law tradition where law is primarily based on statutes, 
although academic and judicial opinions are capable of influencing court decisions.278 
Nevertheless, when analysing any legal issue, the starting point is the applicable 
statutory law. After a brief excursion in the historical development of copyright law 
and detailed description of the statutory provisions, some recent cases will be discussed 
to see how courts interpret and apply the legislation.  
Historical development  
Medieval perceptions of human creations were “mere mediations between god and 
man, whereby the act of creation emanated from divine forces rather than human 
ingenuity”279. The emergence of wood carving art and similar techniques coincides 
with the invention of the printing press in the mid fifteenth century, when the necessity 
of legal protection against reprints became inevitable. Gradually, the Renaissance 
notion of a free man – creator – with their own personality overtook the medieval 
perception and, in turn, forced jurists to adapt to the challenge.280 
Authors started requesting better protection in 1490s. That is when notion of ´author´s 
right´ started first emerging, although at this stage the concept was still based on 
privileges – so called ´author´s privileges´, protecting immaterial interests.281 
                                                 
278 For more details see for example G.Westkamp, J. Cahir, ´International and comparative law of 
copyright and related rights. Section B: French and German copyright law and related rights´, 
(University of London Press, London, 2005), 3 
279 G.Westkamp, J. Cahir, ´International and comparative law of copyright and related rights. Section 
B: French and German copyright law and related rights´, (University of London Press, London, 
2005), p. 4 
280 At this stage, the development in the territory of what is current Germany was very similar to what 
was happening in England. The monarchs or guilds were protecting publishers´ economic 
investment through grant of privileges, such as printing privileges in Germany. 
281 In the sixteenth century, territorial privileges granted to publishers providing general reprint 
prohibitions for specified time periods became common, giving the publishers and printers the 
idea of a publishing property arising out of their work without the need for an express grant of 
privileges. Similar progress was traceable in England, however, unlike in England, in continental 
Europe development of the notion of ´natural right´ became evident. Despite the differences that 





In the eighteenth century, the theory of intellectual property and the deduction of book 
reprint prohibition from natural law became a widely discussed topic in Germany282. 
Gradually, the notion of an immaterial right surfaced, drawing the distinction between 
the personality and economic interests embedded in the act of creation. This seems to 
be the decisive moment of the parting of the two systems, the English copyright and 
the continental European author´s rights system.283 
Several philosophers looked into notion of the intellectual property right. In 1793, 
Fichte stipulated that an incorporeal and separate property right subsisted in creations 
of mind. Hegel postulated the idea of the intellectual property right in 1821 in his legal 
philosophy, acknowledging the distinction between an immaterial right separated from 
the physical property in a book.284  
In 1837 Prussia, the first ´proper´ German copyright legislation, as indicated above, 
was adopted, although based on the criminal, rather that civil system. It addition to 
reprint prohibition it also dealt with a right to perform a musical or dramatic work, 
lasting for 30 years after the author´s death.285 An extensive copyright legislation was 
then adopted in 1870 through the Author´s Rights Act which covered literary and visual 
works, musical compositions and dramatic works. In 1876 act on protection of author´s 
rights in artistic work was also implemented.286  
                                                 
Anne 1710, influenced the subsequent development of copyright law in Germany. It provided the 
authors with an exclusive (though time-limited) right of reproduction – a copyright. The 
underlying assertion being that humans acquire a natural right (“a right immediately emanating 
from divinity”) in the goods and assets they create, as postulated by John Locke in the late 
seventeenth century. 
282 But also in Austria and Switzerland; see G.Westkamp, J. Cahir, ´International and comparative law 
of copyright and related rights. Section B: French and German copyright law and related rights´, 
(University of London Press, London, 2005), 6 
283 Ibid Westkamp (2005), p. 6. It is important to note, that Germany was, at this time, separated into 
number of smaller states and, as such, it was difficult to achieve a uniform copyright legislation. It 
therefore took a petition taken to the Vienna Congress in 1815 by the German book sellers for 
what eventually led to a general statutory provision against illegitimate book reprints, which was 
only finished by the Federal Government over 20 years later. The distinction between the physical 
carrier and the incorporeal right as such started to be recognized though. 
284 Similar ideas were presented by Arthur Schopenhauer in mid nineteenth century; see details in ibid 
Westkamp (2005), p. 6 
285 Ibid, p. 6 
286 Both these acts were then replaced by the 1901 Act on Author´s Rights in Relation to Works of 
Literature and Music (Gesetz betreffend das Urheberrecht an Werken der Literartur un der 




In 1965, the ´current chapter´ of German copyright law begins with the adoption of the 
German Copyright Act (in German Urheberrechtsgesetz, or ´UrhG´ in short)287. The 
Act deals with both author´s rights as well as rights related to author´s rights. The act 
has undergone many amendments since it adoption with the most prominent being 
those introducing new subject matters following European directives (and international 
developments), followed by adjustments to catch up with the hitherto challenges driven 
by information society requirements. Most recently, there were several developments 
introduced in three ´baskets´ between 2001 and now288.  
Another significant revision was adopted in 2002 which is particularly significant for 
the topic of this thesis as it introduced very detailed provisions of copyright contract 
law with the attempt to improve the bargaining position of authors and performers in 
their contractual negotiations289. This was partially affected by some of the earlier 
amendments provided by the reform legislation. This is all discussed in detail below 
under the subchapter on current German legislation. 
                                                 
Author´s Rights in Relation to Works of Art and Photography (Gesetz betreffend das Urheberrecht 
an Werken der bildenden Künste und der Photographie (KUG) of 9 January 1907, 
Reichsgesetzblatt (RGBl.) 1907, p.7). Some parts of the law, in particular arts 22-24 covering 
protection of one´s image (Bildungschutz), are still in force today. See more details in Adolf 
Dietz, „Chapter 14 - Germany“ in Gillian Davies (eds), Moral Rights (2nd edn., Sweet & 
Maxwell, 2016), 456 
287 Act on Copyright and Neighbouring Rights of September 9, 1965 (Gesetz über Urheberrecht und 
verwandte Schutzrechte (Urheberrecht) vom 9. September 1965),  
288 German copyright law has experienced some dramatic reforms in the past 15 years. The first 
basket  (through the First Act on the Reform of Copyright Law) mainly deals with implementation 
of the EU Directive 2001/29 on Copyright and Related Rights in the Information Society (so 
called “InfoSoc” Directive) and as such amends the 1965 Copyright Act in the area of copyright 
limitations and implements provisions Digital Rights Management. The ´second´ basket of 
reforms intends to regulate some of the issues not covered by the mandatory provisions of the 
2001 InfoSoc Directive and further shapes the regulation of copyright contracts. It was brought 
through by the Second Act on Copyright Law in the Information Society, effective as of January 
1, 2008. The ´third basket´, already envisaged when second basket was being implemented, is 
most likely to focus on issues such as interface between copyright protection and scientific and 
educational uses, trade in second-hand software, etc. The draft DSM Directive will surely shuffle 
the cards to some extent on this topic. More details in G.Westkamp, J. Cahir, Supplement to 
´International and comparative law of copyright and related rights. Section B: French and German 
copyright law and related rights´, (University of London Press, London, 2005) - ´Recent 
developments 2012´ (University of London Press, London, 2012) or Arpi Abovyan, Challenges of 
Copyright in the Digital Age. Comparison of the Implementation of the EU Legislation in 
Germany and Armenia (Herbert Utz Verlag, 2013), 50. 
289 Act on Strengthening the Contractual Position of Authors and Performers of March 22, 2002 
(Gesetz zur Stärkung der vertraglichen Stellung von Urhebern und ausübenden Künstlern), for 




Justification of protection granted to authors and performers 
As already indicated in the previous chapters, the underlying philosophical grounds for 
author´s rights´ protection in Germany today follows the monistic theory. This was not 
always the case, however. This concept was first introduced by the Austrian Copyright 
Act 1936 and the 1965 Germany Copyright Act followed. Until then, the German 
philosophical background was aligned with the development in France which follows 
the dualistic doctrine. The monistic theory developed from the notion of intellectual 
property with its main characteristic lying in perception of the author´s rights as a unity 
of economic and immaterial (moral) interests of its holder.290 
Limitations of alienability and waivability of author’s and performer´s rights 
The idea of unity between the economic and moral aspects of author´s rights has 
important practical consequences. Both rights are treated equally from the beginning 
until the end of the granted protection. More details about these consequences are 
described in the introductory chapter and subchapter related to justification of copyright 
protection in the Czech Republic. To quickly summarise, in a monistic doctrine both 
aspects of author’s rights last for the same period of time, i.e. in Germany for 70 years 
post mortem auctoris. Author´s rights can be inherited (together as a whole) but cannot 
be transferred inter vivos in any other way except through a “constitutive transfer” (as 
oppose to ´translative transfer´ - assignment, as described in the Czech chapter), i.e. the 
author can constitute another person´s right to exploit the work – by granting a license 
to use the work. The author´s right remains the source for any subsequent rights 
granted. 
As a result of the inseparability of the economic and moral parts of author´s right it also 
sometimes has to be decided whether a right belongs to the moral or economic 
´section´, or, whether it is a hybrid (as may be the case for the rights to withdraw from 
a contract for non-use etc.).291 
                                                 
290 The notion is often compared to a coin with two sides but forming one, whole, object which cannot 
be divided. Also, Eugen Ulmer compares this teaching to a tree: the trunk represents the roots of 
the rights granted and the branches represent both the economic aspects and moral interests 
emanating from it. They cannot be treated separately. See further details in G.Westkamp, J. Cahir, 
´International and comparative law of copyright and related rights. Section B: French and 
German copyright law and related rights´, (University of London Press, London, 2005), 7. 




Position of an Author and Performer as a Weaker Party to the Contract 
The notion of an author as a weaker party of a contractual relationship has been 
discussed in the introductory chapter as well as in the discussion related to the Czech 
Republic. In Germany, this notion is very strong and the law on copyright contracts 
traditionally protects authors to a much higher degree than in common law systems, as 
will be seen in the analysis of English law. Such protection is not only inherent due to 
the monistic doctrinal approach but also results from the statutory provisions which 
have strengthen the bargaining position of authors to even higher degree after the 2002 
amendment. 
For example, the author may grant a license in relation to a single right or a whole 
bundle, but the rights transferred must be contractually specified in detail (Sec. 31(5) 
UrhG) otherwise a statutory assumption on the scope of transfer will apply. Also, 
licenses to uses which are not know at the time of the conclusion of the contract have 
to be in writing and the author has a (limited) right of revocation (Sec. 31a UrhG). 
These are also referred to as the “rules relating to the purpose of transfer”. The term 
´use´ in this context does not mean the characterisation of an economic right but rather 
the technical possibilities connected to specific economic rights at given time. 
Therefore, a license to reproduce a work granted in the 80s does not include the right 
to reproduce the same work on a compact disc in mid-90s or to share it on the internet 
further 10 years later. Such uses were not known at the time the license was granted. 
The decisive criteria, however, is not if such use was known to a mankind but whether 
the parties would have reasonably expected such mode of exploitation at the given time, 
i.e. whether it was customary.292 It is therefore important for licensees to draft their 
agreements in a very clear and comprehensive language because German courts also 
tend to interpret licenses narrowly in favour of licensors.293  
These statutory limitations for dealing in author´s rights means the author is afforded a 
chance to renegotiate certain aspects of a contract under changed circumstances. This 
                                                 
292 Ibid Westkamp (2005), p. 39 
293 If specific form of use is not described in the agreement, the court will try to define the ´aim of the 
agreement as identified by both parties´ and as such will decide which forms the agreement 
encompasses (Sec. 31(5) UrhG). See more at A. Klett, M. Sonntag, S. Wilske, German Law 
Accessible: Intellectual Property Law in Germany: Protection, Enforcement and Dispute 




is an additional front on which an author can fight for an equitable remuneration. The 
other areas such as the “bestseller clause”, common remuneration standards, or - to start 
with – explanation of the term “equitable remuneration” follows below. 
 
4.1.1.2. Current legislation 
Constitutional foundation for author´s and performer´s rights   
According to Article 14(1) of the German Constitution (”Grundgesetz”), property is 
“socially bound”294. The German federal constitutional court (Bundesverfassungs-
gericht) has also acknowledged several times, that author´s rights are protected under 
this fundamental right to property under Article 14 as well as under Articles 1 par. 1 
and Article 2 par. 1 regarding the moral rights aspect (“general right to personality”) of 
the Constitution.295 
General applicable law   
The applicable German copyright legislation comprises the 1965 Copyright Act 
(Urheberrechtsgesetz ́ UrhG´)296, the 1907 Act on Authors Rights in Relation to Works 
of Art and Photography (´KUG´)297, the Act on the Administration of Copyright and 
Neighbouring Rights of 9 September 1965 (´UrhWG´)298, and to some extent also the 
Code on Civil Procedure of 30 January 1877 (Zivilprocessordnung, ´ZPO´299). 
From the beginning of the adoption of the German Copyright Act of 1965, there was 
already a demand for provisions regulating copyright contracts in some detail, as 
                                                 
294 Some claim that this is the reason for multiple restrictions on copyright when it comes to 
guaranteeing communication in a modern society. See Arpi Abovyan, Challenges of Copyright in 
the Digital Age. Comparison of the Implementation of the EU Legislation in Germany and 
Armenia (Herbert Utz Verlag, 2013), 49. 
295 BT-Drs.10/837, p. 1, 32, 36 et seqq.; BT-Drs. 14/6433, p. 10; BT-Drs. 16/1828, p. 15 ff., 49. See 
details in A.Peukert, N.Hesse, ALAI Congress 2017 in Copenhagen: Copyright, to be or not to be 
- Questionnaire (Justification for copyright and related rights): Country Report Germany, 
accessible at the Congress website www.alai2017.org 
296 Act on Copyright and Neighbouring Rights of September 9, 1965 (Gesetz über Urheberrecht und 
verwandte Schutzrechte (Urheberrecht) vom 9. September 1965), 
297 Act on Authors Rights in Relation to Works of Art and Photography (Gesetz betreffend das 
Urheberrecht an Werken der bildenden Künste und der Photographie – „Kunsturhebergesetz“ 
(KUG)) of 9 January 1907, Reichsgesetzblatt (RGBl.) 1907, p.7 
298 Act on the Administration of Copyright and Neighbouring Rights of 9 Septemebr 1965 
(Urheberrechts- wahrnehmungsgesetz vom 9. September 1965, “UrhWG”)  




contract law for authors was considered inadequate.300 In the end, it took more than 
three decades to get the Federal Ministry of Justice finally to attempt to tackle the issue 
in 1998. During a public hearing in February 2000, both the pressure groups of authors' 
associations as well as the media industries' were heard. In reaction to that, the Ministry 
commissioned a group of copyright experts to draft an amendment introducing contract 
law provisions into the copyright legislation. The main task for them was to grant 
authors equitable remuneration and to make the involved interest groups agree on what 
may constitute “equitable” for each specific sector or means of exploitation.301   
The draft that was presented by the experts stirred a lot of debate and comments from 
both sides of the lobbying camps. It took the Federal Government until summer 2001 
to present its draft piece of legislation. While some provisions (e.g. permission for 
authors to terminate copyright agreements after a period of 30 years302) did not 
ultimately make it to the final draft, some managed to survive the whole legislative 
process. The statutory claim to equitable remuneration or an obligation for the authors´ 
(performers´) and users´ associations to agree on “equitable” remuneration within their 
sectors by establishing common standards were among them. However, the provisions 
did not, at first, contain a clear definition of the term “equitable” in this context, which 
made the industries´ representatives very nervous, anticipating countless disputes. It 
took some time to come up with and implement such clarification, but the Federal 
Government was clearly determined to deliver the regulation during their term. As 
such, the legislative work continued all the way until the last session of the legal 
committee in charge on January 2002 and it was successful. Further compromise was 
introduced (e.g. claim to equitable remuneration could only be asserted against the 
author's contracting partners, not just any user) but the definition of “equitable” was 
                                                 
300 Drucksache Deutscher Bundestag (printed report of the German Federal Assembly) IV/270 of 
March 23, 1962, p.56.  More details in K. M. Gutsche, ´New copyright contract legislation in 
Germany: rules on equitable remuneration provide "just rewards" to authors and performers´, 
E.I.P.R. 2003, 25(8), 366-372, 366. 
     cf Gerhard Schricker, ´Efforts for a better law on copyright contracts in Germany - a never ending 
story´, IIC 2004, 35(7), 850-858, fn 6. 
301 For more details see K. M. Gutsche, ´New copyright contract legislation in Germany: rules on 
equitable remuneration provide "just rewards" to authors and performers´, E.I.P.R. 2003, 25(8), 
366-372, 366 
302 For more details see Martin Schippan, ´Codification of contract rules for copyright owners - the 




added.303 In this shape, the draft passed the Lower Chamber (“Deutscher Bundestag”) 
of the Federal Parliament in January 2002 and (without any comments) the Upper 
Chamber (“Deutscher Bundesrat”) in March 2002, becoming effective as of July 1, 
2002. 
Finally, therefore, in July 2002, the German Copyright Act was amended by the Act on 
Strengthening the Contractual Position of Authors and Performers304, implementing the 
long-awaited copyright contract law in Germany. As indicated, the amendment was 
drafted with the aim to balance the contractual relationship between authors and 
performers on the one hand and their licensees on the other, in a way favourable to the 
former. It is based on the principle that they should receive an equitable remuneration 
for exploitation of their works and performances and should be protected from unfair 
licensing conditions. 
Act on Strengthening the Contractual Position of Authors and Performers 
Until this 2002 amendment to the German Copyright Act, mandatory provisions related 
to copyright contracts were rather scarce305. By adding the new provisions, the reform 
aimed to strengthen the legal position of the weaker contracting party, i.e. of authors 
and performers, vis-à-vis their licensees to whom they grant right of exploitation of 
their works. While at first sight authors and performers can seem to have independent 
status, in reality their standing is more akin to employees when it comes to dependence 
on their source of income. And as such, similarly as is the case with employees, the 
legislator now provides certain “checks and balances”. Unlike other independent 
professions, authors and performers are not protected by a statutory remuneration 
regime and thus need other form of support.306 Otherwise the imbalance of bargaining 
powers often led to agreements for lump-sum payments with a full buy-out. This could 
lead (and often did) to extreme disproportion between the payment received and the 
                                                 
303 For more details see Ibid K. M. Gutsche, (2003), 366 
304 Federal Law Gazette (Bundesgesetzblatt) of March 28, 2002, Part I, p.1155 et seq., also available 
in English at http://www.urheberrecht.org/law/normen/urhg/2002-03-22/text/  
305 These would be (i) rule that the grant of exploitation rights for unknown types of use is invalid 
(Sec. 31(4) UrhG), (ii) the unwaivable right to additional remuneration when the agreed rate was 
grossly disproportionate to the income from use of the work (Sec. 36(3) UrhG, as applicable 
before the discussed amendment, currently contained in an adjusted version in Sec. 32a UrhG), 
(iii) the revocation right in case of non-exercise (Sec. 41(4) UrhG), (iv) the revocation right by 
reason of changed conviction (Sec. 42(2) UrhG). 




endless exploitation opportunities afforded by “new channels” of digitalization, 
multimedia and the internet.307   
The main goal of the amendment was to secure that authors and performers financially 
sufficiently participated on the proceeds from the exploitation of their works, and thus 
implementing the principle embedded in Article14(1) of the German Constitution 
(“Grundgesetz”). Based on the principle of creator participating on exploitation of their 
creation, the creator is entitled to “equitable remuneration” for every single use of their 
work, irrespective of the actual yields resulting from such use.308 
Also, it is difficult to predict whether work will be commercially successful. The 
legislator thus aimed at making sure that authors and performers participate equitably 
in the proceeds and benefits deriving from exploitation of their works and 
performances309. In addition, the aim was to secure that common standards on 
remuneration between authors and their licensees for a specific use or category can be 
determined for the future310 so that in similar cases and for similar uses once fairness 
is achieved, this can be the basis for future cases. The driving force for the copyright 
contract legislation was to provide a statutory and thus enforceable claim to equitable 
remuneration for all creators. The new articles focus on contractual relations between 
authors and performers on one side, and the users of works on the other; it is not aimed 
at collective rights management agreements311, or to agreements entered into by two 
exploiting enterprises.312 
It is important to realize that the new legislation also extends the general wording of 
Section 11 UrhG, which now states that “copyright protects the author in his intellectual 
and personal relationships to the work and in respect of the use of the work. It shall 
also serve to ensure equitable remuneration for the exploitation of the work”. The 
                                                 
307 Drucksache Deutscher Bundestag (printed report of the German Federal Assembly) 14/6433, p.9, 
No.3(a). See more details in Ibid K. M. Gutsche, (2003), 367 
308 More in Ibid Gutsche, (2003), 367 and Adolf Dietz, ´Amendment of German Copyright Law in 
order to strengthen the contractual position of authors and performers´, IIC 2002, 33(7), 828-842, 
831 
309 Sec. 32 UrhG 
310 Sec. 36 UrhG 
311 See Sec(s). 32(4) and 32a(4) UrhG 
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No.2(a). See more details in K. M. Gutsche, ´New copyright contract legislation in Germany: rules 





second sentence was added by the Act on Strengthening the Contractual Position of 
Authors and Performers. 313 The principle of participation became key when standard 
terms and conditions in copyright contracts are revised and it must be followed as an 
elementary notion in German copyright law and always be reflected when contracts are 
interpreted.314 
In 2008, further modification of exploitation provisions were introduced with the 
´second basket´ of reform as described above, aiming to allow even smoother operation 
of copyright licenses. One of the main changes brought by this amendment is 
introduction of Section 31a - Contracts concerning unknown types of exploitation 
(Verträge über unbekannte Nutzungsrechten) and corresponding Section 32c - 
Remuneration for types of exploitation which subsequently become known (Vergütung  
für später bekannte Nutzungsrechten). The author is now able to grant rights to uses 
unknown at the time the agreement is concluded and be remunerated adequately for 
such grants. In exchange, provisions on revocation of such grants are now more limited, 
e.g. in time.315 In the past, the strong rights enjoyed by the authors as regards unknown 
uses had constantly led to difficulties and were harming proper commercial exploitation 
of copyrighted works; these changes attempt to rectify this.316  
Whilst the main focus of this thesis is the “best-seller” clause (i.e. Section 32a UrhG 
after the amendment), the provision does not stand alone. In fact, it is so interconnected 
with the rest of the copyright contract law provisions of the German Copyright Act that, 
in order to understand all the particularities in application of the provision, it is crucial 
to explore and explain also the notion of “equitable remuneration” under Section 32 
UrhG and “common remuneration standards” under Section 36 UrhG (and some other 
                                                 
313 Section 11 UrhG is a general provision of Chapter IV – Scope of copyright of the German 
Copyright Act (UrhG), which after subchapter 1 consisting of merely Section 11, provides in 
subchapters 2-4 lists of individual moral rights, economic rights, and other rights of authors. 
Seeing the affirmation of importance of author´s equitable remuneration by giving this principle 
such prominent position within the Copyright Act explains how deep this notion is embedded in 
the German copyright law and why attempts are constantly made to improve this regulation.  
314 Drucksache Deutscher Bundestag (printed report of the German Federal Assembly) 14/8058 p.18 
IV 1; see also Ibid K. M. Gutsche, (2003), 367, or Dietz (2002), 834. 
315 For more details see above the note on protection of author as a weaker party to the contract and 
also Ibid G.Westkamp (2012), 16 




“accompanying” provisions). The following text will deal with these concepts in turn 
as they are covered by the German Copyright Law.  
The texts of the individual statutory provisions assessed - as well as other important 
provisions securing a stronger position of an author or performer - are rather long and 
their verbatim insertion in the text may disrupt the flow of the text. Reference therefore 
will be made to Figure 4.2.1. - Provisions of German copyright law related to 
exploitation rights, which contain full text of Subchapter 2 – Exploitation rights of the 
Chapter 5 of Part One of the Copyright Act – Dealing in author´s rights.  
The first section in this subchapter (Section 31 UrhG – see Figure 4.2.1.), heavily 
affected by the 2002 amendment, deals with grant of exploitation rights in general, 
specifically how the grant of a license can be divided, including but not limited to, into 
separate uses, territories, time periods. It also stipulates what happens if the description 
of the designated uses is not specific enough (see also above reference to Position of 
an Author and Performer as a Weaker Party to the Contract). 
Section 31a UrhG covers contracts concerning unknown types of exploitation. It is 
relatively detailed and among other author´s protection (also see above) gives the 
author a right of revocation if an equitable remuneration for the unknown type of use 
is not duly agreed. Such revocation right is time-limited and always ends with the 
author´s death (unlike other true ´author´s rights´), nevertheless, it does strengthen the 
author´s bargaining power. Such right cannot be waived. In order to maintain dealings 
with copyright works in the case of collective works (typically films), the revocation 
right is limited for such works317. 
 ‘Equitable Remuneration’ 
Section 32 UrhG, fully redrafted through the 2002 amendment, captures the definition 
of an equitable remuneration, provides for situations when assumption of an equitable 
remuneration is invoked, clarifies that no by-passing is permissible, and determines the 
relationship between equitable remuneration, collective bargaining agreements and 
common remuneration standards, explaining which calculation takes precedence.  
                                                 




There are three different scenarios considered in Section 32(1) of the German 
Copyright Act for the author´s claim to equitable remuneration. Ideally, the 
remuneration is stipulated in the contract and it is equitable. Alternatively, for whatever 
reason, the remuneration amount may not be agreed specifically in the agreement. In 
such cases an equitable remuneration is “deemed to have been agreed”318. The third 
possibility is that the rate agreed in the licence contract does not provide for equitable 
remuneration. In such case authors have a corrective claim for amendment of such 
agreement by way of requirement for their licensee to conclude an amendment to the 
contract changing the remuneration to an equitable level319. In the two latter scenarios, 
it is crucial to be able to ascertain what an equitable remuneration is. 
´Corrective claim´ 
The claim to contractual amendment stipulated in Sec. 32(1), third sentence UrhG 
provides authors with a contractual claim to equitable remuneration directed 
exclusively towards the contracting partner, not a third party licensees. The goal is to 
close the gap between the rate as agreed and an equitable remuneration. Lack of 
equitable remuneration does not make the licence agreement invalid, it only provides 
basis for the author´s additional claim (for assent to the contractual amendment to 
ensure equitable compensation). Such ´corrective claim´ should cover the difference 
between the contractual reward and equitable remuneration. Once such additional 
recompense makes the overall remuneration equitable, the claim ceases to exist.320   
The above described corrective claim is mainly of assistance to securing just reward 
for medium or long-term uses by guaranteeing equitable remuneration to authors and 
performers for the entire term of their contract. Authors and performers can sue for 
payment of the equitable remuneration straight away once the claim for payment 
becomes due based on inappropriate reward.321 As the date of execution of the contract 
is essential for the revision of the equity of remuneration, during the term of a given 
contract the corrective claim can only be asserted once.  
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The right to the corrective claim cannot be circumvented. A contractual term which 
restricts this claim to the detriment of the author is considered null and void.322 One 
also cannot rely on any agreement evading the application of the corrective claim to 
the detriment of the author through a transaction undermining the licence deal in 
question as the deal as such remains valid.323  
The law states clearly though that the corrective claim is not applicable to remuneration 
agreed on in collective bargaining agreements as their parties have adequate negotiating 
power to ascertain fairly negotiated terms. 324   
The corrective claim is applicable to all acts of utilization which took place after March 
28, 2002 if they were based on contracts dated June 1, 2001 or thereafter.325  
This right to an equitable remuneration is praised by authors’ representatives as it helps 
to balance the contractual relationship with exploiters by significantly increasing the 
authors´ bargaining power. On the other hand, the exploiters’ representatives detest the 
legal provision, claiming that the provisions create unnecessary legal uncertainty, 
rendering calculations in the long-term more difficult.326 Since the 2002 amendment, 
litigations regarding the definition of an equitable remuneration and its practical 
application have arisen. In particular translators have been claiming the revision of 
contracts on the basis of Section 32.327 
                                                 
322 Sec. 32 (3) UrhG 
323 Drucksache Deutscher Bundestag  (printed report of the German Federal Assembly) 14/8058, 
p.19., more in Ibid Gutsche, (2003), 368 
324 Sec. 32 (4) UrhG, and Drucksache Deutscher Bundestag  (printed report of the German Federal 
Assembly) 14/8058, p.19 
325 Sec. 132 (3), third sentence, and Sec. 132 (4) UrhG. This is the date on which the draft legislation 
of the Federal Government reached the Upper House of the Parliament. That is when heated 
public discussion about the revision of copyright contract law commenced and after which any 
further retroactive effect was not justifiable. 
326 2014 Creators´ Contract Study, p.38, referring to interviews conducted during compilation of the 
study. 
327 “Talking to Addison“ (BGH, Judgement from October 7, 2009 – I ZR 38/07 (OLG Munich) and 
„Destructive Emotions“ (BGH, Judgement from January 20, 2011 – I ZR 19/09 (OLG Munich): In 
both these two case the OLG Munich held that, under certain circumstances, translators who 
transferred their unlimited exploitation rights to their translations to a publisher can demand 
additional payment. In both cases the translator in question was paid a lump sum per page of 
translation and in addition to that were agreed to get a share in profit if certain amount of texts 
were sold. The translator would get additional payment of less than 1% of the book´s net price. 
Under the new legislation, he translators sued for higher remuneration, claiming that the initial 
contractual remuneration was not equitable. The court held in both cases that the translator could 
claim an additional payment of 0,8% (hard cover) and 0,4% (paperback) of the net price, starting 




Equity of remuneration – assumption and legal definition 
In order to ascertain what “equitable” means for the purposes of the present legislation, 
the German legislator works with two sets of tools. Sec.32(2), first sentence UrhG 
provides an irrefutable assumption that compensation determined by the common 
remuneration standards as further defined in Section 36 UrhG is equitable. Any 
compensation within the defined scope will be deemed equitable. Whether the specific 
author and/or their licensee took part in the negotiation (were members of any of the 
associations involved) about the provision on remuneration in given sector or for given 
use is irrelevant. In order to prevent any breach of freedom of contract where one of 
the contracting parties is not a member of an association or where there are competing 
remuneration standard provisions laid down by several associations considering 
themselves responsible for certain types of works, the parties have to expressly agree 
or imply an existing remuneration standard.328   
If the parties do not agree on the common remuneration clause or such standard has not 
been drawn up yet, remuneration will be determined by application of the legal 
definition set out in Sec. 32(2), second sentence UrhG. The reward will be equitable “if 
at the time the agreement is concluded it corresponds to what in business relations is 
customary and fair, given the nature and extent of the possibility of exploitation 
granted, in particular the duration and time of exploitation, and considering all 
circumstances”, i.e. viewed objectively ex ante.329 As such, equity should no longer 
represent an abstract term – it corresponds to a usual market price and becomes a 
provable fact.330   
One must establish the amount of remuneration ´customary´ in the relevant area of 
business at the time the contract was concluded without using common practices as the 
sole determining factor (as they may reflect the financial superiority of the exploiting 
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publisher from transferring his right to third parties. This was later reduced by the second 
judgement to 20% of the foreign language author´s interest in the net revenue and limited to the 
publisher’s revenue.  -- The summary of the two cases taken from the 2014 Creators´ Contract 
Study, p.39 
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enterprises). Should insufficient compensation be common, it will not be deemed 
equitable. Therefore, the ´fairness´ factor assists in correcting bad practices. In such 
cases the court would have to correct the value of the ordinary fees paid. If there is no 
customary use in the area of business or the practice is not fair, equitable remuneration 
will be determined by reasonably exercising the abovementioned criteria, and using 
remuneration and notion of fairness applied in other fields as comparative standards.331   
Right to Additional Participation ("Best-seller" clause) 
The previous version of the “best-seller clause” only anticipated claims to contractual 
amendment if author´s remuneration was ´grossly disproportionate´ to the income 
actually generated by their work. Given this provisions very narrow interpretation, 
successfully claimed contractual amendments were very rare. One can see the parallel 
between the previous version of the German legislation and the current Czech 
regulation on the topic.  
The relative toothless-ness of the provision was corrected by Section 32a UrhG, 
implementing the ´principle of participation´ enshrined in German copyright law. The 
wording of the new provision is very similar to its former version so reliance on the 
previous case law regarding the component prerequisites is possible.332 But now it is 
irrelevant whether the contracting parties foresaw or could have foreseen the 
commercial success of the work.333 Therefore when referring to the case law rendered 
by the Federal Supreme Court only this change has to be taken into account.   
The claim to additional compensation does not apply if the reward was determined 
either by a common remuneration standard or a collective bargaining agreement.334 
Only a ´conspicuous´ imbalance between the agreed remuneration and the proceeds 
and benefits from use of the work will qualify. Merely ´perceivable´ (or even 
´ordinary´) gap will not entitle the author to any compensation. Still the threshold is 
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lower than in the previous regulation. When assessing what constitutes a ´conspicuous´ 
difference, the reward granted has to be compared with the proceeds and benefits 
derived from exploitation of the work.335 “Proceeds” does not mean profits, but gross 
income is considered. Other benefits, such as advertising, must also be taken into 
account to reflect uses which are not directly aimed at turnover.336 
First, one must compare the reward to the proceeds and then benchmark it against 
equitable remuneration for the use discussed. That will depend on common 
remuneration standards337 (if established for given use) or on what is regarded as 
customary and fair in the relevant sphere of business338. It is, after all, the object of the 
principle of participation to ensure that authors receive equitable remuneration, 
something that can only be achieved by applying uniform concepts.339  
From the preparatory Parliamentary debate, it can be concluded that ´conspicuous´ 
disproportion between the remuneration and the proceeds and benefits of exploitation 
will be found to exist when there is a 100 per cent difference between the agreed reward 
and what would be equitable remuneration340, but one may expect that also smaller 
percentages would be considered conspicuously disproportionate and give rise to a 
claim to additional participation.341   
The claim to further participation will only apply to insufficient reward received in 
exchange for exploitation right to use of works which became highly profitable after 
conclusion of the relevant contract. It will primarily concern lump-sum remuneration 
payments as a royalty rate (if the royalty is set as equitable in the first place) does not 
change the ratio between remuneration and proceeds as a result of increasingly 
successful exploitation of the work. It is therefore always ´safer´ to negotiate royalty 
rates to avoid such claims.342 It may be safer for the exploiters, for sure. Nevertheless, 
there are situations when they do not wish to provide such form of remuneration and 
the author or performer does not have the sufficient bargaining power to change this 
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during the contract negotiations. This brings us back to the need for such provision in 
the first place.  
The claim for amendment of the licence agreement, as introduced in the first paragraph 
of Section 32a, can only be directed against the author's contracting partner.343 But the 
commercial success of the author's work often happens not to be of primary benefit to 
the initial licensee, but to another person in the chain of rights. In such a case, the author 
has claim for equitable remuneration directly against such third party according to 
Sec.32a (2) of the German Copyright Act.  
The question whether such claim arises against the third party depends on the 
contractual relations within the licence chain, including payments made throughout 
such chain. Did the author receive from his contracting partner a fee which is 
conspicuously disproportionate to the licensee's proceeds? Is the consideration paid by 
the licensee to its licensor (the original licensee) disproportionate in the same manner? 
How to make sure that the third party licensee does not pay twice (first to the licensor 
under the licence agreement and subsequently to the author according to the said 
statutory rule)? The entire chain of licenses has to be examined in order to direct the 
claim in the right direction. The only party that should be liable for the creator's 
equitable remuneration is the licensee who gains disproportionate proceeds and 
benefits as compared with the original remuneration obligations of the author´s original 
contracting partner, and only to the extent that such returns are obtained.344  
The prerequisites of ´taking into account the contractual relationships within the 
licensing chain´ and that ´other party shall then not be liable´ proved rather problematic 
in practice.345 The licensing chain (or, web more like) and corresponding stream of 
revenue is a complex ´organism´. In many sectors the substantial revenues and profits 
generated through the exploitation of works are not generated by the actual contracting 
party of the author or performer. In film industry, the director, screenwriter, 
cameraman, leading actors (and a few other creators) probably manage to negotiate 
their deals but with the film producer. However, the film producer further grants 
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exploitation rights to other users. Typically, the film is further exploited by a film 
distributor for theatrical release, TV broadcasting organizations, video/DVD 
distributors, internet platforms such as Netflix, etc.346 The revenues are generated 
separately by separate entities for specific uses for which the creators previously 
granted their licenses to a single contracting partner. Therefore, if the creator wants to 
claim additional fair participation, they may need to go the “third parties” as stipulated 
in Sec. 32a (2) UrhG. But there more likely than not will be multiple third parties adding 
to the pile of revenues generated by the exploitation of the film. And the claim would 
have to be aimed separately at each of them, proportionally to the their participation of 
the overall proceeds and benefits that became conspicuously disproportionate to what 
the creator received from their contracting partner at the very beginning. 
Also, there is no guarantee whatsoever, that the author´s contractual partner will also 
participate in the success as often such partner will transfer respective rights even 
before the production begins in order to finance the film.347 It is a common practice that 
a film producer ´portions´ the rights according to uses and territories and ´sells´ the 
rights to various distributors and broadcasters at film festivals (or otherwise) based for 
example only on a screenplay and the lead actor´s or director´s name, without having a 
single shot taken.348 
It was confirmed by the German highest civil court, the BGH, in the Das Boot case  and 
re-affirmed in the Pirates of the Caribbean case (both discussed below) that:  
“To assess if there is a conspicuous disproportion between the contractual remuneration 
of the author for granting exploitation rights and the revenues and benefits of the third 
party, the court first has to determine the author´s contractual remuneration and the 
proceeds and benefits of the third party from the use of the work. Thereafter, one has 
to determine the remuneration which – in retrospect – would have been equitable 
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considering the third parties´ revenues and benefits. Finally, one has to assess whether 
the contractual remuneration is conspicuously disproportionate in relation to such 
equitable compensation.“349 
Both cases are discussed in detail below together with some more practical points on 
the issue, addressing the issue of reflecting the ´licensing chain´ in any calculations. 
Unlike with the ´corrective claim´, it is irrelevant when the contract was concluded 
(assuming they were concluded after January 1, 1966). The claim to additional 
participation is applicable to all matters that arise as of March 28, 2002.350 The only 
important issue is when the conspicuous disparity between remuneration and proceeds 
arises.351  
Common remuneration standards 
The provisions on common remuneration standards pursuant to Section 36 UrhG aim 
to help substitute the negotiations that were previously done individually with a kind 
of collective copyright for freelance authors and performers to strengthen their financial 
position. The goal is to help develop remuneration standards through self-regulation in 
the respective areas of the media industries by way of urging associations of authors 
and associations of those exploiting copyrighted works to conclude their own, mutually 
agreed, terms of remuneration. Such terms would subsequently serve the parties to 
licence agreements as guidelines for equitable remuneration.352  The encouragement 
made to stakeholders to agree on common rules, through collective agreements or 
common remuneration standards, is that stakeholders are deemed to know better the 
practices and the adequate remuneration that should apply in contractual 
relationships.353  
The common remuneration standards are deemed equitable within Section 32(2), first 
sentence UrhG for all authors, performers, and exploiting enterprises affected. They do 
not have direct legal effect like collective bargaining agreements, but their application 
                                                 
349 BGH GRUR 2012, 496 – Das Boot (The Boat) and BGH GRUR 2012, 1248 – Fluch der Karibik 
(Pirates of the Caribbean); the translation taken from Ibid Reber (2016), 384 
350 Sec. 132(3), second sentence UrhG 
351 in Ibid Gutsche, (2003), 370 
352Ibid Dietz (2002), 835; or Gutsche, (2003), 370 




protects the users of works against creator´s demands for additional remuneration. As 
such, they provide legal certainty for authors´ and performers’´ contracting partners 
and thus represent an incentive to reach an agreement. 354 
Some restrictions apply, however, to the common remuneration standards. Collective 
bargaining agreements, if in place, will always prevail355 when determining the fees 
payable to employees and persons similar to employees356. But that does not prevent 
such standards also being set up in such areas for situations when the priority of the 
collective bargaining agreement ceases to exist, as collective bargaining will not prevail 
where one party is bound by it, but where the collective agreement lacks a provision on 
remuneration for the specific use involved, or does not extend to the relevant licence 
agreement.357 
Common remuneration standards specify the type and the amount of remuneration, due 
date, advance payments and accounts, etc. The circumstances of the relevant sphere of 
regulation, especially the structure and the dimensions of the exploiting enterprise, are 
to be taken into account.358 The assessment of the equity of remuneration will, after all, 
vary depending if a small publishing house or a major enterprise is involved.359  The 
actual remuneration rates are set by the mutual agreement of both ´sides´: associations 
of creators, and associations of users or individual users. Parties setting the rates have 
to be representative, independent and authorized for this task.360 If more than one set 
of standards is set for the same subject-matter by different associations, contracting 
parties have to decide and stipulate in their license agreement which ´equity standards´ 
they will follow.361   
Despite these provisions being seemingly an excellent opportunity for everyone 
involved to improve the business efficacy in the sector, only few agreements have been 
signed on the basis of these provisions. The first agreement relates to the publishing 
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sector and, in particular, the conditions of remuneration of authors of fictional works 
in Germany362. The document stipulates that remuneration rates that would be below 
the ones approved in the agreement shall not be considered as adequate under Section 
32 of the UrhG. This agreement only applies to works of fiction and provides precise 
ranges of percentage of remuneration according to the number of copies sold (at the net 
retail price); it also stipulates the conditions of exploitation applicable to neighbouring 
rights, the terms of the advances paid to the author, the rightful use of new modes of 
exploitation of fictional works, etc. In fact, the agreement is a copy of previous 
agreements that already existed in this sector prior to adoption of the new legislation.  
In the AV sector the German Director’s Guild (BVR) also concluded an agreement 
with broadcaster Pro Sieben/Sat1 Deutschland, establishing minimum fees and the 
participation of the author on the proceeds though success related fees. In November 
2012, the German public broadcaster ZDF was obliged by the Court of Munich to 
negotiate with the German Director’s Guild (BVR) in order to agree on common rules 
for adequate remuneration on the basis of Section 32.363 
Competition law issue 
Question arises whether common remuneration standards are in line with European 
competition law. And party in focus here would not be the enterprises exploiting the 
works. Article 81(1) of the EC Treaty prohibits also authors in their capacity as 
independent businessmen, and even the Member States, from taking measures which 
facilitate or prescribe cartel agreements. But that is exactly the aim of Section 36(1) of 
the German Copyright Act: authors´ associations as well as associations of the 
copyright industry are encouraged to form common remuneration standards. These 
´price cartels´ should only get away with it if the Court of Justice of the European Union 
was to incline to a restrictive interpretation of Article 81, applying ´rule of reason´, or 
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if the European Commission exempted the common remuneration standards under 
Article 81(3) of the Treaty.364 
Arbitration body and mediation 
The German Copyright Act also stipulates for situations when associations of creators 
and exploiters fail to agree on terms of remuneration within a reasonable period of time. 
Detailed provisions of Sections 36 (3) and (4) and Section 36a provide for a necessary 
guidance (see details in Figure 4.2.1.). These provisions also explain how the 
Arbitration board (Schlichtungsstelle) is formed and how it is set up. The formation of 
the board by equal amount of appointments by each side with addition of one 
independent, mutually agreed chairman of the board is very much aligned with most 
existing arbitration models. Such board suggests a reasoned arrangement proposal for 
remuneration standards to the parties. If there are no objections against such proposal 
within three months after it was submitted by the panel, it is deemed to have been 
accepted.   
Additional features of mandatory contract law provision 
Mandatory application 
The claims to equitable remuneration and to additional participation are mandatory. 
They cannot be waived, contracted out or otherwise evaded through circumventing 
transactions.365 This has still proven to be difficult to achieve, as irrespective of what 
the law stipulates, even after 15 years of application of these provision is still not 
common practice in Germany to provide creators with ´residual compensation´ for 
successful exploitation of a work, especially in the fields of television and film. As 
Reber366 explains, “in the wake of a growing “total buy-out” practice in the private 
television industry, even public TV broadcasting organizations (ARD, ZDF) tend to 
bypass the residual compensation regulation in their own collective bargaining 
agreements by outsourcing TV movie productions to private affiliates. German 
entertainment guilds and unions attempted for many years to negotiate such residual 
compensation clauses with television and film producers but without any appreciable 
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result.” Recently a collective bargaining agreement was concluded with the film 
producers´ association but a rather problematic one. Also, only a few common 
remuneration standards (Sec. 36 UrhG) have been set up for directors, screenplay 
writers and cameramen so far.367 It also becomes clear that the principle of adequate 
participation is not properly reflected in such agreements. These collective bargaining 
agreements focus on ´bestsellers´ rather than looking into ´fair compensation’ from the 
outset, reflecting that authors should participate in any revenue generated by their 
work.368  
The law also provides a protection from ´jurisdiction shopping´ by effectively ruling 
out choice of law for specific circumstances. Due to prevalence of mandatory 
provisions of national law, where normally through freedom to contract under 
international private law parties could chose applicable law, restrictions apply. In order 
to avoid a situation where the equitable remuneration provisions are avoided by 
application of foreign laws, Section 32b of the German Copyright Act was adopted (see 
details in Figure 4.2.1.).369  
Section 32b.(2) UrhG370 is of practical importance as it stipulates that the statutory 
provisions on reward have mandatory application as long as the subject-matter of the 
contract is of significant use within Germany. It does not matter if the exploiting entity 
has its registered seat abroad; what matters is if the uses take place in Germany.371 
Therefore remuneration rules are obligatory for acts of use in Germany even if foreign 
law was agreed on. Authors are thus protected irrespective of the choice of law and 
even if they enter into a licence agreement with a foreign entity.372 It is important to 
note though in the cases described above, that where worldwide rights are granted by 
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the author, the statutory claims to remuneration are restricted to exploitation returns 
within Germany and do not expand to worldwide income.373  
Amendment of German copyright law effective as of March 2017 
In addition to the above described regulation aiming at strengthening the bargaining 
position of authors, the German Parliament has recently adopted amendments to the 
UrhG which came into effect as of March 1, 2017374. The objective of the new law is 
to further strengthen the rights of authors of copyright protected works against the 
industries.  
None of these changes is reflected in the studies introduced and discussed in Chapter 
3, although they may have affected the findings. The changes represent even further 
improvement of creators´ positions in contract negotiations. They also introduce an 
“information right”, very similar to the transparency obligations introduced in Article 
14 of the Draft DSMD, however, much more detailed and taking into account 
differences in “importance” of individual contributions to collective works. Something 
the Commission did not take into account (and, to be fair, to the knowledge of the 
author of this work so far none of the national legislators did). The new provisions are 
evidently coming as a reflection of market practice and inadequacy of the current 
legislation to differentiate between various “scenarios” occurring in the complex 
market with copyright protected subject matters. The most important new regulations 
relate to the following provisions of UrhG. 
Reasonable Compensation (Section 32 (2) UrhG) 
According to the previously existing legislation, as described above, authors of 
copyright protected works are legally entitled to ask for an equitable remuneration for 
their work. Up until now, for the determination of “equitable remuneration” time and 
duration of use were taken into account. From  March 2017, it is also frequency and 
extent of use that have to be considered. This seems to be reflecting the need to address 
digital uses and remuneration for them coming to authors. As such, it seems that 
remuneration will not be considered equitable if it does not take onto account frequency 
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of use. In such case, due to lack of equitability of the remuneration, author should be 
able to claim additional fair participation according to Section 32a UrhG if the 
remuneration originally received is conspicuously disproportionate to the proceeds and 
benefits derived from the exploitation of the work.  
Right to Information on the Extent of Usage (Sections 32d and 32e UrhG) 
The newly added Section 32d UrhG is of special importance to the creators. An author 
can now request information from his contractual partners on the extent of the usage of 
the work and the economic benefits obtained from the exploitation of the transferred 
rights. What is more important, the author’s right to request such information does not 
only work against his direct contractual partner, but - according to Sec. 32e UrhG - also 
towards third parties who have a significant commercial influence on the licence chain 
and parties who profit directly from any clear disproportionality in revenue distribution 
according to Sec. 32a (2) UrhG. 
The right to information shall be excluded if the author only made secondary 
contribution to a work, product or service. This will happen in cases in which the 
contribution of the author has only little influence on the overall impression of the 
work. This is a very important limitation of the right to information (and secondarily 
remuneration) because in complex collective works such as films not everyone 
contributes to an extent that deserves additional remuneration and this has been the 
concerns of the creative industries. One can only hope that by this forthcoming the 
legislator made the new law a little more acceptable for the producers, publishers etc. 
An agreement in which an author waives the above-mentioned rights is not allowed 
and will be regarded as invalid except for collective agreements or wage agreements in 
which a fair negotiation between authors and industry can be assumed. 
Limitation of Exclusivity to 10 years 
The amendment added new Section 40 to the UrhG which applies to the so-called “buy-
out contracts” under which exclusive exploitation rights are granted for a lump-sum fee 
with no obligation to pay revenue-based royalties. These licences will now be 
considered “non-exclusive” after an initial 10-year-period. After such time lapses, the 
author is free to use the work originally licensed exclusively and to licence it to other 




However, the law gives the parties of an exclusive license agreement after an initial 5-
year period to extend the period of exclusivity beyond the 10-year limitation. But no 
sooner than those 5 years. This seems a very sensible provision. In such given time, the 
author will know how successful the work is and if the lump sum initially paid was 
inappropriately low, the transferee can either pay additional remuneration or loose 
exclusivity. This gives the creator a chance to seek other opportunities for revenue. In 
practice, however, it is more likely that the initial licensees will agree on additional 
payments. It is hard to imagine they would let go of a certain revenue stream just 
because they are not willing to pay some extra for a well selling product. 
Exemptions for Computer Software 
It was however decided (sensibly) that computer programs are not affected by the 
changes (Sec. 69a (5) UrhG). Because of the high demand in the software sector, the 
legislator believed that authors in the software business do not need the same level of 
protection against the industry as authors in the creative business. It may also be 
attributed to the very different nature of computer programs as copyright protected 
works and other differences this industry represents compared to the “traditional” 
creative industries. 
Overall impact of the new legislation 
It seems that the newly introduced changes to the German copyright law will have 
considerable impact on the creative business in Germany. Total-buy-out agreements on 
a flat-fee basis (still considerably frequent in Germany) now must be renegotiated after 
5 years or there will be no more exclusivity after 10 years. Alternatively, the author 
must be given a fair share of profit made by exploiters. This should support the practice 
of splitting remuneration into a flat-fee and a recurring royalty payment. Such 
behaviour would, however, carve such contract out of the claws of the newly introduced 
Section 40 (which is to be expected). It will therefore put another burden on the creators 
when negotiation their original transfer contract to make sure that the revenue-based 
royalty is sufficiently high (equitable).  
The new reporting regulations can mean considerable efforts not only for the 
transferees, but now also for third parties. They will face a demand to provide annual 




lead to additional fairness in the copyright industry and how the courts will interpret 
and enforce these provisions. Nevertheless, it is to be expected that the cunning industry 
lawyers will come up with ways how to play around the new provisions. As they always 
did. They are more resourceful than the creators. That is why creators are in a weaker 
bargaining position in the first place. In addition, contracts that have been concluded 
before March 2017 are not affected. Therefore, for example, practical implications of 
Section 40 will not be easily assessable until 2022. 
Beneficiaries of protection 
It goes without saying that German authors and performers are beneficiaries of the 
rights described herein.375 However, the circle of beneficiaries extends this group: the 
treatment is also afforded to stateless persons and foreign refugees living in 
Germany376; to nationals of the Member States of the European Union and the 
European Economic Area377; works published for the first time in Germany are also 
protected.378 Authors from any other country can to invoke the remuneration provisions 
if they publish their work first in Germany based on a license agreement. It would be 
interesting to see if this could incite a ´publication country shopping´ on the side of 
international authors, potentially promoting German publishing sector, bringing 
authors from various language areas to Germany, should the EU harmonization fail to 
level up the standards to German level. What happens after the UK exits the EU and 
the acquis communautaire ceases to apply (if that happens – current EU law, as 
effective as of the day of UK leaving the EU, will probably be proclaimed part of the 
UK law through the European Union (Withdrawal) Bill) while the DSM Directive 
strengthens the position of European authors (if ever)? Could this lead to a portion of 
the numerous authors currently published in the UK flee to the continent and seek 
stronger protection here, especially if German publishers are capable of editing and 
publishing in English and other languages? Same rules apply to foreign performers 
whose performances take place in Germany. Otherwise foreign authors and performers 
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cannot rely on the provisions on remuneration. As regards international treaties on 
copyright, Germany has not created new exploitation rights to which the principle of 
national treatment would apply and as such besides the situations described above; 
foreigners are afforded the rights and protection of the German copyright contract 
law.379 
Employee works 
In German copyright Law, the basic principle is that the author´s rights are vested in 
the author380 and according to Section 43 UrhG, the general copyright regime as 
described above applies exactly the same with regards to exploitation rights of 
employees, “unless otherwise provided in accordance with the terms or nature of the 
employment or service relationship”. 
But the application and interpretation of this provision is not as simple as it may seem 
at first sight. German case law has proclaimed, for example, implied grants when the 
work was created within the specific exercise of the duties of the employee and where 
the employee was aware of the fact that the work is used by the employer and the 
employer compensated the employee for this transfer381. This, as reasoned by the court, 
was required by the very purpose of the contract. One can see resemblance with the 
implied license as known in English law.  
Section 43 UrhG does not apply to freelancers or independent workers, since they do 
not work under employment agreement.382 As regards commissioned works, Section 
44 (1) UrhG383 stipulates that “if the author sells the original of a work he shall, in cases 
of doubt, not be deemed to have granted a right of use to the buyer”. In addition, the 
owner of the original of an artistic work or of a photographic work is authorised to 
exhibit the work in public even if it has not yet been published, unless the author has 
explicitly ruled this out at the time of the sale of the original (Section 44(2) UrhG). 
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Moral rights always remain with the employee, same way they remain with the author 
in case of a “regular” grant of exploitation right. 
Performers 
When application of the exploitation provisions to performers is concerned, Section 
79(2), second sentence UrhG stipulates that Sections 31, 32 to 32b, 33 to 42 and 43 
shall apply mutatis mutandis. Therefore, from the provisions discussed above, only 
provisions related to Contracts concerning unknown types of exploitation384 and 
Remuneration for types of exploitation which subsequently become known385 are not 
applicable to performers. 
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Figure 4.1 – provisions of German copyright law related to exploitation rights 
Act on Copyright and Neighboring Rights 386 
of September 9, 1965 
(Gesetz  über  Urheberrecht und verwandte Schutzrechte (Urheberrecht)  
Vom 9. September 1965) 
Part 1 – The copyright (Urheberrecht) 
Chapter 5 – Legal relations in copyright law (Rechteverkehr im Urheberrecht) 
Subchapter 2 – Exploitation rights (Nutzungsrechte) 
Section 31 Grant of exploitation rights (Einräumung von Nutzungsrechten) 
(1) An author may grant another party the right to exploit a work in individual or all 
forms of exploitation (exploitation right). An exploitation right may be granted as a 
non-exclusive right or as an exclusive right, and may be limited in respect of place, 
time or content.  
(2) The non-exclusive exploitation right entitles the rightholder to use the work in the 
permitted way without a use by others being ruled out.  
(3) An exclusive exploitation right shall entitle the rightholder to use the work in the 
manner permitted to him, to the exclusion of all other persons, and to grant exploitation 
rights. It may be agreed that utilisation by the author is reserved. Section 35 remains 
unaffected.  
(4) (repealed)  
(5) If the types of exploitation have not been specifically designated when an 
exploitation right was granted, the types of use to which the right extends shall be 
determined in accordance with the purpose envisaged by both parties to the contract. A 
corresponding rule shall apply to the questions of whether an exploitation right has in 
fact been granted, whether it shall be a non-exclusive or an exclusive exploitation right, 
how far the exploitation right and the right to forbid extent, and to what limitations the 
exploitation right shall be subject.  
Section 31a Contracts concerning unknown types of exploitation (Verträge über 
unbekannte Nutzungsrechten) 
                                                 
386 The translation of the statutory provisions is taken from the www.juris.de (accessed April 2017) 
provided by the Federal Ministry of Justice in cooperation with juris GmbH and combined with 
translation from German to English language provided in A. Klett, M. Sonntag, S. Wilske, 
German Law Accessible: Intellectual Property Law in Germany: Protection, Enforcement and 
Dispute Resolution, (Verlag C.H.Beck Lexis/ Nexis, 2008 Münich), as the author of this thesis 
saw best fit for the terminology used in this work. 
 Provisions in English language of the latest amendment of the German Copyright Act, effective as 
of March 1, 2017 are taken from:  
 https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_urhg/englisch_urhg.html#p0177 (accessed July 
2017). 
 Provisions newly added to the text of the UrhG as of March 2017 are indicated in blue colour of 




(1) A contract where the author grants rights in respect of unknown types of 
exploitation, or where he undertakes the obligation to do so, shall be in writing. Written 
form is not required if the author grants an exploitation right to everyone free of charge. 
The author can revoke the granting of such right or the obligation to do so. The right 
of revocation shall expire after three months after the other person sent the author, at 
the address last known to the sender, the information concerning intended 
commencement of the new type of exploitation of the author’s work.  
(2) The right of revocation shall not apply where the parties, upon becoming aware of 
the new type of exploitation, have agreed on remuneration pursuant to Section 32c (1). 
The right of revocation shall also not apply where the parties have arranged for 
remuneration according to common remuneration standards. The right of revocation 
shall expire upon the author's death.  
(3) If more than one work or contribution to the work have been combined to form one 
collection that can only be exploited in an appropriate way in the new form of 
exploitation using all the works or contributions to the work, the author may not 
exercise the right of revocation in bad faith.  
(4) The rights arising from subsections (1) to (3) cannot be waived in advance.  
 
Section 32 Equitable remuneration (Angemessene Vergütung) 
(1) The author shall have a right to the contractually agreed remuneration for the 
granting of exploitation rights and permission for exploitation of the work. If the 
amount of the remuneration has not been determined, equitable remuneration shall be 
deemed to have been agreed. If the agreed remuneration is not equitable, the author 
may require the other party to consent to a modification of the agreement so that the 
author is granted equitable remuneration.  
(2) Remuneration shall be equitable if determined in accordance with common 
remuneration standards (Section 36). Any other remuneration shall be equitable if at 
the time the agreement is concluded it corresponds to what in business relations is 
customary and fair, given the nature and extent of the possibility of exploitation 
granted, in particular the duration, frequency, extent and time of exploitation, and 
considering all circumstances.  
(3) The other contracting party may not rely on any agreement deviating from 
subsections (1) and (2) to the detriment of the author. The provisions referred to in 
sentence 1 shall also apply if they are by-passed by other arrangements. However, the 
author may grant a non-exclusive exploitation right to everyone free of charge.  
(4) The author shall have no claim under subsection (1) sentence 3 if the remuneration 
that has to be paid for the exploitation of his work is specified in a collective bargaining 
agreement.  
Section 32a Author’s further participation (Weitere Beteiligung des Urhebers) 
(1) Where the author has granted an exploitation right to another party on conditions 
which, taking into account the author’s entire relationship with the other party, result 
in the agreed remuneration being conspicuously disproportionate to the proceeds and 
benefits derived from the exploitation of the work, the other party shall be obliged, at 




author further equitable participation appropriate to the circumstances. It shall be 
irrelevant whether the parties to the agreement had foreseen or could have foreseen the 
amount of the proceeds or benefits obtained.  
(2) If the other party has transferred the exploitation right or granted further exploitation 
rights and if the conspicuous disproportion results from proceeds or benefits enjoyed 
by a third party, the latter shall be directly liable to the author in accordance with 
subsection (1), taking into account the contractual relationships within the licensing 
chain. The other party shall then not be liable.  
(3) The rights under subsections (1) and (2) cannot be waived in advance. An expected 
benefit shall not be subject to compulsory execution; any disposition regarding the 
expected benefit shall be ineffective. However, the author may grant a non-exclusive 
exploitation right to everyone free of charge.  
(4) The author shall have no claim under subsection (1) if the remuneration has been 
determined according to common remuneration standards (Section 36) or by a 
collective bargaining agreement and if further appropriate participation is expressly 
stipulated for the case referred to in subsection (1).  
 
Section 32b Compulsory application (Zwingende Anwendung) 
The application of Sections 32 and 32a shall be compulsory  
1. if German law would be applicable to the exploitation agreement in the absence of a 
choice of law, or  
2. to the extent that the agreement covers significant acts of exploitation within the 
territory to which this Act applies.  
 
Section 32c Remuneration for types of exploitation which subsequently become 
known (Vergütung  für später bekannte Nutzungsrechten) 
(1) The author shall be entitled to separate equitable remuneration where the other 
contracting party commences a new type of exploitation of the author’s work, pursuant 
to Section 31a, which was agreed upon, but still unknown, at the time the contract was 
concluded. Section 32 (2) and (4) shall apply mutatis mutandis. The other contracting 
party shall, without delay, inform the author about the commencement of the new type 
of exploitation of his work.  
(2) Where the other contracting party has transferred the right of exploitation to a third 
party, the third party shall be liable to provide the remuneration pursuant to subsection 
(1) upon commencement of the new type of exploitation of the author’s work. The other 
contracting party shall cease to be liable.  
(3) The rights under subsections (1) and (2) cannot be waived in advance. However, 
the author may grant a non-exclusive exploitation right to everyone free of charge. 
 
Section 32d Right to information and accountability (Anspruch auf Auskunft und 
Rechenschaft) 
(1) Where an exploitation right has been granted or transferred in return for payment, 




accountability in respect of the extent of the use of the work and the proceeds and 
benefits derived there from on the basis of information which is generally available in 
the ordinary course of business activities. 
(2) The entitlement under subsection (1) is ruled out if 
1.  the author has made only a secondary contribution to a work, product or service; a 
contribution is, in particular, secondary where it has little influence on the overall 
impression created by a work or the nature of a product or service, for example because 
it does not belong to the typical content of a work, product or service or 
2.  the claim on the contracting party is disproportionate for other reasons. 
(3) The author shall have no claim under subsection (1) and (2) if the remuneration has 
been determined according to common remuneration standards (Section 36) or by a 
collective bargaining agreement. 
 
Section 32e Right to information and accountability in a licence chain (Anspruch 
auf Auskunft und Rechenschaft in der Lizenzkette) 
(1) Where the author’s contracting partner has transferred the exploitation right or 
granted further exploitation right, the author may also demand information and 
accountability pursuant to section 32d (1) and (2) from those third parties 
1.  which essentially economically determine the use processes in the licence chain or 
2.  from whose profits or benefits the conspicuous disproportion pursuant to section 
32a (2) results. 
(2) In order to be able to assert the entitlements under subsection (1) it shall be sufficient 
that there are clear indications based on verifiable facts that their conditions are met. 
(3) The author shall have no claim under subsection (1) and (2) if the remuneration has 
been determined according to common remuneration standards (Section 36) or by a 
collective bargaining agreement. 
 
Section 33 Continuing effect of exploitation rights (Weiterwirkung von 
Nutzungsrechten) 
Exclusive and non-exclusive exploitation rights shall retain their effect vis-à-vis 
exploitations rights that are granted a later point in time. The same shall apply if the 
right holder who granted the exploitation right changes or if he waives his right.  
 
Section 34 Transfer of exploitation rights (Übertragung von Nutzungsrechten) 
(1) An exploitation right may only be transferred with the consent of the author. The 
author may not refuse his consent contrary to good faith.  
(2) If, together with an exploitation right in a collective work (Section 4), exploitation 
rights in the individual works included in the collective work are transferred, the 
consent of the author of the collective work shall be sufficient.  
(3) An exploitation right may be transferred without the consent of the author if the 
assignment takes place within the course of the sale of a company as a whole or of parts 




expected in good faith to accept the exercise of the exploitation right by the transferee. 
Sentence 2 shall also apply if there are material changes to the shareholdings in the 
right holder´s business.  
(4) The transferee shall be jointly and severally liable for the fulfilment of the 
transferor’s obligations arising from the contract with the author if the author did not 
expressly agree with the transfer of the exploitation right in the individual case.  
(5) The author may not waive the right of revocation and the liability of the transferee 
in advance. Otherwise, the holder of the exploitation right and the author may agree on 
different terms.  
 
Section 35 Grant of further exploitation rights (Einräumung weiterer 
Nutzungsrechten) 
(1) The holder of an exclusive exploitation right may grant further exploitation rights 
only with the consent of the author. The author's consent shall not be required where 
the exclusive exploitation right is granted only to ensure that the author's interests are 
served.  
(2) The provisions under Section 34 (1), second sentence, subsections (2) and (5), 
second sentence, shall apply mutatis mutandis.  
 
Section 36 Common remuneration standards (Gemeinsame Vergütungsregeln) 
(1) In order to determine whether remuneration is equitable pursuant to Section 32, 
authors' associations together with associations of users of works or individual users of 
works shall establish common remuneration standards. Common remuneration 
standards shall take account of the circumstances of the respective area of regulation, 
especially the structure and size of the users. Regulations contained in collective 
bargaining agreements shall take precedence over common remuneration standards.  
(2) Associations as referred to under subsection (1) shall be representative, independent 
and empowered to establish common remuneration standards. An association which 
represents a significant proportion of the respective authors or users of a work shall be 
deemed to be empowered within the meaning of the first sentence, unless the members 
of the association reach a decision to the contrary. 
(3) If the parties have so agreed, proceedings for the establishment of common 
remuneration standards shall be conducted before the arbitration board (Section 36a). 
Proceedings shall be conducted upon the written request of one of the parties, if  
1. the other party does not commence negotiations on common remuneration standards 
within three months of the written request of one of the parties to initiate such 
negotiations,  
2. negotiations on common remuneration standards do result in an outcome one year 
after the written request to initiate such negotiations, or  
3. one of the parties declares that the negotiations have irretrievably failed.  
(4) The arbitration board shall submit to the parties a settlement proposal giving reasons 




be deemed to have been accepted if the arbitration board does not receive any written 
objection thereto within six weeks of the receipt of such proposal.  
 
Section 36a Arbitration board (Schlichtungsstelle) 
(1) In order to establish common remuneration standards, authors' associations together 
with associations of users of works or individual users of works shall set up an 
arbitration board, if the parties have agreed this or one of the parties has requested that 
arbitration proceedings be conducted.  
(2) The arbitration board shall consist of an equal number of assessors appointed by 
each of the respective parties, and an impartial chairperson, the appointment of whom 
both parties should agree upon.  
(3) ... 
 
Section 40 Agreements as to future works (Verträge über künftige Werke) 
(1) A contract in which the author undertakes to grant rights of use in future works 
which are not specified in any way or are only referred to by type shall be made in 
writing. The contract may be terminated by either party after a period of five years 
following its conclusion. The term of notice shall be six months, unless a shorter term 
is agreed. 
(2) The right of termination may not be waived in advance. Other contractual or 
statutory rights of termination shall remain unaffected. 
(3) Where rights of use in future works have been granted in the performance of the 
contract, upon the termination of the contract the provision concerning the works which 
have not yet been supplied shall become ineffective. 
 
Section 40a Right to other exploitation after ten years in the case of flat-rate 
remuneration (Recht zur anderweitigen Verwertung nach zehn Jahren bei pauschaler 
Vergütung) 
(1) Where the author has granted an exclusive exploitation right against payment of 
flat-rate remuneration he shall nevertheless be entitled to exploit the work in another 
manner after the expiry of ten years. The first owner’s exploitation right shall continue 
as a simple exploitation right for the remainder of the period for which it was granted. 
The period referred to in the first sentence shall begin to run upon the granting of the 
exploitation right or, if the work is delivered at a later stage, upon delivery. Section 38 
(4), second sentence, shall apply mutatis mutandis. 
(2) The contracting parties may extend the exclusivity of the right to cover the entire 
duration for which the exploitation right was granted at the earliest five years after the 
point in time referred to in subsection (1), third sentence. 
(3) Contrary to subsection (1), the author may, when concluding the contract, grant an 
exclusive exploitation right without any limitation of time if 
1.  he makes only a secondary contribution to a work, product or service; a contribution 




by a work or the nature of a product or service, for example because it does not belong 
to the typical content of a work, product or service, 
2.  the work is a work of architecture or the draft of such a work, 
3.  the work is, with the author’s consent, intended for use in a trade mark or other 
distinctive sign, in a design or Community design or 
4.  the work is not intended for publication. 
(4) The author shall have no claim under subsection (1) to (3) if the remuneration has 
been determined according to common remuneration standards (Section 36) or by a 
collective bargaining agreement. 
 
Section 41 Right of revocation for non-exercise (Rückrufsrecht wegen 
Nichtausübung) 
(1) Where the holder of an exclusive exploitation right does not exercise the right or 
only does so insufficiently and this significantly impairs the author’s legitimate 
interests, the author may revoke the exploitation right. This shall not apply if the non-
exercise or the insufficient exercise of the exploitation right is predominantly due to 
circumstances which the author can be reasonably expected to remedy. 
(2) The right of revocation may not be exercised before the expiry of two years 
following the grant or transfer of the exploitation right or, if the work is delivered at a 
later date, since its delivery. In the case of a contribution to a newspaper the period 
shall be three months, in the case of a contribution to a periodical published monthly 
or at shorter intervals six months, and in the case of a contribution to other periodicals 
one year. 
(3) The revocation may not be declared until after the author has, upon notification of 
the revocation, granted the holder of the exploitation right an appropriate extension to 
sufficiently exploit the exploitation right. It shall not be necessary to determine an 
extension if it is impossible for the rightholder to exercise the exploitation right or he 
refuses to do so or if granting an extension would prejudice the author’s overriding 
interests. 
(4) The author shall have no claim under subsection (1) to (3) if the remuneration has 
been determined according to common remuneration standards (Section 36) or by a 
collective bargaining agreement. 
(5) The exploitation right shall terminate when revocation becomes effective. 
(6) The author shall compensate the person affected if and insofar as this is fair and 
equitable. 
(7) The rights and claims of the persons involved according to other statutory 





4.1.2. Case law and Market Practice 
During the arguably short period since the enactment of the amendments strengthening 
author´s and performer´s position there have been already several cases brought before 
court and decided. Although some voices indicate that the expectation was much 
higher. A brief contemplation over what may be the reason follows in the analytical 
chapters. 
Below are outlined three cases on the application of Section 32a UrhG tried by German 
courts of different instances. Some have been finalized, while the first one discussed 
(Das Boot) is still moving back and forth between appeals. But the debate presented in 
the hitherto stages of the Das Boot case is a valuable input into the discussion whether 
the changes brought about by the Act to Strengthen the Contractual Position of Authors 
and Performing Artists has met its objective. 
In addition to these three cases, the previous jurisprudence on application of (former) 
Section 36 UrhG387 on the best-seller clause remain applicable as long as it is not in 
contradiction to what was changed with the new legislation, specifically the shift from 
requirement of ´gross´ disproportion to ´conspicuous´. 
 
4.1.2.1. Das Boot 
In the "Das Boot" case, a famous German cameraman, Jost Vacano, sought fair 
remuneration for his contribution to a successful German movie. Das Boot is a story 
about a submarine during World War II. It was made into a full-length movie, 
theatrically released in 1982388, as well as a six-part TV series released in 1985389. Mr. 
Vacano´s work on the cinematography of the movie was quite remarkable, contributing 
to the movie´s inclusive atmosphere with “the unforgettable pictures and feeling of 
claustrophobia, panic and hope, giving viewers the impression to be right among the 
movie's protagonists”390. In fact, Vacano was recognized for his work on the movie by 
                                                 
387 GRUR 2002, 602 - Musikfragmente (§ 36 a.F.), GRUR 2002, 149 - Wetterführungspläne II (§ 36 
a.F.), GRUR 2002, 153 - Kinderhörspiele (§ 36 a.F.), GRUR 1998, 390 - Comis-Übersetzungen I 
(§ 36 a.F.), GRUR 1991, 901 - Horoskop-Kalender (§ 36 a.F.), GRUR 1990, 1005 - Salome (§ 36 
a.F.) 
388 http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0082096/?ref_=nv_sr_1  
389 http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0081834/?ref_=nv_sr_2  




nominations and wins of several awards, including a 1982 Oscar nomination for Best 
Cinematography391. 
In 1981, when the movie was being made, the technology advancement was not at such 
a high level to be able to accommodate for the demanding conditions of the shooting. 
Mr. Vacano, originally an electrical engineer, had done a lot of innovative development 
on his camera and lighting equipment392 in order to make his work as striking as 
possible. 
While the numbers differ slightly depending on sources393, the overall ratio between 
the movie´s budget and its worldwide gross revenue is approximately 15 million USD 
budget against 85 million worldwide gross sales in 2013 (therefore including the 
movie´s director´s cut re-release in 1997). However, its high production costs also rank 
it among some of the most expensive films in the history of German cinema. 
After the amendment of the German copyright law attempting to strengthen author´s 
contractual position it does not seem to come as a surprise that artists of Mr. Vacano´s 
calibre come forward with their claims. 
Mr. Vacano brought his claim before the Munich District Court (Landgericht München 
I) in 2009, trying to receive additional compensation (fair additional participation) from 
the licensee who achieved such a (not only) monetary success with the film.  
Mr. Vacano was – in compliance with the German copyright law – recognized as a joint 
author of the audiovisual work and as such together with the other co-authors he 
conceded a limited exploitation rights to the film´s production company – Bavaria 
Films. However, he argued under Sec. 32a of the UrhG that the lump-sum remuneration 
agreed and paid for such concession was “strikingly disproportionate to the proceeds 
                                                 
391 Vacano won the 1982 Bavarian Film Award for Best Cinematography (Kamerapreis), the 2007 
German Golden Camera Award for “25th Anniversary Camera”, the 2011 Historical Shot by the 
Society of Camera Operators for the "running in the hallway of the submarine" shot.  He was also 
nominated for the 1983 Oscar for Best Cinematography. More details at: 
http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0082096/awards?ref_=tt_awd  
392 For example, he developed a "Gyroscope" which enabled him to rush through the narrow boat, 
steady camera in hand, while armored like an American Football player. He also oversaw the 
putting together of a purpose-built camera which was required specifically for the making of the 







and benefits derived from the commercial exploits” by Bavaria Film and demanded 
that his contracts with Bavaria of 1980 and 1981 be adjusted in light of the global 
success of the film by way of a retroactive share of the revenue. The argument put 
forward was that a clear correlation between Mr. Vacano´s input and the remuneration 
should be made. Mr. Vacano was paid approximately £20 an hour which amounted in 
circa £9.000 total. He brought his claim not only against Bavaria Films, but also against 
the West German Broadcasting Station (WDR) in respect of TV broadcasting rights´ 
exploitation (both for the movie and the series), and against Euro-Video Ltd, a 
subsidiary of Bavaria and distributor of videos and DVDs. He sought access to the 
relevant licensing documentation between Bavaria and this broadcaster and distributor 
respectively in order to be able to determine an exact amount of compensation to 
request. In response to Mr. Vacano´s claim Bavaria declared that his claim was not 
justified as not only did Mr. Vacano receive remuneration that was 40% above the usual 
tariff applicable at the time of the film making but also that the film have not even 
gotten to the point of “breaking even”394.  
This case was the first one brought forward to the Federal Court of Justice (BGH)395 to 
test whether the adjustment of the “best-seller” clause introduced through Section 32a 
UrhG by the Act to Strengthen the Contractual Position of Authors and Performing 
Artists396 in fact represents any improvement.  
Due to so-called action by stages (Stufenklage), meaning that issues arising at various 
stages of action are tried separately, Mr Vacano, demanding that his 1980 and 1981 
contracts with Bavaria are adjusted in light of the global success of the film, first has 
to claim access to information about the respective (theatrical and DVD) user licensing 
and related agreements which would then enable him to calculate the exact amount of 
additional participation.  
                                                 
394 Mr. Vacano´s lawyer allegedly rebutted this response by accusing Bavaria of employing "creative 
accountancy methods", saying that Bavaria will find it difficult to convince the court that "Das 
Boot" has not made a profit yet. Seeing the numbers in public records as outlined above, his 
suspicion seems justifiable. More in http://ipkitten.blogspot.cz/2009/02/will-german-cameramans-
compensation.html 
395 The other two cases analysed later –the “Tatort” and “The Pirates of the Caribbean” cases were 
decided by a lower court and by BGH at a later date, respectively. 
396 Bundesgesetzblatt [Federal Law Gazette] of March 28, 2002, Part I, p.1155 et seq., also available 




After decisions by the Regional Court of Munich I (Landgericht München I) and the 
court of appeal, the Higher Regional Court of Munich (OLG München), the Federal 
Court of Justice (the Bundesgerichtshof) had to assess whether Mr. Vacano had the 
right to claim information (somewhat akin to disclosure) as co-author of the work, and 
whether the defendant had the duty to provide this information to the extent claimed. 
The Higher Regional Court of Munich initially had granted Mr Vacano’s claim to 
information for the time after 28 March 2002, as there had been concrete evidence for 
an indication that he had a claim to additional participation. For the time before 28 
March 2002, however, the Munich court denied the claim to information since the 
transitional provision of Sec.132 (3), second sentence UrhG only allowed the 
consideration of proceeds and benefits that the exploiter of the work obtained after 28 
March 2002. 
In its decision of September 22, 2011397 the BGH confirmed that an author will have a 
claim to information (Auskunft) if there are clear indications that he had a claim based 
on Sec.32a UrhG. Since the claimant was a co-author of the work “Das Boot” he could 
bring such claim himself and demand this type of information himself and for himself. 
The defendant film producing company also appealed, arguing that the court’s 
assumption that there was tangible evidence of a conspicuous disproportion in the sense 
of Section 32a UrhG was based on insufficient facts. The court’s decision that Mr. 
Vacano had a claim to information for the time after 28 March 2002 could thus not be 
upheld. The court of appeal, the Higher Regional Court of Munich (OLG München), 
therefore undertook a renewed assessment as to whether there had been tangible 
evidence based on verifiable facts that in light of the overall relationship between the 
claimant and defendant there was a conspicuous disproportion between the agreed 
payment for the claimant and the defendant’s respective proceeds and benefits.  
Upon subsequent claimant's appeal, the BGH disagreed with the court of appeal and 
concluded that the claimant could also have a claim to information for the time before 
28 March 2002. The Federal appellate court stated that for the assessment of a 
                                                 






conspicuous disproportion within the meaning of Section 32a UrhG, all revenue 
that had been accrued before 28 March 2002 had to be considered.  
The court assessed interpretation of the ambiguous term “facts/circumstances” 
(Sachverhalt) in Sec. 132(3), second sentence UrhG398 and interpreted it as 
encompassing the conspicuous disproportion mentioned in Sec. 32a UrhG as well as 
the actual facts, which had led to the disproportion. However, on the claimant’s appeal, 
the Federal Court of Justice (Bundesgerichtshof) interpreted the term differently and 
included only exploitation actions (Verwertungshandlungen). Sec. 132(3), second 
sentence UrhG in BGH´s opinion only meant that in cases were all prerequisites of 
Sec.32a UrhG were given, a further equitable participation was owed only of the 
proceeds and benefits of exploitation actions which had happened after 28 March 2002. 
For the assessment of acceptability of the claim based on Sec.32a UrhG, the BGH held 
that it was immaterial in the light of Sec. 132(3), second sentence UrhG whether the 
conspicuous disproportion had only existed after 28 March 2002 or whether it had 
already existed on that day and had further existed after 28 March 2002. 
After this assessment, the BGH sent the case back to the court of appeal, the Higher 
Regional Court of Munich, for a further hearing and decision.   
Since, so far, the case has only been at the stage of obtaining information rather than 
deciding on specific compensation, and also seeing that it is doubtful whether any 
compensation will be awarded given the BGH´s assertion that only proceeds taking 
place after 2002 will be considered (which is likely to be very limited given the 
respective release dates of the work)399, one probably should not hold their breath for 
the final outcome. Nevertheless, the decision is important help in interpreting the 
transitional provision of Section 132 UrhG. 
By way of a concluding comment one might add that even if eventually Mr. Vacano 
does not receive any additional compensation (which – irrespective of whether one 
                                                 
398 Sec. 132 (3): “The provisions of this Act as amended on 28 March 2002 shall continue to apply to 
contracts concluded, or other facts which occurred, before 1 July 2002, subject to the second and 
third sentences. Article 32a shall apply to facts which occurred after 28 March 2002. Article 32 
shall apply to contracts concluded between 1 June 2001 and 30 June 2002, if the right granted or 
the permission is used after 30 June 2002.” 
399 As of the creation of this thesis, the case has gone only through the first stage of obtaining 





would wish Mr. Vacano some sort of justice – would be arguably the correct outcome 
of the case, given the public interest to limit retroactive claims), surely his efforts did 
not end up in vein. The acclaim he achieved through his work on Das Boot allowed 
him to work with world renowned directors and on American blockbusters such as 
Robocop or Total Recall. For comparison, the latter´s budget in 1990 was 65 million 
USD while it grossed at 260 million USD worldwide as of 2013. One may wonder 
whether Mr. Vacano would attempt to get some extra participation also for this movie. 
But realizing that it was a US production and that, leaving aside the relatively strong 
guilds in the United States, the environment is not exactly protectionist of the “weaker 
parties”, the evident answer is that there would not be a legislation to back it up with. 
The analytical chapters below provide some discussion on which environment and 
legislative approach seems to provide a better incentive for creativity and/or fairness. 
 
4.1.2.2. Pirates of the Caribbean 
The Pirates of the Caribbean400 case is an excellent opportunity to demonstrate that the 
mandatory copyright contract law provisions apply to performers same way as to 
authors.401 The case concerns claim for additional fair participation under Sec. 32a 
UrhG brought forward by a German “dubbing actor”, Marcus Off. In Germany, 
(similarly as in many other European countries) films (particularly with young target 
audience) are dubbed (or, “voiced-over”) for TV and sometimes even initial cinema 
release.  
Mr. Off is the person normally dubbing Johnny Depp in Germany402. The Higher 
                                                 
400 See details here http://ipkitten.blogspot.cz/2011/08/court-as-film-critic-no-fairness.html  
401 Section 32a UrhG refers to 'authors' but Section 79(2) UrhG guarantees the provision´s application 
also to performers. 
402 It is a common practice that local distributors tend to use the same local person for dubbing 
specific actor (normally even more than one) so that the audience is used to the same tone, 
similarly as viewers enjoying the original language vision can recognize their favourite stars by 
their voice. Some national dubbing actors even enhance their career (or at least income) by 
becoming „the voice” of an international star. Dubbing can be conducted in such a professional 
way that it becomes an artistic performance discipline of its own. This was the case in the Czech 
Republic, for example, when Vladimír Dlouhý brilliantly voiced over Tom Hanks in Forrest 





Regional Court in Berlin403 initially decided Mr. Off’s claim against the actor. Given 
the success of this film franchise at the German box office, the related DVD releases 
and TV licensing of the films Mr Off felt that the fee of approximately €18.000 paid to 
him was not a fair consideration for his contribution and requested additional fair 
participation of €180,000. 
The Berlin court thought that, while theoretically there could be cases where a fee 
received by a dubbing actor was disproportionate to the success of a film and an artist 
could thus demand such an additional fee, his was not such case. The court argued that 
a dubbing artist who lends his voice to a lead actor has no claim for a supplemental fee 
as ´fair additional participation’ where the dubbing actor's actual contribution is of 
´merely ancillary importance to the film´, which will apply “where the film consists 
mostly of technical effects, has numerous supporting actors and where the lead actor 
appears only infrequently”. The Berlin court found that this was exactly the case of the 
Pirates of the Caribbean film, which mostly consisted of technical effects and had 
numerous extras and supporting actors with the actual contribution of the main actor 
(and his German voice) being comparatively small. Overall, the court held that while 
Mr. Off’s contribution to the films was not insignificant, it was already covered by the 
fee paid by the film production company. 
Mr. Off appealed to the Federal Court of Justice (Bundesgerichthof, ´BGH´), pointing 
out that he was already the second dubbing actor to give voice to Jack Sparrow because 
the first one´s efforts were not considered sufficient. He felt that he truly has given the 
character his own personality404.  
On appeal the BGH405 decided in Mr Off´s favour. The BGH held that Mr Off was 
entitled to additional payment because the contribution of a dubbing actor who lends 
his voice to one of the main characters of a film was ´not of mere ancillary importance 
to the overall film´ and the fee paid was not a fair remuneration for the contribution. 
                                                 
403 (Berliner Kammergericht) 24 U 2/10 of 29 June 2011 
404 Mr. Off´s take on Jack Sparrow, the lead character in the Pirates of the Caribbean, can be watched 
here: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4yeNzU8epeo  




The court found that there was a disproportion between the fee paid and the enormous 
success of the work.  
Referring to cases related to the old version of Section 36 UrhG, the court clarified that 
Sec. 32a UrhG may indeed be applicable to the work of dubbing actors who lend their 
voice to main characters of a film if their contribution is not purely "marginal". The 
BGH expressly disagreed with the Higher Regional Court and found that Jack 
Sparrow's part and his appearance was more than just of marginal importance. 
The court also clarified that a dubbing actor may be regarded as a "co-author" of a work 
and provided a detailed guidance as to when one may assume a disproportion in the 
sense of Section 32a UrhG and confirms that financial gains based on distribution of 
the (dubbed) film abroad can be relevant if the parties have agreed on German law as 
governing law.   
Due to the German judicial system, the case was remitted back to the Higher Regional 
Court (Kammersgeright) in Berlin to take account of the BGH´s findings.  
Several comments come to mind when assessing the case. Firstly, one may wonder 
where did the notion of assessment of the “proportion of special effects compared to 
acting” used by the lower court came from? How does it help evaluate the contribution 
of the said work or performance to the works success? And, how does one measure it? 
In addition, anyone who is familiar with the movies knows that Jack Sparrow is a role 
famous for Johnny Depp´s acting and that it is of much more than ´mere ancillary 
importance´. In fact, Johnny Depp was nominated for several acting awards406 for his 
work, which – given genre of the films – is an important acknowledgement of his work. 
Some argue that the character of Jack Sparrow as depicted by Johnny Depp is indeed 
the main driver for the series´ worldwide success. Therefore, the finding of the BGH 
seems more relatable. As such, however, it is very difficult to give the dubbing of such 
character one´s own personality when they have to focus on truthfully copying the 
                                                 
406 To name a few, Mr. Depp was nominated for the 2004 best actor Oscar, Golden Globe and 
BAFTA award for the Pirates of the Caribbean: the Curse of the Black Pearl and for the 2007 
Golden Globe for the Pirates of the Caribbean: Dead Man´s Chest. List of Johnny Depp´s award is 




personality that Johnny Depp gave the role in the first place (in order to maintain the 
crucial factor of the film´s success). 
Also, as noble as the intentions of the legislator may be, the reality is different. After 
Mr. Off brought his claim for additional fair participation, the German distributor hired 
someone else to voice over Johnny Depp in the fourth instalment of Pirates of the 
Caribbean in 2011. If for no other reason, for this one may find the additional €180.000 
a fair remedy.407 
If one accepts that the contribution of the (co)author or performer to the overall success 
of the (collective) work is the decisive factor for entitlement for additional fair 
participation, still with the dubbing actors one may ask: Would the movie achieve the 
same box office success in the given country if the lead (and most popular character) 
was voiced-over by a different dubbing actor? It seems like the answer would be yes in 
this given case and that as such Mr. Offs performance did not really contribute to the 
overall financial success of the work. 
 
4.1.2.3. Tatort 
In the “Tatort” case408 the Higher Regional Court of Munich had to decide a claim for 
additional fair participation brought by the co-creator of the intro to one of Germany’s 
most famous TV crime series: Tatort (in English: “Crime scene”). Tatort409 is a 90 
minute crime story initially shown on Sunday nights and produced by different local 
stations of German broadcasting station ARD.  Different police investigators solving 
fictitious crimes in various parts of Germany were depicted (with famous detective 
Schimanski played by Götz George being one of them). Irrespective of which detective 
                                                 
407 It may be interesting to make a survey to see what is considered an ´equitable remuneration´ for 
dubbing of a blockbuster movie´s lead character´ in the first place and how does the market 
practice differ country by country. For comparison, a Czech dubbing actor would get, depending 
on their local fame, a fee in the realm between 2,500 to 5,000 CZK (€95 – 190) for dubbing a 
DVD release and around 15,000 CZK (€555) for theatrical release (to clarify: the rate is a lump-
sum for the whole movie, not an hourly rate or so). That is only 3% of the fee Mr. Off received.  
 To compare the markets, here are a few numbers: Czech Republic has 10,5 million people, average 
cost of a cinema ticket is €4,50 (2015) and the Pirates of the Caribbean: the Curse of the Black 
Pearl grossed in the cinema box office between its release on 28/8/2003and year end at $1,16 mil. 
The numbers for Germany are 81 million /€8,1 / $44 mil. 
408 29 U 2749/10 of 10 February 2011 




was investigating or where the respective episode of the series took place, one part of 
the series never changed: the series’ iconic intro. The show has been airing for over 40 
years now and the intro remains the same.410 
The co-creator (a graphic designer and filmmaker) of this intro (consisting of distinct 
visual and audio elements) had been paid a lump-sum fee of 2,500 Deutsch Marks 
(which converted but not considering inflation makes up to roughly £1200) when the 
series was first aired in 1970. She claimed that she was the sole author of the underlying 
storyboard and a co-creator of the intro scene. Having seen the success of the series 
over the years, the claimant thought that 2,500 Deutsch Marks was not a fair 
remuneration for her contribution and decided to claim an additional fair participation 
from the ARD under Section 32a UrhG. 
Initially, the Regional Court of Munich I (LG München I) had (surprisingly) decided in 
her favour. On appeal, the Higher Regional Court of Munich (OLG München) found in 
favour of the defendant, ARD. The Regional Court had found that the payment of a flat 
fee had been in conspicuous disproportion to the time of exploitation and held that the 
claimant should be entitled to a claim under Section 32a UrhG.411  
On February 10, 2011 the appellate court agreed with the defendant and dismissed the 
claim. The court held that the intro was not a separate work in its own right.  It had no 
direct impact or influence on the commercial success of the Tatort series and as such 
Section 32a UrhG did not apply. The court further explained that viewers did not watch 
the series in order to see and hear of the intro. The intro was well-known to viewers 
because it had been shown regularly on television for over 40 years unchanged. Since 
the wording of Section 32a UrhG does not expressly list who is entitled to claim under 
the provision, the court assessed this question by referring to the expected intent of the 
legislator. The Higher Regional Court of Munich took the view that the application of 
Section 32a UrhG had to be reserved for such cases where the claimant’s ‘contribution 
to overall work was not only of merely subordinate importance’.   
The Higher Regional Court of Munich also dismissed the claim to be named as an 
author in the intro stating that the claimant’s right to be named as one of the creators 
                                                 
410 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=veOJYxHlgW8  




had been forfeited since over four decades had passed since the intro’s creation. It was 
also held that not every contributor to the series could be named and that it was 
customary in the sector for the given use to only list the main contributors.  
The judges, however, confirmed that the claimant had a right to prevent others from 
being named as sole authors of the intro. It turned out that ARD had named one of its 
employees as the sole creator and the court found that this infringed the claimant´s 
rights as the sole and true author. Further appeal has been not allowed. This is 
unfortunate as it seems that a strong moral right case was dismissed. 
It would have been nice to see if contribution of the co-author of the work (the 
cameraman) in the “Das Boot” case to the overall success of the film was also 
considered. It that case it might be much easier to argue and establish. 
Reber412 comments in his article that he finds it astonishing that the BGH in both the 
cases testing the application of Sec. 32s UrhG413 did not address the part of Sec. 32a 
(2) UrhG mentioning “taking into account the contractual relationships within the 
licensing chain”, which may lead to conclusion that the court did not consider the 
wording to be relevant.  He argues that this issue should not be ignored. It is important 
to note that there is no subsidiarity between claims against the author´s contractual 
partner414 and claims against a third party exploiter.415 But some link between these 
two claims has to be acknowledged if a portion of the proceeds obtained by such third 
party is to be paid to the author´s contractual partner. It may be reasonable to view a 
portion of the proceeds payable by such third party to the author´s contractual partner 
as a license fee (despite the fact that proceeds considered for the additional participation 
claim are to be taken as gross) because the author should not be able to participate twice 
in one and the same part of revenues – claiming further participation against his 
contracting partner first and the third party exploiter next. Reber believes that the third 
party should be able to deduct the license fee payable to the contractual partner from 
                                                 
412 Nikolaus Reber, ´The "further fair participation" provision in Art. 32 a (2) German Copyright Act - 
Claims against a third-party exploiter of a work´, JIPL&P 2016, 11(5), 382-385, 384 
413 BGH GRUR 2012, 496 – Das Boot (The Boat) and BGH GRUR 2012, 1248 – Fluch der Karibik 
(Pirates of the Caribbean) 
414 Under Sec. 32a (1) UrhG 




the gross revenues.416 Only the remaining revenue should then be considered for the 
assessment of whether there is a ´conspicuous disproportion´, and this should be the 
case for all ´third party exploiters´ who have license fee payable to the author´s 
contracting partner and against which the author could have a claim under Sec. 32a (2) 
UrhG. 
While this may seem like a ´common sense´ approach, there are also competing 
interpretations of this rather unclear part of the provision which believe that all 
revenues of the third party (licensee) have to be taken into account and it must be the 
task of the licensee to subrogate against the licensor on a contractual basis if an author 
succeeds with his claim.417 Reber therefore confirms his view that a license fee paid by 
the third party exploiter to the author´s contracting partner should be deductible from 
the third party´s proceeds considered for the purpose of assessing ´conspicuous 
disproportion´.418 Reber gives a calculation example which, for the easier 
demonstration, is provided in verbatim here: 
“Let us assume that the author only received € 1 from his contractual 
partner for the video rights. The author´s contractual partner then transfers 
the video rights to a third-party user for € 1000. Let us pretend that this 
payment is adequate for the transfer of the video rights. The third party 
subsequently exploits the film on video and gains revenue of €10 000. In 
order to receive adequate compensation, the author should have received 
10% of the revenues. Therefore, we would find conspicuous disproportion 
in both relationships. In my [Reber] view the author should now be able 
to claim 10% of € 1000 from his contractual partner, i.e. € 100 pursuant 
to Sec. 32a (1) UrhG. Further, the author should be entitled to claim 
                                                 
416 Ibid Reber (2016), 384 
417 Reber mentions for example Nordemann, ´Das neue Urhebervertragsrecht´ (The New Copyright 
Contract Law´)´, 2002. Another opinion (of Professors Schultze and Dreier in their 5 th edition of 
the Commentary to the German Copyright Act (2015)) is also considered, although it has no 
foundation in the wording of the law or its legislative history: They believe it is important to 
assess whether the third party paid a reasonable license fee to the author´s contractual partner or 
its licensor and if that is the case they think it unjustified to claim further participation against the 
third party user if the latter had already paid the reasonable fee to their contracting partner. Reber 
disagree with such approach pointing out for example that it would be very difficult for the author 
to assess what a reasonable license fee is in a contractual relationship in which he in no way 
participates. 




another 10% of the revenues against the third party/licensee after 
deduction of the license fee, i.e. 10% of € 9000 which is € 900. All in all, 
the author would receive ´further equitable participation’ of € 1000.”419  
Reber also mentions that if the other interpretation was adopted, the author would have 
received only € 100 from his contractual partner because the license fee paid by the 
licensor (his contracting partner) to the licensee (the third party) was equitable. That 
would be unfair to the author and against the law and the intention of the German 
legislator. 
The disunity of the German commentators on the interpretation and application of the 
discussed provisions shows how difficult it is to draft a legislation in a precise enough 
manner that it meets its objectives, is fair to all the participants and is easy to interpret 
and apply. Considering how long it has taken Germany to draft it and the problems 
emerging despite the otherwise famed German precision, one becomes sceptical how 
can this be done on a European level in a short time frame and reflecting often 
competing interests of national legislators, numerous stakeholders and also diverse 
legal systems and doctrines. 
As far as market practice is concerned, at least for film industry, even after those 15 
years, producers and TV companies tend to preserve their ´buy-out´ practice and insist 
on the grant of all possible rights from the author for a non-recurrent lump-sum 
payment as low as possible. They are also reluctant to accept provisions guaranteeing 
additional payment for repeated use of film (as can be seen in major US Guild 
Agreements concerning film production).420 It seems like the legislator did not 
anticipate the difficulties the 2002 reform will experience when enforcing the law. The 
authors are still in a very unfortunate position of having to sue their contracting partners 
which – as seen on the example of Mr. Off – gets them ´blacklisted´. So, while they 
may get some additional participation, it will deprive them from a long-term source of 
income and secures them a label of a troublemaker. Many may therefore still hesitate 
to enforce their statutory right. 
 
                                                 
419 Ibid Reber (2016), 385 




4.1.3. Conclusion to Chapter 4.1. 
It is clear from the hitherto addressed national regulation that Germany has already 
dedicated a considerable amount of time and effort to address the question how to 
achieve fair reward for authors and performers paid for exploitation of their work vis-
à-vis the strength of their licensees. Such efforts are a result of combination of factors 
with the monist doctrine being one of the strongest drivers. The bond between the 
author and his work or the performer and his performance and corresponding 
(constitutional) right to obtain what is a fair participation on all the proceeds resulting 
from utilization of such work or performance is evident. It is hard to imagine same 
being afforded to an author or performer under UK law with the different justification 
for copyright protection as briefly outlined in the opening chapter and followed by more 
analysis in Chapter 4.3. In the Czech Republic, some attempts have been made but the 
results are rather ineffective (the question remains whether the intent was genuine and 
as such the attempt is a failure, or if the aim was that the proverbial wolf has been fed421 
- a result of a political compromise). The UK and Czech approach will be discussed in 
the next chapters. But it is without a doubt that Germany has so far gone the furthest 
when it comes to introducing a fair contract adjustment mechanism as stipulated in 
Article 15 of the draft DSM Directive. As such, it is likely that in order to succeed with 
their attempts, the Commission should take example from the current German approach 
and try to learn from German successes and fails. 
But even in Germany it will not be easy to determine if the reforms brought by the 
described legislation were indeed effective and achieved the designated goal. After 
certain period during which authors and performers will claim both equitable 
remuneration and further participation, and the courts will indicate in their 
interpretation and application of the said provisions how to read the rules (and also 
possibly a considerable amount of common remuneration standards will be developed), 
it will be difficult to determine if the frequency with which claims are made goes down 
(if that is the case) because they are simply difficult and expensive to enforce or because 
                                                 
421 There is a Czech proverb stating in literal translation “The wolf has eaten and the goat remained 
whole”, meaning coming up with a solution that seemingly is a solution to a problem (hungry 
wolf) but the party that would have been hurt should the problem truly be resolved remains intact 




the regulation in fact has been succeeding. One could assume that after a few successful 
claims made, the licensees of exploitation rights will be willing to provide additional 
compensation, after this is claimed by their licensor, rather than undergoing an 
expensive court proceeding which may ultimately award the claimant with higher 
amount than what would have been agreed through the requested amendment of the 
contract or the further participation request. 
Arguably, any assessment on the success of the German legislator´s endeavour can be 
done only through an (empirical) economic study comparing the state of contractual 
remuneration in 2002 and now, trying to track if the position of authors and performers 
indeed improved. Also, possibly a cross border study would be helpful in order to see 
if – within the examined time - the German protectionist legislation improved the 
position of authors and performers in Germany compared to other markets (with similar 
size of entertainment industry) where any such regulation does not exist. Does this kind 
of interference of the state into contractual freedom actually bring any fruits or should 
the markets be left to regulate themselves spontaneously? This kind of outcome would 





4.2. Czech Republic 
4.2.1. Legislation 
4.2.1.1. Historical background and justification 
Introduction 
Czech copyright law (and previously Czechoslovak law - interrupted by the dissolution 
of the federation in 1993) follows the continental civil law system and the Central 
European sub-system (influenced by German scholarship) in which author´s rights 
were mainly promoted to protect an expression of personality ("child of a mind") rather 
than a property right, emanating from the right to copy as is the case in common law 
system of the United Kingdom. 
Until early 2000, the German-like monistic author´s rights system (as oppose to 
“copyright” system) was followed. However, in 2000 - by way of the CZCA - Czech 
Republic introduced a blend between the German monistic422 and the French 
dualistic423 system. As in the dualistic systems, the law deals with moral rights 
and the economic rights of the author and performers separately, but in the same way 
as in monistic systems, the economic rights are inalienable and can be only licensed 
(not assigned) while the author always formally retains such economic rights. More 
details on this so called quasi-dualistic system424 follow below. This differentiation 
will be shown as important due to the emphasis it places on transferability of rights and 
the potential corresponding limitations on options for remuneration of authors and 
performers. 
In 2004, Czech Republic joined the European Union and, as such, gradually 
implemented the constantly growing EU copyright law, harmonizing the copyright 
                                                 
422 In addition to Germany, the following EU Member States follow the monistic approach to author´s 
rights in their copyright doctrines: Austria, Bulgaria, Latvia, and Slovenia. (This is based on a 
research made in 2010 by the author of this work for her LL.M. thesis “Can an Exclusive Licensee 
Ever be the Owner? An Examination of the Non-Assignability of Author´s Economic Rights in the 
Czech Republic” submitted at the Center for Commercial Law Studies, Queen Mary University of 
London. 
423 In addition to France, the following EU Member States follow the dualistic approach to author´s 
rights in their copyright doctrines: Belgium, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Greece, Italy, 
Luxemburg, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Spain, and Sweden. 




legislation with the rest of the Member States, and curtailing the differences in those 
areas of copyright law already affected by such work of the Commission425. 
Historical development  
After the formation of the Czechoslovak state in 1918, the countries of the current 
Czech Republic and Slovakia adopted the Austrian and Hungarian laws, respectively, 
of the former Austro-Hungarian Empire: the Austrian Copyright Act of 1895 
was accepted in the western (Czech) part of the country (Bohemia, Moravia and a 
portion of Silesia) and the Hungarian Copyright Act of 1884 in the eastern (Slovak) 
part of Czechoslovakia (Slovakia and Subcarpathian Ruthenia). Only in 1926 was the 
Czechoslovak copyright law unified.426   
The Act of 1926 was replaced by a 1953 Copyright Act adopted after the 1948 
communist takeover and was shaped by the political doctrines of the State. Whilst 
formally resembling many provisions of the 1926 Act, in reality it sought to embed 
communist ideology, such as to "provide incentive to works serving the interests of the 
people", to ensure that "the broadest masses of the working people will benefit from 
the creative work of the authors", so that "their works become an effective instrument 
in the progress of the socialist society".427 As with many property rights and 
possessions, the communist copyright law deprived the authors of any property rights. 
As per communist ideology, it was the State who decided what the remuneration tariffs 
would be and the use any copyright works in state owned media, leisure and 
                                                 
425 At that time they were Council Directive 91/250/EEC of 14 May 1991 on the legal protection of 
computer programs; Council Directive 93/83/EEC of 27 September 1993 on the coordination of 
certain rules concerning copyright and rights related to copyright applicable to satellite 
broadcasting and cable retransmission; Council Directive 92/100/EEC of 19 November 1992 on 
rental right and lending right and on certain rights related to copyright in the field of intellectual 
property; Directive 96/9/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 1996 on 
the legal protection of databases; Council Directive 93/98/EEC of 29 October 1993 harmonising 
the term of protection of copyright and certain related rights; Directive 2004/48/EC of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the enforcement of intellectual 
property rights; the Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 
May 2001 on the harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the 
information society; Directive 2001/84/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 
September 2001 on the resale right for the benefit of the author of an original work of art. 
426 The preceding step in such unification was achieved for publishing contracts in the 1923 Law on 
Publishing Contracts. More details on the historical development of copyright law in the Czech 
Republic see Rudolf Leška, Kateřina Štechová, „Chapter 12 - Czech Republic and Slovakia“ in 
Gillian Davies (eds), Moral Rights (2nd edn., Sweet & Maxwell, 2016), 374 
427 Rudolf Leška, Kateřina Štechová, „Chapter 12 - Czech Republic and Slovakia“ in Gillian Davies 




entertainment.  Interestingly, the law was in fact dualistic, with 
alienable economic rights and inalienable moral rights. 
The 1965 Copyright Act428 followed the 1953 Act but provided for purely monistic 
approach to remuneration, very similar to the German 1965 Copyright Act (applicable, 
as amended, until today). To some extent, it also reflects development of so called 
socialist laws, including adoption of the socialist constitution429 and the new (socialist) 
civil code430, but it was not so politically driven as those two acts.431 In addition to 
author´s rights, the 1965 Copyright Act also extended protection to performer´s rights, 
rights of producers of sound recordings, and rights of broadcasting and television 
organisations. The Act survived intact for25 years before being amended with the 
change of political regime in the country. Since the collapse of the former Soviet Union, 
until its replacement in 2000, it was amended six times; for example in order to reflect 
Czech Republic´s successful negotiations on EU accession, or in order to comply with 
international obligations resulting from the TRIPS agreement or the business 
agreement with the United States.432 These amendments also introduced into Czech 
copyright law the notion of computer program and extended the list of compulsory 
licenses to free licenses for educational establishments and libraries.  
The 2000 Copyright Act (the ´CZCA´), as a new modern act, abandoning the rigid, 
monopolistic approach of the state to copyright law, brought Czech copyright law into 
conformity with European Union legislation and with international copyright 
legislation433 adopted in late 90s. Details of the new regulation are provided below with 
the text on current applicable law. 
                                                 
428 Act No. 35/1965 Coll. 
429 Constitutional Act No. 100/1960 Coll. 
430 Act No. 40/1964 Coll. 
431 More details in Ivo Telec, Autorský zákon a předpisy související -Texty s předmluvou [„Copyright 
Act and Related Regulation – Texts with Introductions“] (2nd edn., C.H.Beck, Prague 1996), X 
432 More details in Ivo Telec, Autorský zákon a předpisy související -Texty s předmluvou [„Copyright 
Act and Related Regulation – Texts with Introductions“] (2nd edn., C.H.Beck, Prague 1996), 
XXII 
433 Despite the political influences on copyright law and the doctrinal approach during the communist 
era, Czechoslovakia was always proactive in the development of international copyright laws; 
Czech Republic, as its successor state, is bound by all of the international conventions to which 
Czechoslovakia was a party. These are (as of June 2017) all the major copyright-related treaties: 
the Berne Convention (entry into force for Czechoslovakia as of February 22, 1921 (Berlin Act 
and the Berne Additional Protocol), November 30, 1936 (Rome Act) and April 11, 1980 (Brussels 





Justification of protection granted to authors and performers 
As shown in Chapter 2.8., the philosophical reasons (justification) for provision of 
protection to allow authors to benefit from their creative endeavours (or investment of 
various kinds, and not just monetary) are reflected in a way rights to works and 
performances can be managed (transferred - by way of a licence or an assignment, or 
waived). That is in turn connected to the way such grants can be monetised. 
As indicated in the introductory chapters, the three jurisdictions under observation were 
partially chosen in the given composition because they each represent one of the 
different systems, or its variation. Czech Republic being a continental – civil – law 
jurisdiction, but mixing a monistic and dualistic doctrinal approach to author´s rights, 
gives a great insight into how such theoretical consideration can affect the practical 
issues of dealing with author´s and performer´s rights. 
 
Limitations of alienability and waivability of author’s and performer´s rights 
Before describing and analysing the current applicable law it is necessary to understand 
the historical and philosophical background, and to realise that some options for 
remuneration of authors and performers may be restricted by the doctrinal approach 
embedded in the text of a regulation. 
As already indicated, Czech legal theory adheres to the quasi-dualistic approach to 
relationship between the economic and moral rights of authors and performers. The nature 
of the hybrid system lies in the fact that there is a different approach to both the duration 
                                                 
Property Organization, Universal Copyright Convention, Geneva Convention for the Protection 
of Producers of Phonograms, International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 
Treaty on the International Registration of Audiovisual Works, Agreement on Trade Related 
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, WIPO Copyright Treaty, WIPO Performances and 
Phonograms Treaty, Beijing Treaty on Audiovisual Performances (signed but not yet ratified), 
Marrakesh Treaty (signed but not yet ratified). 
 More details on Czech Republic´s memberships in regional and international conventions and 
treaties related to copyright law see K.Garnett, G.Davies, G.Hardbottle, Copinger and Skone 
James on Copyright. Volume 1 (16th edn., Sweet & Maxwell, 2011) as amended by First (2012) 






of and inalienability of separate moral and economic rights. In comparison to the 1965 
Copyright Act, the CZCA introduces some dualistic elements but does not introduce the 
dualism in its full form, with similar approach to economic rights as in the common law 
copyright approach434.  
The dualistic elements are represented by clear separation of author’s rights into exclusive 
moral rights (listed in Sec. 11 CZCA) and exclusive economic rights (listed in Arts. 12 to 
27 CZCA). On the other hand, author´s and performer´s rights are considered personality 
rights435 in the wider sense. Telec436 explains that “The reason for exclusion of these ‘ideal 
objects’ from assignability lies in the fact, that this property has a personal substance. 
This substance is of a spiritual character. The very substance of these creations, no matter 
if artistic, scientific or technical, prevents them from alienability. The creations are 
ontologically bound to the spiritual personality of the creator (creation de l´esprit) 
because they lie in the creator’s specific personal skills and endowment. The doctrine of 
incorporeal property thus speaks about an ontological union of creator’s personality and 
his creation.”  
It is expressly provided for in Section 26 (1) and (2) CZCA that economic rights to 
author’s works and performances437 can be alienated exclusively in case of death (mortis 
causa) not by assignment among living persons (inter vivos); they cannot be waived. 
Nevertheless, they can be licensed.  To sum it up, the maintenance of the personal nature 
                                                 
434In addition to the United Kingdom, the following EU Member States are “copyright” jurisdictions: 
Cyprus, Ireland and Malta. On the ‘quasi-dualistic‘ concept in Czech law see I. Telec, P. Tůma, 
Autorský zákon – komentář ["Author’s Act – Commentary"], (1st edn., C.H.Beck, Praha 2007),  at 
p. 311; and J.Kříž, I.Holcová, J.Kordač, V. Křesťanová - Autorský zákon – komentář a předpisy 
související ["Author’s Act – Commentary and Related Regulations"], (2nd edition, Linde Praha, 
2005), at p. 80 
435 For further details see R. Leška, K. Štechová, „Chapter 12 - Czech Republic and Slovakia“ in 
Gillian Davies (eds), Moral Rights (2nd edn., Sweet & Maxwell, 2016), 400 or I. Telec, Přehled 
práva duševního vlastnictví: Lidskoprávní základy, Licenční smlouva ["Summary of Intellectual 
Property Rights: Basis of Human Rights, License Agreement"], (2nd edn., Doplněk, Brno 2007), 
101.  
  Telec in his work divides intellectual property that is out of transferability or assignability into 
five categories: (i) features of personality (such as life, name, health, honour, privacy); (ii) 
manifestations of a personal nature (personal diary, letter or e-mail) which belong to general 
personality rights; (iii) artistic or scientific works, (iv) performances; and (v) technical creations 
such as an invention or design. 
436I. Telec, Přehled práva duševního vlastnictví: Lidskoprávní základy, Licenční smlouva ["Summary 
of Intellectual Property Rights: Basis of Human Rights, License Agreement"], (2nd edn., Doplněk, 
Brno 2007), 101 
437 Regulation of transferability of performer´s economic rights is equal to that of author´s economic 




of the economic rights is reflected in ´four limitations´. Author´s and performer´s 
economic rights cannot be (i) waived, (ii) assigned inter vivos, (iii) subject of 
execution/enforcement procedure, and (iv) included as an asset in an insolvency 
settlements.438  
Through these prohibitions the state does not only protect the ́ personal interest of a creator 
and the essence of the fruits of his creation´, but also protects the author from himself, e.g. 
from an imprudent alienation of his economic rights inter vivos.439 This protectionism is 
further discussed in relation to the protection of the weaker party to copyright contractual 
relations. 
The CZCA still follows the personal basis of author’s and performer’s rights which lie in 
the natural character of a creation as an activity of the human mind. In contrast with the 
previous 1965 legislation, where author’s rights were subject to law of succession as an 
inseparable and non-appraisable personal-economic unit, according to the CZCA, 
however, moral rights cease to exist at the time of death of the author because they are 
connected to the author or creator by their very essence. Although general elements of 
moral rights end with author´s or performer’s death, paternity and integrity rights 
remain protected. That is because the law clearly stipulates that “after the death of the 
author no one may arrogate to himself authorship of the work; the work may only be 
used in a way which shall not detract from its value and, unless the work is an 
anonymous work, the name of the author must be indicated where this is a normal 
practice”.440 For the above mentioned naturalistic reason an author or performer cannot 
waive his exclusive moral rights neither can he transfer them, either during his lifetime or 
in the event of death441 (inter vivos or mortis causa).442 It also means that they cannot be 
                                                 
438 Sec. 26 (1) CZCA and its application; for further details see also I. Telec, Některé základní a 
obecné otázky nového českého autorského práva – část 2 [“Some Fundamental and General Issues 
of New Czech Author’s Rights Act – part 2”], Buletin Advokacie, 2001, č. 3, at p. 40 
439I. Telec, Některé základní a obecné otázky nového českého autorského práva – část 2 [“Some 
Fundamental and General Issues of New Czech Author’s Rights Act – part 2”], Buletin 
Advokacie, 2001, č. 3, at p. 40 
440 Section 11 (5) CZCA 
441 Section 11 (4) CZCA 




subject to execution or insolvency procedures.443 No one but the author or performer can 
ever exercise their moral rights, even if the economic rights change hands.444 
In comparison, the dualistic aspect of the concept is reflected in the fact that, on the death 
of the author, economic rights are inherited by his heirs and last for another 70 years 
whereas moral rights come to an end.445 
 
Types of transfer under Czech doctrine and their application 
As Tůma explains, under the Czech legal theory, two kinds of transfer of intellectual 
property can be made: a ‘constitutive (improper) transfer’ (konstitutivní (nepravý) 
převod) - equalling a license; and so called ‘translative (real) transfer’ (translativní 
(pravý) převod) which means alienation of the right and transfer of ownership of the 
right - in the common law sense an ‘assignment’. While in case of translative transfer, 
absolute rights and obligations of one person to the object of the transfer cease to exist 
and corresponding rights and obligations are derivatively acquired by another person, 
the substance of a constitutive transfer does not lie in alienation of the rights but rather 
in the constitution of an authorization to use.446 In case of constitutive transfer, a 
transferee keeps the right but is obliged to refrain from such actions as would preclude 
the transferee from exercising the rights acquired.447  
Complete non-transferability of an author’s economic rights, as is the case with author’s 
moral rights448, would lack any general legal-theoretical basis. Since economic rights do 
not form part of human personality under Czech law certain forms of transfer of an 
author’s economic rights are granted recognition under various national copyright laws, 
even in civil law jurisdiction with a monistic doctrine of author´s rights. Failing to do so 
                                                 
443Ibid  
444 For more details on exception for employee and commissioned works, moral rights of performers 
performing as part of an anasamble, and the heir´s right to object to an infringement of author´s 
paternity and integrity right on behalf of the author or performer after their death see Rudolf 
Leška, Kateřina Štechová, „Chapter 12 - Czech Republic and Slovakia“ in Gillian Davies (eds), 
Moral Rights (2nd edn., Sweet & Maxwell, 2016) 
445Ibid Telec (2001/2), 40 
446 P. Tůma, Smluvní licence v autorském právu ["Contractual License in Copyright Law"], (1st edn., 
C.H.Beck, Praha 2007),  11 
447 ibid 
448 Section 11(4) CZCA (“author may not waive his moral rights; these rights are non-transferable and 




would lead to a factual preclusion of the economical evaluation of an author’s rights and 
to a denial of their property character.449  Due to the doctrinal reasons explained above, 
Czech legislators decided to prohibit assignment of an author’s economic rights during 
his lifetime. 450  This is established in particular by virtue of Section 26 (1) CZCA which 
stipulates that an author’s economic rights may not be waived by the author; such rights 
are not assignable and are not subject to the enforcement of a decision.451 Section 26 
(2) CZCA sets out that economic rights are inheritable, however, once these rights are 
inherited, they are not further assignable by the successor; the inheritor himself is also 
limited in dealing with the inherited economic rights inter vivos to the same extent as the 
author, no matter that the work does not emanate from his personality whatsoever. It is 
doubtful whether such a restriction on the freedom to contract is still justifiable by the 
doctrine of a bond between an author’s personality and the work. There are even voices 
(including the author of this work) claiming that this approach should be abandoned and 
purely dualistic approach to author´s rights should be adopted. Esteemed scholars such as 
Telec452 or Tůma453 advocated such an option, and Kříž454 was contemplating such 
possibility already shortly after the adoption of the 2000 CZCA, although did not see the 
time ripe for such change at that point.  
The principle of non-assignability of author’s economic rights (with only constitutive 
transfer being allowed) also gives rise to other prohibited transactions, in particular it is 
                                                 
449Ibid Tůma (2007), 13 
450It is worth noting here that as non-creative related rights (the right of a producer of a phonogram to 
his recording; the right of a producer of an audiovisual fixation to his fixation; the right of a radio 
or television broadcaster to his broadcast; the rights enjoyed, in respect of a previously 
unpublished work, by the person who, after the expiry of copyright protection, for the first time 
lawfully made the work public; the right of a publisher to remuneration in connection with the 
making for personal use of a copy of the work published by him) lack any personal element they 
are assignable under Czech law and this is, in fact, common practice. Such assignability is 
stipulated under Sections 76 (5), 80 (4), 84 (3) CZCA. A performer’s rights, on the other hand, 
contain a personal element and, unlike other related rights, are not assignable according to Section 
74 CZCA, referring to applicable provisions on author’s rights.  
451The same applies to a performer’s economic rights. Prohibition of their assignment is stipulated in 
Section 74 CZCA 
452 Seminar of ALAI Czech Republic held May 21st, 2013 in Prague on the Effect of the new Czech 
Civil Code on copyright legislation in the country. 
453 Pavel Tůma, ´K problematice převoditelnosti majetkových autorských práv´ [“On the Issue of 
Transferability of Economic Rights”], Buletin Advokacie, 2012, Issue no. 4, 64. He even goes as 
far as claiming that “the reasons for application of the current concept of author´s rights are not of 
dogmatic nature but of legal policy; it is up to the legislator which position on the topic will be 
chosen, while options are multiple (author´s translation)”  
454 J.Kříž, I.Holcová, J.Kordač, V. Křesťanová - Autorský zákon – komentář a předpisy související 




prohibited to make recourse to author’s rights by execution, to secure receivables (claims) 
by author’s rights and, especially, to use author’s rights (or even work) as a pledge455. In 
addition, and for the reasons explained, economic rights cannot be appraised for any such 
purpose456. This unnecessarily limits the economic utilisation of one´s creativity. In civil 
law dualistic systems and in common law jurisdictions, securitisation of investment 
through existing and even future rights is a common and effective way how to raise funds. 
It forms, for example, a considerable part of film industry financing. 
These bans of transfer distinguish author’s and performer´s rights from other intellectual 
property rights and also from non-creative related (entrepreneurial) rights457. In addition, 
author’s economic rights are non-waivable and do not become time-barred. Any attempt 
to assign an author’s right would be null and void by conflict with applicable law.458 
Therefore, according to current applicable Czech copyright law a license is the only 
legally permitted form of transfer of author’s rights inter vivos and only in relation to 
economic rights. Therefore, licensing remains a key instrument in the exploitation of 
works protected under Czech copyright law. 
 
                                                 
455 Ibid Tůma (2007), 15 
456 Another aspect of non-assignability of author’s economic rights inter vivos follows from the 
provisions of the Act on Evaluation of Property that sets out that author’s and performer’s 
economic rights are not evaluated because these are rights that are not assignable during author’s 
life (Section 17 (5) Act No. 151/1997 Coll. on Evaluation of Property (Zákon č. 151/1997 Sb., o 
oceňování majetku)). This act is, however, also used for the evaluation of assets for the purposes 
of inheritance proceedings. Since author’s economic rights may be subject to inheritance 
proceedings, their evaluation would therefore be helpful for these purposes. Under current Czech 
legislation, an author’s economic rights are kept in books as non-appraisable assets during 
inheritance proceedings. This results in the fact that, as non-appraisable assets, they are not subject 
to succession tax because no basis of assessment exists for them. They also do not form part of 
matrimonial ownership, cannot be sold in bankruptcy proceedings and cannot be seized 
by the authorities in administrative or criminal proceedings. 
457 Rights of a producer to their sound recording or audiovisual recording, rights of a broadcaster to 
their broadcast, publishers right to private copying levy, database producer´s right to their 
database. 




Position of an Author and Performer as a Weaker Party to the Contract 
The CZCA also incorporates legal principles already existing in other Czech private law 
statutes, principally the Civil Code459 and formerly the Commercial Code460. These 
principles include most importantly contractual freedom of parties (further emphasised in 
the new Civil Code), but also protection of the weaker party, and protection of investment.  
Protection of the weaker party to the contract is, similarly to German copyright law after 
the amendment in 2002, an important feature of the CZCA. The weaker party in this 
context is deemed the author. For example, in relation to a license agreement, while 
respecting contractual freedom (“unless agreed otherwise”) certain provisions in doubt 
would be interpreted in author’s favour461. If, for example, an agreement remains silent 
on the scope of the license it is assumed that the license has been only granted for a 1 year 
period, for the territory of the Czech Republic only, and is non-exclusive. Following this 
principle, authors, as well as performers, are treated by the law in a similar way as, for 
instance, consumers, employees, tenants and, to a certain extent, minority shareholders462. 
The new Civil Code in some instances shifts the preference from the protection of a 
weaker party to enforcement of contractual freedom, as one of the main principles 
governing the new law (e.g. in case of tenants), but since the civil code only applies to the 
CZCA as a subsidiary regulation, the protection of ´weaker´ authors and performers 
remains intact.  
Protection of investment is reflected in the CZCA in the provisions on ‘entrepreneurial 
rights’ (non-creative related rights, i.e. related rights excluding performer’s rights) and 
rights related to employees’ works. 
                                                 
459 Act No. 89/2012 Coll., Civil Code (Zákon č. 89/2012 Sb., Občanský zákoník) and its predecessor 
Act No. 40/1964 Coll., Civil Code, as amended  (Zákon č. 40/1964 Sb., Občanský zákoník) 
460Act No. 513/1991 Coll., Commercial Code, as amended (Zákon č.513/1993 Sb., Obchodní zákoník 
), superseded in the relevant parts by the 2012 Civil Code as listed above. 





4.2.1.2. Current legislation 
Constitutional foundation for author´s and performer´s rights   
The 1991 Czechoslovak Declaration of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms (the 
“Declaration”)463 which forms an integral part of the current constitutional order of the 
Czech Republic was adopted (as the name suggests) during the time of still joint state 
of the Czechs and Slovaks. The Declaration stipulates in Article 34 paragraph 1 that 
the outcome of creative intellectual activity must be protected by the law (as such, this 
provision arguably covers only authors and not performers and related rights 
holders). The moral right to the author´s creation is granted to every person, including 
foreigners, irrespective of reciprocity.464   
Author´s economic rights are also protected by Article 11 paragraph 1 of the 
Declaration, covering the protection of property: "Everyone has the right to own 
property. Each owner’s property right shall have the same content and enjoy the same 
protection." This right is afforded to both material and intangible property, irrespective 
of the person´s nationality and whether such right is reciprocated by such person´s 
country of origin. 
General applicable law   
The Czech Copyright Act of 2000465 (the “CZCA”), as amended, is the current main 
national law applicable to copyright issues. The word “main” is used because with the 
Czech civil law466 reform, effective as of January 1st 2014, the contractual law applying 
to copyright was carved out of the CZCA by the “new” Civil Code of 2012467 (the 
“NCZCC”). Any regulation related to a licence agreement in general, as a contractual 
type, is now covered by the part on obligations of the NCZCC. First, in Sections 2358 
and following, general provisions on licence (irrespective of the subject of such licence 
agreement and thus providing common grounds for licensing of industrial property as 
                                                 
463 Act No. 2/1993 Coll., on Proclaiming the Declaration of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms as Part 
of the Constitutional Order of the Czech Republic (the “Declaration”) 
464 For more details see Telec (2001/1), 25 
465 Act No. 121/2000 Coll., On Author’s Rights, Related Rights, and on Change of Several Acts as 
Amended (‘Copyright Act) (Zákon č. 121/2000 Sb. o právu autorském, o právech souvisejících s 
právem autorským a o změně některých zákonů (autorský zákon)) 
466 in the sense of area of national law rather than an adherence to a legal system in international 
context 




well as “personal” intellectual property) are covered. Section 2371 et seq. of the 
NCZCC then deals with licensing of copyright works specifically.  
The CZCA is a lex specialis to a civil code. Therefore, where the CZCA stipulates 
regulation different from the NCZCC, this special provision of the CZCA will prevail. 
However, a civil code is a subsidiary regulation to the CZCA and as such if 
the CZCA is tacit about an issue, the provisions of the NCZCC shall apply. For 
example, where copyright law does not accommodate a specific type of paternity right 
(e.g. a right akin to the right to object to false attribution as known in the UK law), one 
must rely on the provisions of the NCZCC on personality rights468.  
Best-seller clause in the Czech copyright law  
Given the above-mentioned protectionism of the Czech legislator over authors and 
performers, their right to additional fair compensation has been enacted in Czech 
copyright law since the beginning of application of the CZCA in 2000.  
Section 49 paragraphs 4 to 6 CZCA stipulated that where the amount of the royalty has 
been agreed to depend on the proceeds from the utilisation of the licence, the licensee 
has the obligation to allow the author to audit the licensee’s accountant documents in 
order to be able to determine what the correct amount of royalty is payable. And, where 
the amount of the royalty agreed has been determined by a lump sum, where such an 
amount is obviously disproportionately low compared to the profit made from the 
utilisation of the licence and to the importance of the work for the achievement of such 
profit, the author is entitled to an additional appropriate royalty.469 It is worth noting 
                                                 
468 Section 81 et seq. NCZCC 
469 Section 49 paragraph 4 to 6 stipulated as follows (as applicable until the NCZCC became effective 
as of 1st January 2014): 
(4) Where the amount of the royalty has been agreed in dependence on the proceeds from the 
utilisation of the licence, the licensee shall be obliged to make it possible for the author to audit 
the relevant accounting documents or other documentation in order to establish the real amount of 
the royalty. Where the licensee thus provides the author with information designated by the 
licensee as confidential, the author may not divulge such information to any third party, nor use it 
according to his needs in contravention of the purpose for which it has been made available to 
him. 
(5) The licensee shall submit to the author, at agreed time intervals, regular financial statements of the 
royalty referred to in Paragraph (4) above; unless otherwise agreed, he shall do so at least once a 
year. 
(6) Where the amount of the royalty has not been derived from the proceeds from the utilization of the 
licence and where such an amount is so low that it is in obvious disproportion to the profit from 




here that the law only expected a license to be granted (not any different type of 
transfer), which is a manifestation of previously discussed doctrinal approach. 
Until May 2006, this right to additional appropriate royalty was, however, waivable. 
The provision stipulated that “the author is entitled to an additional appropriate royalty, 
unless agreed otherwise”. This made the protection provided to the authors de facto 
ineffective. Most license agreements concluded at the time contained a clause 
providing that the author undertakes not to trigger application of Section 49 paragraph 
6, i.e. in effect waiving the right. While less experienced (frequent) parties to such 
transactions may not have been aware of the way out from the provision, license 
agreement drafted by the major licensees (publishing houses, record producers, etc.), 
who would be the most likely persons requested to provide an additional appropriate 
royalty based on the disproportion of the proceeds, almost without an exception 
incorporated the “waiver” clause into the license agreement. They were also the parties 
with the stronger bargaining power and as such the licensor (author, performer) did not 
usually have an opportunity to request an amendment of the said clause. With the major 
amendment of the CZCA in 2006470, this problematic postscript in paragraph 6 was 
therefore deleted from the law in order to secure a stronger protection to authors and 
performers.  
The same amendment also introduced paragraph 7 to Section 49 of the CZCA, 
stipulating that when a royalty is being negotiated, purpose of the licence, the manner 
and circumstances of the use of the work and the scope of the licence in terms of 
territory, time and quantity shall be taken into account. The initial goal of introduction 
of this provision was wider than what eventually made it to the text. The provision 
aimed at embodiment of fair (adequate) remuneration into Czech copyright law, 
strengthening thus the economic position of an author or other person granting a licence 
or a sub-licence to a licensee. Such concept was influenced by the German legislative 
changes made in 2002 (see further above the concept of angemessene Vergütung). The 
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italics applicable only until 21.5.2006). 
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manner and circumstances of the use of the work and the scope of the licence in terms of territory, 
time and quantity (para. 7) only added as of 22.5.2006). 




provision was not to provide for an absolute author´s right to a royalty but a stipulation 
of a royalty was a mandatory provision of a license agreement, lack of which made the 
agreement null and void for non-compliance with statutory requirement.471 Ultimately 
the imposition of a fair royalty was deleted from the draft amendment and the additional 
provision of paragraph 7 “only” stipulates obligation of the parties to take into account 
the prescribed criteria when negotiating the royalty; such royalty does not, however, 
have to be fair. It is nevertheless questionable, how potent such provision is as non-
compliance will not result in nullity of the license agreement; only liability for damages 
can be claimed, with the actual damage being very difficult to establish. 
With further reference to former Section 49 CZCA, specifically to paragraph 4472, from 
the order in which prospective provisions on setting up a royalty are listed one can 
deduct the legislator´s preference. It is preferred to have the royalty based on the 
proceeds from the licence granted. Lump sum royalty is considered only a secondary 
means of establishment of the remuneration. Where the proceeds are indeed the basis 
for the licensor´s remuneration, the law stipulates what rights and obligations the author 
and the licensee have in order to secure controlling mechanism for the author.473 While 
the licensee has to provide the licensor with an access to the accounts (on a regular 
basis as agreed or at least once a year474), for the protection of the licensee, such 
information cannot be disclosed and/or used by the licensor for any other purpose than 
control of adequacy of the remuneration obtained. Failure of the licensor to comply 
with this provision would result in a liability for any damage caused to the licensee by 
such licensor´s behaviour.475 
                                                 
471 For further details see I. Telec, P. Tůma, Autorský zákon – komentář ["Author’s Act – 
Commentary"], (1st edn., C.H.Beck, Praha 2007), 515 
472 Sec. 49 (4) CZCA (see above) 
473 The obligation of the licence to disclose any accounts related to the utilisation of the work is given 
for the benefit of the author (or other licensor); the right can be exercised by the author personally 
or through a proxy or a specialist such as an accountant. Further details on this topic can be found 
in I. Telec, P. Tůma, Autorský zákon – komentář ["Author’s Act – Commentary"], (1st edn., 
C.H.Beck, Praha 2007), 514 or J.Kříž, I.Holcová, J.Kordač, V. Křesťanová - Autorský zákon – 
komentář a předpisy související ["Author’s Act – Commentary and Related Regulations"], (2nd 
edition, Linde Praha, 2005), 160. 
474 Section 49 (5) CZCA, as applicable until 31st December 2013 
475 For further details see I. Telec, P. Tůma, Autorský zákon – komentář ["Author’s Act – 




Section 49 paragraph 4 was partially akin to what is proposed in Article 14 of the draft 
DSM Directive – Transparency obligation. A comparison of how these two wordings 
differ and what common grounds they have is discussed in Chapter 5. 
As the so called “bestseller clause” of former Section 49 (6) CZCA stipulates, if parties 
agree on other form of remuneration than proceed-based, the licensor has a relative476 
right to “adequate additional royalty”, should the royalty obtained be 
disproportionately low compared to the revenues made by the licensee through 
utilisation of the licence and to the importance of the work for achieving such revenues. 
While the adequacy of the additional compensation will be a question of law, 
determined by the court (unless parties agree between themselves), the importance of 
the work (performance) for the level of revenues resulting from utilisation of the licence 
is a matter of factual assessment which will always be very difficult and subjective.  
Delay with payment of the additional royalty can trigger a right of the licensor 
requesting such additional royalty to withdraw from the license agreement.477 In theory, 
it is possible to request the additional royalty repeatedly as long as the royalty paid up 
to date becomes proportionate to the proceeds made. Whether this is a market practice 
is discussed further below. 
Formal, not material changes by the civil law reform   
With the adoption of the NCZCC, as of 1st January 2014, provision of Section 49 of the 
CZCA (together with the whole Volume 6 of Title I. of the CZCA – Contractual Types, 
regulated in Sections 46 to 57) were moved to the NCZCC, Part IV – Obligations. The 
content of those provisions remains the same (with marginal textual corrections), 
however, they have been divided and seemingly unsystematically moved to different 
places of Part IV of the NCZCC.  
Sec. 49 (4) and (5) CZCA were moved to Section 2366 (2) and (3) NCZCC (under the 
general provisions on a license-based royalty, without any change in the wording. Sec. 
49 (6) and (7) CZCA were subsumed under the heading of Special provisions for the 
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and claim it against a specific infringer; it is not an absolute right effective erga omnes 
477 For further details, incl. how difficult it may be to determine when the due date for such payment 
is and when it becomes barred by the statute of limitations, see I. Telec, P. Tůma, Autorský zákon 




licence to the subjects protected by copyright law (Section 2371 et seq.). Specifically, 
they became Section 2374 (1) and (2), with minor changes to the text. Now Section 
2374 (1) explicitly states the right to adequate additional remuneration is non-waivable 
and Section 2374 (2) gives the authority to determine such additional remuneration 
explicitly to a court, while also extending the factors to be taken into account.478 
Other provisions strengthening position of an author or performer under applicable 
Czech copyright law  
Czech copyright law provides some further safeguards to authors and performers, 
giving them a chance to affect the use of their work, even after the work or 
performances has been transferred (even through an unlimited exclusive license). A 
creator can withdraw from their exploitation contract (license agreement) in two cases. 
Withdrawal from a license agreement due to inactivity of a licensee 
According to Section 2378 NCCC479, an author has the right to withdraw from a license 
agreement due to the inactivity of licensee, that is where the licensee of an exclusive 
licence does not utilise the licence at all or utilises it insufficiently, and where this has 
a considerable adverse effect on the legitimate interests of the author480. This may be 
viewed as comparable, to some extent, to the English doctrine of restraint of trade and 
to the Germany provisions to the same effect contained in Section 41 UrhG. 
The Act then goes into further details and stipulates that the right of withdrawal from 
the agreement due the licensee’s inactivity may not be asserted by the author before the 
expiry of two years from the granting of the licence or, where applicable, from the 
delivery of the copyright work if it was delivered to the licensee only after the licence 
was granted; the time limit is three months for contributions to daily periodicals and 
                                                 
478 Section 2374 (2) NCZCC: “The amount of additional royalty shall be determined by the court 
which shall have particular regard to the amount of the original remuneration, the proceeds from 
utilization of such license, the importance of the work for such proceeds, and the usual amount of 
remuneration in comparable cases where the amount of the royalty is derived from the proceeds; 
this does not preclude an out of court agreement on the amount of additional compensation.” 
479 Formerly Sec. 53 CZCA 
480An author may withdraw from the agreement for such reason only after urging the licensee to 
utilise the licence adequately within a reasonable period after being so urged, and after the 
licensee’s failure to utilise the licence sufficiently in spite of being so urged (Section 2378 (2) 




one year for contributions to other periodicals.481 This mirrors the provisions of the 
German UrhG.482 
The author needs to compensate the transferee for any damage incurred by the 
transferee because of the withdrawal if that is justified by reasons deserving special 
consideration. In this context, the reasons for which the transferee failed to sufficiently 
use the licence will be considered.483   
If the transferee does not utilise the licence at all, upon the withdrawal, the author must 
return to the transferee the remuneration received; if the licence has only been used 
insufficiently, the author will return the remuneration reduced by the part 
corresponding to the actual use.484 If a licensee is obliged to use the licence and 
breaches this duty, the author’s right to remuneration remains unaffected by the 
withdrawal from the agreement due to the licensee´s inactivity.  Where remuneration 
based on yields from the copyrighted work has been agreed, the author is presumed to 
have become entitled to remuneration in an amount equivalent to that to which the 
author would have become entitled had the licensee sufficiently used the licence before 
the withdrawal from the agreement.485   
Withdrawal from a license agreement due to a change of author’s conviction 
An author can also withdraw from a license agreement due to a change of his 
conviction. Where the work has not yet been made public and no longer corresponds 
with his conviction, and where the making public of the work would have a significant 
adverse effect on his legitimate personal interests, an author can withdraw from such 
agreement486. Traditionally, this would be subject to reimbursing the licensee of the 
costs already involved in preparation of publication of the work, such as translation 
costs and cost of graphical layout. This right can only be exercised until such time as 
the work is made public and is therefore very limited. 
                                                 
481 Section 2379 (1) NCZCC, 
482 Section 41(2) UrhG; see Figure 4.1. above 
483 Section 2380 NCZCC 
484 Section 2381(1) NCZCC 
485 Section 2381(2) NCZCC 




Czech authors, however, do not make a significant use of these two options. Also, 
despite the statutory provisions being mandatory, withdrawal due to inactivity of a 
licensee is often avoided contractually by stipulating the earliest moment when such 
right can be exercised by the author. Such a contractual term ensures that the author’s 
right guaranteed by law is preserved while the licensee has plenty of time to ‘not to 
utilise’ the work.  In everyday practice the two abovementioned safeguards provided 
to authors are rather toothless. 
To sum up, there exist certain safeguards for authors in the Czech copyright law giving 
them the opportunity to affect their relationship with a licensee after a contract has been 
concluded. This concedes to the protectionist attitude of Czech legislators in favour of 
the author, but to the detriment of contractual freedom. However, these safeguards are 
either not very helpful, as in the case of withdrawals, or, as regards fair additional 
royalty, have not yet proved to be helpful. In the meantime, they create legal uncertainty 
on the part of licensees. 
Employee and commissioned works   
Exercise of an Author’s Economic Rights by an Employer 
The Czech Copyright Act stipulates that an author’s economic rights to a work created 
by the author when fulfilling his duties arising from an employment487 (employee 
work), unless otherwise agreed, shall be exercised by the employer in his own name 
and on his own account.488 Similarly as in other jurisdictions, including the UK, such 
work has to be created “in due course of his employment”, or “as part of his duties”, it 
does not apply to activity that is not a normal part of an employee’s duties489. However, 
it is not required that the employment or similar contract explicitly contains a provision 
that the employee creates or will create author’s works as part of his duties. 
                                                 
487The same applies for civil service contract with the employer or for an employment relationship 
between a cooperative and its member under Sec. 58 (1) CZCA. Employment contracts include all 
contracts stipulated by labour law, including casual workers, etc. 
488Sec. 58 (1) CZCA 
489For UK, applicable law on determining whether the work was “made by an employee in the course 
of his employment” (S.11(2) CDPA 1988) see for example, Noah v. Shuba [1991] FSR 14 and 
Stevenson Jordan v. MacDonell & Evans (1952) 69 RPC 10.  It is also worth noting that in the 
UK, under S.11 (2) CDPA 1988, the employer is the first owner. According to Czech law, the first 
(and only) owner is the author, but the employer exercises the economic rights. In both 




A particular natural person who created the work, in this case an employee, remains 
the author of the work but the employer exercises the employee’s economic rights and 
is entitled to resulting benefits. An employer exercises the right to utilize the work and 
a right to royalty. This even includes royalties resulting from rights subject to 
compulsory collective rights management. This differentiates it from a situation when 
an exclusive unlimited license is granted by an author as is further evaluated below.  
The employer may only transfer the exercise of the right pursuant to this paragraph to 
a third party with the author’s consent, unless this occurs when an undertaking or any 
part thereof is being sold.490 Therefore when the undertaking of the employer is being 
assigned, author’s consent is not needed.  
As a matter of fact, one way to arrive at a situation in which a person different from the 
author is freely exercising economic rights (and, as will be explained later, also moral 
rights to a certain extent) is to intentionally have the work created in the course of 
employment. Exercise of economic rights to such work can then be assigned to another 
entity by way of transfer of the undertaking. This may seem to be a complicated 
construction, but, for example, in the case of extensive projects, it can be helpful to set 
up a company for the purpose of creating specified work(s) and then manage the rights 
to the work by dealing with the company as a whole.  Use of such construction may be 
very limited but it de facto achieves an outright transfer of author’s economic rights. 
In the event of the death or dissolution of an employer who has been authorised to 
exercise the economic rights over an employee work and who has no successor in title, 
the authorisation to exercise these rights shall go back to the author491. This is similar 
to the consolidation principle seen in the case of licences, where, after the termination 
of the licence, rights to utilize the work return to the author.   
The CZCA deals with the situation of withdrawal due to inactivity of an employer in 
case of works deriving from employment in similar way to withdrawal due to inactivity 
of the licensee. Where the employer does not exercise the economic rights to an 
employee work at all, or exercises them inadequately, the author may request the 
employer to grant him a licence under normal conditions, unless there is a serious 
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reason on the part of the employer to decline such a request.492 Comparing this to the 
mandatory provision of Section 53 CZCA, in the case of employee works there are 
circumstances under which the employer is not obliged to exercise the rights.  
Employee’s Moral Rights 
An employee’s moral rights to his work remain unaffected under the CZCA. However, 
if an employer exercises author’s economic rights to an employee’s work, it is deemed 
that the author has given his consent to certain uses and adaptations of the work. In 
particular, it is deemed that the author has given his consent to the work’s being made 
public, altered, adapted (including translation), combined with another work, included 
into a collection of works and, unless agreed otherwise, also presented to the public 
under the employer’s name493. The last legal fiction, in particular, seems to be a strong 
intrusion into the author’s paternity right. It is however quite logical and justifiable 
with reference to the principle of protection of investment enshrined in the CZCA. This 
provision is nevertheless optional. Hence the parties can agree otherwise, for instance, 
where the author-employee is well known for certain expertise. It is also deemed that 
the author has given the employer his consent to complete his unfinished work in the 
case that his employment contract expires sooner than the work is completed494. 
Provisions on employee works give the employer, as a person who has made an 
investment into the creation of a work, quite a strong position in terms of the exercise of 
rights originally vested in the author. It is not, however, the same position an assignee 
would have. Exercise of author’s economic rights by an employer is a kind of ‘middle 
ground’ between an exclusive unlimited license and an assignment of author’s economic 
rights. It de facto deprives an author of certain rights and transfers them to an employer. 
The employer’s position is in fact stronger than that of an exclusive licensee. However, 
there is a difference between ‘ownership’ of rights and a “right to exercise the rights under 
one’s own name and on one’s own account”. In everyday practice, however, it is a 
sufficient protection if it gives the employer secure enough authorization to further utilize 
the work without unnecessary worry. 
                                                 
492Sec. 58 (3) CZCA 
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These provisions are, as in other jurisdictions, used with appreciation by employers in the 
entertainment industry. It has become a common trend, for instance, that TV companies 
use employment contracts for most of their productions. 
What about the author´s claim to additional adequate remuneration per Sec. 2374 CZCA 
in case of employee works? Section 58 (6) CZCA stipulates that: 
 “Unless agreed otherwise, the author of an employee work is entitled to an equitable 
additional remuneration from the employer if the salary or any other compensation paid 
to the author by the employer is in evident disproportion to the profit from the utilisation 
of the rights to the employee work and to the importance of such work for the achievement 
of this profit; this provision shall not apply to works referred to in Paragraph (7)495, 
irrespective of whether they are actual employee works or are as such just considered496, 
unless otherwise agreed.” 
It must be noted here, that the “best-seller” provision for employee works contains an 
additional condition. It stipulates that compensation paid has to be in evident 
disproportion to the profit from the utilisation of the work and to the importance of such 
work for the achievement of this profit (emphasis added). Such test does not apply to 
“normal” works. If one makes the comparison to somewhat similar provision in English 
patent law497, where compensation for utilisation of employee inventions is also stipulated 
by law, it is highly unlikely that any employee will ever be able to claim any such 
compensation. Through the case law on compensation for employee inventions it has been 
demonstrated that is extremely difficult to establish that a wok (invention) is of 
outstanding benefit to the employer. How does an employed author prove that his salary 
is disproportionate to proceeds of the employer made by the utilisation of the work AND 
that the work is important for the achievement of the profit to an extent that goes beyond 
usual importance? This is a very subjective assessment, which will have to be made by 
the court based on the facts of each case, and does one establish such disproportion? How 
does one evaluate importance?  
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created as employee works 
496 i.e. works to order (commissioned works) 




And, even if such assessment can be made, the provision contains the “opt-out” option. 
As such, most well informed employers will put the commitment of the author not to 
invoke this provision in their standard employment contracts. 
Performers   
By way Section 2387498 of the NCZCC, the above written applies mutatis mutandis to 
performers. Before January 1st, 2014 the same reference for performer´s rights to 
provisions on author´s rights was stipulated in Section 74 of the CZCA. 
4.2.2. Case law and Market Practice 
Even after the deletion of the postscript of Section 49 paragraph 6 CZCA, allowing for 
the ´agreement to the contrary´, the situation did not improve between the amendment 
of 2006 and the civil law reform of 2014. The provider of the license could not 
contractually agree not to claim the additional adequate remuneration but this did not 
stop the market from effectively neutering its force. Prospective licensees with 
sufficiently strong bargaining power would impose provisions stipulating, for example, 
that the licensor will not trigger the said provision sooner than 10 years after the license 
commences to be utilized. Licensees would also agree to provide a proceed-based 
royalty but setting such royalty disproportionately low. 
Also, it may not come as a surprise that there is virtually no case law related to 
additional royalty (court orders to access to accounts of the licensee by the licensor in 
order to determine correctness of the royalty paid). There may be several reasons for 
this; firstly, in general, Czech copyright law is not the most frequent subject of civil 
law proceedings. Partially this is given by the fact that Czech Republic is a statute based 
jurisdiction where case law is very limited in general (one might suspect that – among 
other reasons – unbearable length of judicial proceedings is to be blamed). In addition, 
Czech judges are not most famous for their expertise in copyright (or intellectual 
property). The market with copyright works and performances is quite small due to the 
size of the country and thus the number of players involved in the business is somewhat 
limited. With adversaries knowing the limitations of Czech judicial system, more often 
                                                 
498 Section 2387: “Artistic performances are governed by Sections 2371 to 2383 by analogy; however, 
a performing artist does not have the right under Section 2377 (i.e. right to authorial copies of the 




than not parties settle before even getting to the court. This may be a positive notion 
for advocates of agreements achieved through mediation and/or pre-trial negotiations, 
lifting the burden from the overloaded courts on what is ultimately a very subjective 
issue. But it is not very positive for those seeking legal certainty and interpretation of 
vague statutory provisions. Given the limited chances for judicial clarification, parties 
involved in copyright licensing have to rely mainly on their own or scholarly 
interpretation and their respective bargaining positions and resources. 
Such interpretation made by practicing copyright lawyers will always be biased by 
composition of such lawyer´s clientele. Those representing major licensees will always 
find a way around any protective provisions, hoping that if any questionable clause is 
challenged by the licensor, they can attempt to hold the grounds by relying on their 
client´s position of power and also the reluctance of the counterparty to participate in 
an expensive and lengthy proceeding. It is speculated that more often than not the 
licensor challenging the amount of a royalty will settle for less than what would 
(arguably) be awarded by the court. 
Rights owners with little or no bargaining power standing on the other side of the scale 
(e.g. artists closer to the beginning of their career than to its peek) will, on the other 
hand, often have no notion of the measures the law provides to them. They are normally 
not educated in legal matters related to their activities and often cannot afford a lawyer 
to draft and negotiate license agreements for them.  
This is, after all, the main reason why there is an attempt by various legislators (national 
and European) to provide a mechanism preventing such imbalance. 
The question why is it, that despite the relevant statutory provisions being in place, 
fairness is not necessarily achieved in the Czech Republic is answered further in 
Chapter 6, following a review of applicable law (and its application) in the other two 
jurisdictions and into the Commission´s proposal for the DSM Directive. 
An additional reason why “under-paid” licensors are reluctant to claim additional fair 
remuneration is that they would not want to go to court for one more important reason: 
they do not want to lose or antagonize their “customer base”. With the above mentioned 
limited amount of potential “buyers” of content, authors or performers do not want to 




pursuing additional royalty. They seem to rather overlook the disproportion and hope 
for a better deal next time, even by pointing out the success of their previous work – 
increasing the demand for their creations. 
From the perspective of,  licensees, given the limited size of the market and revenues 
thus achieved, works which are so successful that any royalty - agreed on a lump sum 
basis – could become close to disproportionate, taking into account the importance of 
the specific work or performance for the achievement of the success, come by very 
scarcely. The opportunity to claim additional adequate compensation according to 
Section 2374 (1) of the NCZCC is very limited in the Czech Republic. 
4.2.3. Conclusion to Chapter 4.2. 
To sum up, to limited extent, Czech law already provides for measures potentially 
capable of securing additional appropriate compensation for authors and performers. 
However, unlike the case of the draft DSM Directive (as discussed in Chapter 6), these 
are only limited to cases where the royalty has been agreed on a lumps sum basis. 
Where the royalty is agreed as calculated from the proceeds received through utilization 
of the licence granted, it is assumed that such royalty is properly negotiated and thus 
proportionate and additional remuneration is already intrinsically provided. The author 
or performer does have the right to audit the licensee’s books to see if the royalty is 
calculated correctly (a trend the Commission seems to be following in the Draft DSM 
Directive) but even if the royalty is calculated correctly according to the provision of 
the contract, the unfairness still remains in cases where the remuneration was not 
negotiated as appropriate from the beginning. While this should normally be the case, 
it may be argued that such approach does not take into account the disproportion 
between bargaining powers of the parties to such agreement. And in case of the Czech 
Republic, the market does not regulate itself towards a more balanced environment. On 
a contrary, contracts are drafted in a way that even the limited protection provided to 
the weaker parties of the contract seems to be further stripped down by evasive clauses.  
It will, therefore, be discussed below whether and how the draft DSM Directive´s 
Article 15 could improve the situation in the Czech market and provide the level of 





4.3. United Kingdom 
Given the relatively narrow focus of this work, i.e. measures allowing the creators to 
adjust their individual contracts and results of transfers of their rights if the 
remuneration thus agreed and received becomes disproportionate to the proceeds made; 
measures which are almost non-existent under English copyright law, there is naturally 
much less commentary available on this topic in relation to English law. The below 
overview and analysis therefore focuses on alternative ways how to improve creator´s 
bargaining position and discusses whether some of them may provide sufficient 
substitute for the statutory provisions as introduced in relation to the German and Czech 
laws. 
4.3.1. Legislation and case law 
4.3.1.1. Historical background and justification 
Introduction 
A lot has been written on the historical development of copyright law in what now 
represents the United Kingdom.499 A quote from Torreman´s textbook to summarise it 
is convenient: 
“Copyright has two types of root. On the one hand, it started as an 
exclusive right to make copies- that is, to reproduce the work of an 
author. This entrepreneurial side of copyright is linked in tightly with 
the invention of the printing press […]. On the other hand, it became 
vital to protect the author now that his or her work could be copied 
much more easily and in much higher numbers. It was felt that that the 
author should share in the profits of this new exploitation of the work, 
although this feeling was much stronger in Continental Europe than it 
was in the UK.”500 
The above summary of the roots of copyright nicely demonstrates the approach of 
English law to purpose of copyright rules. First aim is to protect investment and only 
                                                 
499 See for example J.A.L. Sterling, World Copyright Law, (3rd Edition) Sweet & Maxwell 2008, 
Chapter 1, para 1.02 – 1.23; K. Garnett, G. Davies, G. Hardbottle, Copinger and Skone James on 
Copyright. Volume 1 (16th edn., Sweet & Maxwell, 2011), Chapter 2, para 2.08 – 2.43; L. 
Bentley, U.Suthersanen, P. Torremans, Global Copyright. Three Hundred Years Since the Statute 
of Anne, from 1709 to Cyberspace (1st edn., Edward Elgar, 2010). 




as secondary goal is to reward authors. This is a common thread that will be visible 
throughout the exploration of English regulation of authors´ remuneration. 
English law is a typical example of common law jurisdiction in that it relies heavily on 
common law co-shaping the regulation through interpretation provided in precedents. 
Copyright law is relatively statute-driven but still a lot of issues are resolved through 
case law. 
Historical development  
Literary, dramatic, musical and artistic works have been created since as long as we 
can trace back history. But even in such developed systems as of Rome, ancient laws 
did not provide any protection to authors of such creations. Such situation continued 
until the middle of the 15th Century in Europe. As already mentioned in the previous 
two national chapters, things started to change with the development of printing press 
when it became much easier to replicate books (previously “copied” by way of hand 
“rewriting” them, usually by monks and others who at the time were – quite unusually 
– able to read and write).501  
Throughout Europe, on the one hand, states began to adopt rules or decrees to protect 
the local printing industry. On the other hand, censorship of such printed materials was 
secured through new procedures adopted.502 In England, these industry “protection 
measures” had the same underlying foundation but would be processed through guilds. 
The King claimed the right to print as a Royal prerogative and in pursuance of this 
prerogative, the Stationers Company503 was granted a Royal Charter in 1556504. The 
                                                 
501 The fact that it became possible to print and disseminate quite quickly hundreds, or even thousands 
of copies resulted in the advance of the new industries devoted to printing which became 
important for the local economy (Particularly in Germany, England, Venice, Rome, etc. See more 
for example in A. Sterling, ´UK, EU & US Copyright Law – Unit 1 Historical Background, 
International Context and General Principles´, (2010-2011, King´s College London), 1-035).  
  In addition, as a result of this development, state and religious authorities realized they will need 
to control what was being disseminated. Mainly in order to prevent heretical and/or rebellious 
material to get in the hands of the public but one can also argue that control over the monetary 
factor would be a good by-product. 
502 The pattern was very similar in all the areas where book print advanced. The state would claim – 
as a sovereign – sole authority over the right to print or authorise print and anyone who wished to 
print had to apply for the grant of some form of “privilege” form the state authorities. The 
authorisation would normally be provided only for a limited amount of time and for specific uses. 
503 Composed of persons who printed and sold books and based in London.  
504 This is over a century later after Johannes Gutenberg „invented“ the book print in 1444; the 




system worked in a way that books could lawfully be printed only by members of the 
Stationery Company.505 In addition, public performance of work had to be obtained 
from the State authorities. 
Due to constitutional changes at the end of the 17th Century, the Stationers Company 
system lost its effectiveness506. The printing and publishing industry learned that they 
have to rely on the common-law protection.  
The issue had been debated in length in the Parliament and studies were consulted. In 
the end the famous Statute of Anne was finally passed, effective as of 1710.507 With its 
adoption, a question arose whether the Act replaced the preceding common law right 
to authorise publication, or, if the two streams of protection ran in parallel. In Millar v 
Talor508, it was held that the common law right would continue, but in Donaldson v 
Beckett509 it was overruled by the House of Lords.510  
By the Copyright Act 1842, the period of protection was extended to life plus 7 years, 
or 42 years from publication, whichever terminated longer. In addition, other statutes 
were passed in the 19th Century, providing the authors with protection against 
unauthorised public performance of their works and adding new categories of works, 
such as statues, drawings, photographs. By the end of the 19th Century there were 
numerous statutes providing protection to variety of authorial works, such as books, 
                                                 
505 To obtain a membership in the Stationers Company was difficult; it was a very closed group and 
the State authorities were very well aware of any of their activities. Normally, an author would 
take a manuscript to a member of the Stationers Company and sell it for an agreed one of sum. 
The member of the Company became the “owner of the copy in the work”, meaning that he had 
the right to print it. These members´ rights were registered in Company´s records (Adrian Sterling, 
´UK, EU & US Copyright Law – Unit 1 Historical Background, International Context and General 
Principles´ (2010-2011, King´s College London), 1-037). 
506 As Professor Sterling records (Adrian Sterling, ´UK, EU & US Copyright Law – Unit 1 Historical 
Background, International Context and General Principles´ (2010-2011, King´s College London), 
1-037) points out, this is „because of uncertainty in various areas and the complexity of legal 
procedures, not an effective means of protection against unauthorised printing or import of books 
reproducing manuscripts for which the publishers had paid the authors.” (ibid at para 1-048) 
507 The statute (as mentioned in previous national chapters, the “first Copyright Act”) granted authors 
the exclusive right to print their works for a period of 14 years, with the possibility of further 14-
years extension if the author was still alive at the time of the lapse of the first term of protection. 
In practice, author´s right was assigned to a publisher who then controlled the printing of the 
book. 
508 (1769) 4 Burr 2303; 98 ER 201 
509 (1774) II PC 129, 1 ER 837; 4 Burr 2408, 98 ER 257 
510 It was held that while the common law right to authorise publication of an unpublished work 
continued indefinitely, once the author or the person to whom the author assigned their 
“copyright” had authorised the publication of the work, the common law right ceased to exist and 




paintings, photographs, etc., and in 1886 Berne Convention was adopted. After the 
Berne Convention´s revision in 1908 in Berlin, the English Parliament realised it was 
time to revise and consolidate copyright law. The aim was to introduce one statute for 
all the law related to this area and also comply with “Berne” after the Berlin Act. The 
result was the 1911 Copyright Act, coming into force July 1, 1912. The significance of 
this Act is that by repealing all the previous piecemeal legislation, as of that moment 
protection was given generally to “original literary, dramatic, musical and artistic 
works” (“LDMA works”). In addition, this became law (or basis for a law) across the 
British Empire.  
After the World War II, as a result of outcomes from several studies into the need of 
revision of the 1911 Copyright Act, a new act was adopted. The Copyright Act 1956, 
effective as of June 1, 1957 repealed the previous Act but kept the main principle of 
protecting original LDMA works but added protection of additional materials, such as 
films, broadcasts, sound recordings (under the 1911 Act protected as musical works), 
called “other subject matter”, which, however, did not have to be “original”. 
Further technological developments and adoption of international copyright treaties led 
to need of further revision which materialised in the Copyright, Designs and Patents 
Act 1988 (“CDPA”). Together with its amendment and Orders made there under, the 
1988 CDPA represents current law in copyright area. 
Justification of protection granted to authors and performers 
As shown in Chapter 2 and in the previous national chapters, there are differences in 
how the protection granted to authors over their works and to performers over their 
performances is justified in each country. Despite the harmonising effects of the 
international instruments (such as the Berne Convention), there are still two major 
distinct conceptualisations of the functions of copyright.511 The so-called Anglo-
American, or common law, tradition stresses the economic role of copyright protection. 
Protection against unauthorised acts of exploitation enables the right holder to decide 
if they want to deal in the work or fixed performance themselves or through a transferee 
(assignee or licensee), and for what price. If there were no granted rights, anyone could 
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free-ride on the creators’ efforts and the creators would not have much incentive to 
further create. As such, copyright is a response to market failure. Through copyright 
protection, socially beneficial activities can be made financially meaningful for the 
creators. “It rests ultimately upon the general or public interest in having works 
containing ideas, information, instruction, and entertainment made available, and in 
rewarding those – publishers as well as creators of the works – who perform this 
function in society in accordance with the public demand for their efforts.”512 When 
contrasting this notion with the continental conception of justification of protection of 
authors (referring to the author´s connection to the work), it may seem that the common 
law approach of guarantee of appropriate reward for creative effort in public interest of 
access to content is  more aligned with the rationale behind the concept of fair 
remuneration as currently being enforced by the Commission´s proposal. It would seem 
that assurance of appropriate remuneration for any “digital uses” should be easier in 
common law jurisdictions. The reality, however, is somewhat different.                                                                                                                                                                                
Position of an Author and Performer as a Weaker Party to the Contract 
Basically, unlike in the two previously examined civil law jurisdictions, there are no 
provisions in the English copyright statutory law that would help strengthen creators´ 
position of their transfer agreement negotiations. There may be, arguably, some routes to 
explore in common law. But they still would be difficult to apply to copyright transfer 
related scenarios. See more details below in this chapter with regards to general contract 
law. 
 
4.3.1.2. Current legislation and case law 
The basic copyright law is contained in a statute, specifically the CDPA 1988, and in 
the Orders made under the Act. In addition, decided cases are of importance when the 
need to interpret and apply the statutory provisions arises. In the United Kingdom, 
being a common-law system and thus relying of precedence, the decisions in cases 
before the courts play an important part of regulation.  
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General applicable law - copyright transfers 
Chapter V – Dealing with rights in copyright work of the CDPA 1988 is quite short, 
it only contains 7 Sections, out which last three deal with presumption of transfer of 
rental right in case of film production agreement (Section 93A CDPA), right to 
equitable remuneration where rental right transferred (Section 93B CDPA) and 
equitable remuneration: reference of amount to Copyright Tribunal (Section 93C 
CDPA) and therefore are out of scope of this work.513 Provision of section 93: 
Copyright to pass under will with unpublished work also is not within the scope of 
this study. 
Ultimately, the statutory provisions on dealing with rights in copyright works relevant 
for our purposes shrink to Section 90 dealing with assignment and licences, Section 
91 providing guidance prospective ownership of copyright, and exclusive licences in 
Section 92. 
According to CDPA, copyright can be transferred by way of assignment, by a grant of 
a licence, by waiver of rights, by testamentary disposition or by operation of law, as 
personal or moveable property. 514 A mere sale of the work (the physical carrier) does 
not mean that the copyright in it is also transferred. 
Any transfer of copyright may be total or partial. Partial assignments apply to one or 
more, but not all the things the copyright owner has the exclusive right to do; or may 
apply to part, but not the whole, of the period for which the copyright is to subsist.515 
The “bundle” of rights comprised within a copyright interest is divisible for the purpose 
of assignment a copyright interest can be assigned for a limited period, with reversion 
                                                 
513 It may be noted though that the notion of equitable remuneration is known in English copyright 
law (due to implementation of EU regulation), albeit in relation to „exception-based“ 
compensation, and that the Copyright Tribunal is the competent body to deal with these claims.  
514 CDPA, S.90 Assignment and licences. 
(1)Copyright is transmissible by assignment, by testamentary disposition or by operation of law, as 
personal or moveable property. 
(4)A licence granted by a copyright owner is binding on every successor in title to his interest in the 
copyright, except a purchaser in good faith for valuable consideration and without notice (actual 
or constructive) of the licence or a person deriving title from such a purchaser; and references in 
this Part to doing anything with, or without, the licence of the copyright owner shall be construed 
accordingly. 
515CDPA, S.90 (2)An assignment or other transmission of copyright may be partial, that is, limited so 
as to apply— 
(a)to one or more, but not all, of the things the copyright owner has the exclusive right to do; 




to the assignor/or another at the expiry of that period. Transfer can be for the payment 
of a royalty (proportional remuneration) or a lump sum. 
Assignment 
An assignment of copyright is not effective unless it is in writing signed by or on behalf 
of the assignor516, but the “writing” does not have to have any particular form - a receipt 
has, for example, been accepted as complying with this requirement in certain 
circumstances517. It is possible to assign the copyright in a work that has not yet been 
created, such assignment of future copyright is possible by way of Section 91518. 
Assignments in equity is also possible where a party has contracted to transfer the 
ownership of a copyright interest to another, but fails to do so in the manner required 
under CDPA 1988. In that case the transfer may be regarded as having already taken 
place “in equity”519. 
In common law, an applied beneficial assignment can also take place. Therefore, “when 
a freelance author [designer] is commissioned to create a work [logo] for a client and 
the contract for the commission is silent as to the ownership of copyright, it will 
normally be necessary, in order to give business efficacy to that contract, to imply a 
term requiring the beneficial assignment of the copyright to the client so that he may 
prevent others from using the work [logo].”520  
                                                 
516 CDPA s.90 (3): “An assignment of copyright is not effective unless it is in writing signed by or on 
behalf of the assignor.” 
517 E W Savory Ltd v The World of Golf Ltd [1914] 2 Ch 566 
518
CDPA s. 91: Prospective ownership of copyright. 
(1)Whereby an agreement made in relation to future copyright, and signed by or on behalf of the 
prospective owner of the copyright, the prospective owner purports to assign the future 
copyright (wholly or partially) to another person, then if, on the copyright coming into 
existence, the assignee or another person claiming under him would be entitled as against all 
other persons to require the copyright to be vested in him, the copyright shall vest in the 
assignee or his successor in title by virtue of this subsection. 
(2)In this Part— 
“future copyright” means copyright which will or may come into existence in respect of a future 
work or class of works or on the occurrence of a future event; and  
“prospective owner” shall be construed accordingly, and includes a person who is prospectively 
entitled to copyright by virtue of such an agreement as is mentioned in subsection (1).  
519 Western Front Ltd v Vestron Inc [1987] FSR 66. 





In the UK, licences are governed by Section 90(4) CDPA521 for general provisions on 
to what extent licences are binding, and then further in Section 92 CDPA, exclusive 
licence is discussed.522 An exclusive licensee cannot sue the copyright owner for 
infringement of copyright523, otherwise he has locus standi against other parties. Non-
exclusive licensee has locus standi only in some specific circumstances under S.101A 
CDPA 1988524. The rights of the copyright owner and exclusive licensee are 
concurrent. This restricts the ability of both to bring proceedings alone525.  
Otherwise, the terms of the licence are left to the parties. In the case of exclusive 
licences. The exclusive licensee´s statutory procedural status is equivalent to that of the 
owner. Similarly, as is the case in the countries where assignment of author´s rights is 
not permitted, while there may be some practical differences, the position of an 
exclusive licensee and an owner of copyright is very similar in terms of their rights.526 
In practice, an exclusive licence is very close to assignment and it is sometimes difficult 
to determine if the parties drafted a contract for an exclusive licence or an assignment. 
It is a matter of construction and the words used by the parties are not conclusive.527 
Implied licenses can also arise, normally in situations where, in the circumstances, it 
can be inferred that the parties must have intended the licensee to be permitted to use a 
                                                 
521 CDPA, S.90 (4): A licence granted by a copyright owner is binding on every successor in title to 
his interest in the copyright, except a purchaser in good faith for valuable consideration and 
without notice (actual or constructive) of the licence or a person deriving title from such a 
purchaser; and references in this Part to doing anything with, or without, the licence of the 
copyright owner shall be construed accordingly. 
522 CDPA, S.92: Exclusive licences. 
(1)In this Part an “exclusive licence” means a licence in writing signed by or on behalf of the 
copyright owner authorising the licensee to the exclusion of all other persons, including the 
person granting the licence, to exercise a right which would otherwise be exercisable 
exclusively by the copyright owner. 
(2)The licensee under an exclusive licence has the same rights against a successor in title who is 
bound by the licence as he has against the person granting the licence. 
523 CDPA 1988, s 101(1): An exclusive licensee has, except against the copyright owner, the same 
rights and remedies in respect of matters occurring after the grant of the licence as if the licence 
had been an assignment. 
524 it must be in writing and signed and must expressly grant the non-exclusive licensee a right of 
action. 
525 CDPA 1988, s 102 
526 See for example A. Rahmatian, Dealing with Rights in Copyright-protected Works: Assignment 
and Licenses in E. Derclaye, Research Handbook on the Future of EU Copyright, 2009, Chapter 
12, at p. 287 




work in a manner that would otherwise infringe copyright.528 However, courts are only 
willing to imply a term into an agreement in restricted circumstances: it must be  
reasonable and equitable, necessary to give business efficacy to the contract, obvious 
that ‘it goes without saying’, capable of clear expression, and must not contradict any 
express term of the contract.529 
English copyright law also knows future licences. Licences can be granted by a 
“prospective owner of copyright”530 
Employee and commissioned works 
As regards works of employment, again, the employer is “the protected party” in order 
to give way to purpose of the employment and protect investment the employer puts 
into conducting business. CDPA 1988 stipulates, that “where a literary, dramatic, 
musical or artistic work is made by an employee in the course of his employment, his 
employer is the first owner of any copyright in the work subject to any agreement to 
the contrary.”531 
Answer to a question “When is a person an employee?” is best demonstrated in Robin 
Ray v Classic532. Stevenson, Jordan v Macdonald & Evans533 and Noah v Shuba534 
provide guidance on when a work is created in the course of employment. 
 
As regards commissioned works, transfer of rights is not automatic the same way as 
with employee works. It must be stipulated in the contract for work. 
                                                 
528 Roberts v Candiware Ltd [1980] FSR 352; Blair v Osborne & Tompkins [1971] 2 QB 78 
529 See, for example, Ray v. Classic FM [1998] FSR 622, or more recently Clearsprings Management 
Ltd v Businesslinx Ltd [2006] FSR 3 
530 CDPA 1988, s 91(3): A licence granted by a prospective owner of copyright is binding on every 
successor in title to his interest (or prospective interest) in the right, except a purchaser in good 
faith for valuable consideration and without notice (actual or constructive) of the licence or a 
person deriving title from such a purchaser; and references in this Part to doing anything with, or 
without, the licence of the copyright owner shall be construed accordingly. 
531 CDPA 1988, S. 11(2). Otherwise the author of the work is the first owner of any copyright in the 
work (CDPA 1988 S. 11(1)). 
532 [1998] FSR 622 
533 (1952) 69 RPC 10 




Performers   
Sections 191A to 191H CDPA 1988, listed under the Section Performers´ property 
rights, mirror the provisions of Sections 90 to 93C CDPA 1988, applicable to authors 
(to the extent possible, reflecting the differences between them). There are additional 
provisions dealing with performers´ rights under that section, including equivalents of 
provisions on remedies, but they are not – again – relevant for this analysis. 
 
General applicable law - contracts 
As indicated before, the terms and conditions under which rights to copyright works 
and recorded performances are transferred are normally determined contractually 
between the relevant parties. The following text does not aim to explain the general 
English law of contracts, such as law governing formation of contract, consideration, 
terms and conditions, infringement and enforcement of terms, etc. General contract law 
will only be discussed to the extent as relevant for the present evaluation of “first stage” 
copyright transfers, remuneration for such transfers, and mechanisms providing any 
sort of protection to the creators as weaker parties in the contract negotiations. It also 
needs to be reminded that, with some exceptions, English contract law is not codified, 
it is all built on case law and its interpretation. 
The principle of freedom of contract will generally apply, parties are free to agree 
whatever they wish. In the past, judges were firmly of the view that persons of full 
capacity should be allowed to make what contracts they wanted and the law interfered 
under specific circumstances, such as existence of misrepresentation, undue influence, 
or illegality. The law would not interfere merely because one party was economically 
more powerful than the other. Important erosions of the principle of freedom of contract 
only appeared with legislation passed to recompense some imbalance of bargaining 
power, mostly influenced by the European legislation. For example, many employment 
contracts are now regulated in detail by legislation; terms are compulsorily implied into 
contracts and cannot be excluded by contrary agreements; validity of standard form 




the parties is still governed by an agreement, but many of the terms are imposed or 
regulated by law.535  
Returning to copyright law though, there are only exceptional situations in which the 
law in any way controls the way rights to copyright works are exploited. These 
exceptions fall generally into four categories: (i) mechanisms regulating contracts 
between creators and their first transferees (“entrepreneurs” within the meaning of 
English law), (ii) limitations driven by the British and European competition law, (iii) 
regulation of copyright contracts related to users´ copyright, and (iv) controls imposed 
by the collecting societies.536 It is only the first category which is relevant for the 
present study and the statutory framework has been outlined above. 
There are other limitations to the owners´ ability to exploit and use copyright works 
(resulting either from general regulatory restrictions about acceptability of the content 
of the works or from rights existing in the underlying works) but these are also not 
subject of this analysis. The focus is mainly on any restrictions that could in one way 
or another resemble equivalent of the civil legal systems´ protectionist objectives, i.e. 
restrictions imposed on the “stronger” party in the contract bargaining (although 
English law is very reluctant to assign weaker and stronger positions to parties of a 
contract). 
The extent to which UK law interferes to regulate terms of transactions between authors 
and entrepreneurs (their transferees) – either to protect the psychological link between 
the author and their work, or to protect author´s financial interest – is very limited 
compared to what was described in relation to the German and Czech copyright laws 
as done through interpretation of copyright contracts or overriding terms that protect 
creators. In the UK, there are very few measures specifically directed at the creators, 
and validity of transactions is generally dependant on the law of contract not copyright 
law. The basic principle is that once a contract was freely entered into by two adults it 
is binding and a court will not reopen it just because it might have been unreasonable 
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or unfair.537 There are several theories as to the function and purpose of contract law538 
but the “classical theory” is most influencing in English law: contract is a reciprocal 
bargain entirely dependent upon the will of the parties, and the general law should 
intervene as little as possible with the freedom of the parties to contract; parties are 
entirely free to pursue their own interests.539 
Any aim to protect the authors and performers should be met through other means than 
legal regulation. Protection can have a form of collective process (such as unions), 
promotion of standard contracts with specific sectors540, or simply by securing the 
authors or artists an agent who is better positioned to negotiate a reasonable deal on 
their behalf.541  
There are, however, a few ways how a contract between an author or performer and 
their transferee may be regulated, although through general contract law doctrines, not 
copyright law. In the past, doctrines of undue influence and restraint of trade have been 
used to protect vulnerable authors. In general, where consent of a contracting party may 
have been obtained by some form of pressure (enabled through stronger bargaining 
position), the law may consider it improper and the ´victim´ of such pressure may be 
entitled to a relief under the common law of duress or under the equitable rules of undue 
influence. In general, a person may be protected against an unconscionable bargain. In 
copyright law scenarios, “weaker” parties also sometimes relied on the unacceptability 
of restraint of trade. 
Undue influence 
If a disadvantageous bargain is the outcome of the exercise of undue influence, the 
court may be willing to set such bargain aside.542 The equitable doctrine of undue 
                                                 
537 L. Bentley, B. Sherman, Intellectual Property Law (4th edn., OUP, 2014), at p. 313 
538 See more in John Phillips, 'Protecting Those in a Disadvantageous Negotiating Position: 
Unconscionable Bargains as a Unifying Doctrine', Wake Forest Law Review 2010, vol. 45, no. 3, 
pp. 837 – 861, 837 
539 ibid 
540 As done for example through the Society of Authors or Writers’ Guild 
541 Although, as it turns out in Elton John v Jones (1985) [1991] FSR 397 (see more below), even the 
agent may not act in the best interest of the author, and then the author may also need to challenge 
the contractual relationship concluded with the agent. 
542 See, for example, Hugh Beale, Chitty on Contracts: Vol. 1: General principles (31st edn., London: 
Sweet & Maxwell, 2012), para 7-057et seq., or Edwin Peel, Treitel. The Law of Contracts (13th 




influence covers cases in which a transaction between two parties who are in a 
relationship of trust and confidence may be set aside if the transaction is the result of 
an abuse of the relationship.543 The transaction may be set aside if the claimant shows 
that the other party obtained it by abusing the relationship (“actual undue influence”), 
or, in the absence of direct proof, if claimant shows the existence of a relationship of 
trust and confidence with the other party, and that the transaction is one that “calls for 
explanation”544. In such cases, there will be an evidential presumption that the 
transaction was the result of undue influence and unless the presumption is rebutted, 
the transaction may be set aside. The doctrine extends to cases of coercion, domination, 
or pressure outside those special relations. Most cases in which undue influence was 
successfully pleaded relate to gifts and guarantees, but the same principles apply to 
purchases at undervalue or sales at an excessive price545. However, the rules may also 
apply to contracts which are not obviously disadvantageous to the complainant in terms 
of under- or over-value, at least where undue influence is actually shown. 
In copyright field, an extreme example may be where an author assigned copyright to 
a publisher because of threats made by the publisher. In such cases the court would 
probably apply the doctrine of undue influence. But the court may extend their hand 
beyond these extreme scenarios to cases when a ´person in a position of domination 
has used the position to obtain unfair advantage for himself and so caused injury to the 
person relying on his authority or aid´546. For the court to interfere with the inviolability 
of a contract, the two following factors need to be present: (i) the parties must be in a 
relationship where one person has influence over the other one, and (ii) such influence 
has to be used to secure a ´manifestly disadvantageous transaction´547. If it is 
established that there is an undue influence, the contract is voidable. In such cases 
copyright assigned under such contract may be re-vested in the author.548  Before 
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546 Natinal Westminster v. Morgan [1985] 2 WLR 588, 599 
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further discussing the doctrine of undue influence, it is worth noting that for the present 
discussion – i.e. assessment of possibilities to protect an author or performer under 
English law (and arranging for them a fair remuneration) – the outcome of finding 
presence of undue influence may not be exactly what resolves the creator´s problem. 
The author may not need the contract to be void but would rather if the contract 
remained in place but a better remuneration term was implied into it. 
For the contract to be set aside due to undue influence, one must show that due to the 
relationship between the parties, one has influence over another. This will be common 
where the parties are in a ´fiduciary´ relationship, i.e. normally one of trust. Where the 
court finds the relationship between the parties to be fiduciary, the necessary 
dominating influence is presumed. However, in cases involving copyright transfer, for 
example when publishing contract is being signed, such fiduciary relationship will 
scarcely exist as there will normally be no previous relationship. But in John v. 
James549 there was an exception to this.  
The case concerned a series of publishing, recording and management agreements, 
entered into by Elton John and his lyricist, Bernie Taupin, and their manager Richard 
Leon James and his various co-workers or subsidiaries, all beginning in 1967, when 
the claimants were unknown and still minors. The agreements were extended and 
varied from time to time.  
From 1971, Mr. James began to set up a network of wholly-owned subsidiaries in the 
most lucrative world markets in order to sub-publish the plaintiffs' works there and they 
received substantial rates of commission which, together with the expense of 
maintaining offices and employing staff, substantially reduced the net earnings of the 
second defendant, and thus the plaintiffs' share of the gross revenues from their work. 
The plaintiffs ' primary claims were for the setting aside, on the ground of undue 
influence, of the publishing and recording agreements, the return of the copyrights in 
all compositions and recordings covered by the agreements and delivery-up of all 
master recordings. The claimants conceded that the defendants (Mr. James and the 
subsidiaries companies) should retain all sums received by them so far, save that they 
should account for (a) all sums wrongly retained by them by way of the sub-publishing 
                                                 




agreements and (b) the difference between the royalty rates in the agreements being set 
aside and the best possible rates obtainable in the market. 
It was held, among other things and dismissing the claims under the management 
agreements and allowing in part those under the sub-publishing and licensing 
agreements, that there was a fiduciary obligation on the part of the defendants to 
account properly for royalties received. It was further held that the copyright agreement 
was in the nature of a joint venture and the writers would need to place trust and 
confidence in the publisher over the manner in which it discharged its exploitation 
function. A publisher's freedom to consult its own commercial interest in balancing 
expense and risk against prospects of success was not inconsistent with the existence 
of fiduciary duties. Nor was there any reason why the publisher's ability to assign its 
rights under the publishing agreement should negative the existence of a fiduciary duty. 
In addition, the court found that the failure to complain for so many years did not make 
it unconscionable for the plaintiffs ever to be heard to complain.550 The court also found 
that there was deliberate concealment and unconscionable conduct on the part of the 
defendants in that they kept from the plaintiffs facts relevant to their right of action. 
The fact that plaintiffs were able to, and did, start their proceedings without this 
knowledge was not relevant. With regard to royalty rates, the defendants had behaved 
in an unconscionable way towards the plaintiffs and had concealed facts relevant to 
their right of action under this head. When the plaintiffs had brought their action within 
six years of the true facts coming to light, it was not wise for the defendants to plead 
limitation. In deciding how such unconscionable conduct was to be reflected in the 
result of the proceedings, however, the court had to bear in mind that its objective was 
not the punishment of the defendants but the attainment of a just result.  
The court further found that, because the two ingredients required before the court 
would set aside a transaction on the ground of undue influence were, first, a relationship 
in which one person had a dominating influence over another and, second, a manifestly 
disadvantageous transaction resulting from that influence551, to have tied two young 
men at the beginning of their career to a publishing agreement for six years on the terms 
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in question represented an unacceptably hard bargain. But in this case, no distinction 
fell to be drawn between laches and acquiescence, and the test to be applied was 
whether, having regard to all the circumstances, the balance of justice was in favour of 
setting the agreements aside. The balance of justice was firmly against setting aside the 
publishing agreements. However, those to whom royalties were payable ought to be 
able to have trust and confidence that the publishing and recording companies would 
treat them fairly in the exploitation arrangements made. 
Overall, thus, the doctrine of undue influence can in specific circumstances be used to 
help young artists. Nicholls J did hold that there was a dominant influence’ even though 
the acquaintance of John and James was short before the publishing arrangement was 
signed, because James ´really took charge´, knowing that the Elton John was young 
and eager, and received no independent advice. He stated that in his view, ´it was clear 
that the reason why Mr. John and Mr. Taupin signed the agreement for such an 
onerously long period lies not only in their keenness to be signed by Mr. James but 
also, and importantly, and this is partly why they were so keen, in the trust they reposed 
in him as a man of stature in the industry that he would treat them fairly´552. 
Similar outcome was achieved in O´Sullivan v Management Agency553, a case brought 
by a young, then unknown composer, Gilbert O´Sullivan who entered into an exclusive 
management agreement with the defendant, who operated through several companies 
with which O´Sullivan entered into publishing agreements. He later sought a 
declaration that such contracts were void and unenforceable because their signing was 
achieved through undue influence. It was found that because the defendant (as well as 
the associated companies554) was in a fiduciary position, the agreements were presumed 
to have been obtained by undue influence. Despite the fact that there had been no 
pressure placed on Mr. O´Sullivan to sign the agreements, the burden was on the 
defendants to show that that Mr. O´Sullivan had been fully informed and freely entered 
the contracts exactly because a fiduciary relationship existed. And because Mr. 
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O´Sullivan has no independent advice the defendants were not able to show that the 
agreements should be upheld. 
From the two above explained copyright cases it is possible to deduct that one can rely 
on the doctrine of undue influence more in relation to the creators´ agents or managers 
rather than their transferees. But while we still have not established a way how to set a 
disadvantageous transfer of rights aside, or, even better, claim fair participation on the 
transferees’ financial success achieved by exploitation of transferred work, it clearly 
demonstrates that the need for fairness and its seeking is present in the English judicial 
system. 
To have a contract set aside based on the claim of undue influence, one must be also 
be able to show that the dominating influence was used to induce the transaction and 
that the transaction was manifestly disadvantageous’. But in the complex copyright law 
scenarios – as was already demonstrated before – it is difficult to determine what is 
manifestly disadvantageous. Firstly, they can argue that some of the advantages 
brought to the creators are not of a financial nature and claim it is the transferee´s 
reputation, experience, contacts, supply chain capabilities and so on what balances the 
remuneration. Secondly, the assignee or exclusive licensee can argue that such 
arrangement is a standard and refer to agreements with other authors and practices of 
other entrepreneurs, equally ´disadvantageous´ - which seemingly makes it a norm. 
This, however, did not work in John v. James. The court found some of the publishing 
agreements unfair despite Mr. James acting in a bona fide manner, because the royalty 
under that contract was less than what was paid to other unknown artists. 
Restraint of trade 
Another doctrine under English contract law capable of protecting vulnerable creators 
is a doctrine of ´restraint of trade´ which reflects a general policy of contract law that a 
person should be able to practice their trade.555  
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General contract law tells us that all covenants in restraint of trade are prima 
facie unenforceable at common law. They are enforceable only if they are reasonable 
with reference to the interests of the parties concerned and of the public. Save where 
the unreasonable part can be severed by the removal of either part or the whole of such 
covenant, its inclusion renders the covenant, or the entire contract, unenforceable. An 
unreasonable covenant in restraint of trade is void in the sense that courts will not 
enforce it. However, if parties wish to implement it they would not be acting illegally 
and the courts would not intervene to prevent them from doing so. It has been held that 
“a covenant which is unenforceable ab initio should simply be disregarded unless and 
until it is subsequently and explicitly re-agreed”556. The doctrine of restraint of trade is 
one of the oldest applications of the doctrine of public policy, with cases related to the 
doctrine going back to the sixteenth century.  The validity of a covenant in restraint of 
trade is assessed at the date when the contract is entered into557. 558 
The definition of a covenant in restraint of trade presents special conceptual difficulty, 
because to some extent all contracts are in restraint of trade by at least preventing the 
parties to them from trading with others, but there has been no suggestion that all 
contracts are or should be subject to the doctrine. In the leading House of Lords 
case, Esso Petroleum Co Ltd v Harper's Garage (Stourport) Ltd559 Lord Reid 
stated560 that he “would not attempt to define the dividing line between contracts which 
are and contracts which are not in restraint of trade”.561 Agreements that restrict ability 
to practice one´s trade will be scrutinised by the courts in order to make sure they are 
justified562. 
This doctrine has been significant for the music industry, where the long-term contracts 
have been fairly common. In Schroeder Music Publishing Co Ltd v Macaulay 563, it 
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was held by the House of Lords that an agreement between a publisher and a songwriter 
was invalid because it represented a restraint of trade. The contract was a standard form 
and bound the songwriter to assign copyright in all his songs to the publisher for the 
period of 5 years which would extend another 5 years if the royalties received within 
the first period exceeded £ 5.000. As such, Mr. Tony Macaulay (formerly Anthony 
Gordon Instone) was bound to the publisher for the period of 10 years without the 
publisher´s obligation to exploit any of his songs. Lord Reid found it “an unreasonable 
restraint to tie the composer for this period of years so that his work will be sterilised 
and he can earn nothing from his abilities as a composer if the publisher chooses not to 
publish. If there had been […] any provision entitling the composer to terminate the 
agreement in such an event the case might have had a very different appearance. But 
as the agreement stands not only is the composer tied but he cannot recover the 
copyright of work which the publisher refuses to publish.”564 
Another publishing agreement under the scrutiny of the restraint of trade doctrine´s 
optics was in Zang Tumb Tuum Records Ltd v Holly Johnson565, in which the court 
assessed a publishing and recording agreements signed by the group Frankie Goes to 
Hollywood. The pop group entered into a recording contract with a record company 
which bound them, collectively and individually, for a period of up to nine years, 
following the initial period of the contract. Soon after the band became popular, the 
defendant Holly Johnson left the group. ZZT, the recording company tried to enforce a 
´leaving member’ clause in the recording contract and sought an injunction to restrain 
Mr. Johnson from cooperating with another record company.566 The group maintained 
that the contract was unenforceable because it was in restraint of trade. The company 
argued that even if the contract was unreasonably in restraint of trade, the pop group 
had waived their objections thereto. The court held, dismissing the appeal by the 
company against the finding of the lower court, that the provisions of the agreement 
were so one-sided as to be unenforceable, and that the fact that the pop group had not 
objected to the contract at the earliest possible moment did not prove that they had 
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waived their right to do so567. Dillon LJ further commented: “Pop musicians are 
promoted by the sales of their records, and obviously a recording company has 
difficulty in promoting a little known group when there are so many others seeking 
fame and fortune. Stringent provisions such as many of those in the recording 
agreement may be justifiable in an agreement of short duration. But the onus must, in 
my judgment, be on the recording company to justify the length of the Term and the 
one-sidedness of the provisions as to its duration in this recording agreement.”568 The 
company failed to justify those terms. 
These outcomes represent some “hope” for the artists in the weaker bargaining position, 
even in the UK. Especially when the outcome in Schroeder, de facto achieves the same 
result as application of the author´s right to withdraw from a contract due to the 
transferee´s inactivity as embedded in Czech copyright law and described earlier. But 
the doctrine does have its limitations as demonstrated in Panayiotou v Sony Music 
Entertainment569. Mr. Panayiotou, known to the world as George Michael, was looking 
to have a recording agreement with Sony, signed 1988, set aside. The chronology and 
facts of the case are rather complex but to sum up, George Michael first signed an 
agreement with Sony in 1982 as a member of group called Wham! Validity of the 
agreement was challenged before court after some initial success of the group but 
eventually the case was settled between the parties, leading to concluding of a new 
agreement in 1984. The 1984 contract imposed on Wham! a potential obligation to 
record eight albums. The group dismembered in 1986 and Sony exercised its ´leaving 
member clause´, which effectively meant that George Michael was bound by the 
agreement as an individual recording artist. First Michael´s solo album ´Faith´ was 
extremely successful and as result, the 1984 contract was renegotiated in 1988. This 
1988 contract with Sony bound George Michael to eight albums, should Sony so 
request, and lasted for 15 years. On the other hand, George Michael was provided much 
better financial terms. When Sony´s corporate structure changed in 1992, George 
Michael sought to release himself from the 1988 contract. The claim was rejected by 
the court on the grounds that it was ´contrary to public policy to seek to reopen a 
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previously compromised action´ and that ´the 1984 agreement was such a 
compromise´; the 1988 agreement, being based on the 1984 predecessor, was covered 
by the same policy570. 
Further in his assessment, Parker J considered whether, had there been no compromise, 
the 1988 agreement would have been an unreasonable restraint of trade. He found that 
while it was restrictive of trade571, the restraint was reasonable.572 For Parker J the 
restraint seemed to be an acceptable restraint as being “necessary to protect Sony´s 
interests in merely not recouping the investment that it had placed in Mr. Michael, but 
also the investment generally made in young artists who turned out to be 
unsuccessful”573. Also, considering the generous remuneration promised to Mr. 
Michael under such agreement, and comparing the terms of the 1988 contract to that 
from 1984, the restraint was minimal and fully attributable to Mr. Michael´s success. 
It is clear from this case that there are limits to the application of the doctrine of restraint 
of trade, however, it is difficult to determine where the limits are. What is still a 
legitimate interest of a recording or publishing company, making any terms imposed 
reasonable (is it 5 or 3 years term of the contract; is it an option for 3 albums or 5, etc.).  
One additional feature is important for the present discussion. As Bentley points out, 
the case introduced a new feature limiting the doctrine as a result of Parker J´s final 
reasoning when dismissing Mr. Michael´s case. He found that by requesting an advance 
from Sony in 1992, Mr. Michael affirmed the existence of the contract and could not 
thereafter argue that it should be set aside574. Given that this approach is followed by 
later cases575, authors and performers who seek to have long-term or one-sided 
agreements set aside need to be careful not to accept the benefit of the agreement after 
being informed of its potential unenforceability.  
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This basically prevents the reliance on this doctrine in any cases where additional fair 
compensation is sought. By definition, if one requests ´additional´ adequate 
remuneration, some previous remuneration had to change hands.  
Duress 
The literature on general contract law576 agrees that a contract which has been entered 
as the result of duress may be avoided by the party who was threatened. A threat to the 
victim's person has long been recognised as a basis for duress; the same is now 
established for wrongful threats to person´s property, including threats to seize the 
victim´s goods, and of wrongful or illegitimate threats to person’s economic 
interests, at least where the victim has no practical alternative but to submit. In each 
case, the wrongful or illegitimate threat must have had some causal effect on his 
decision to enter the contract, but the causal requirements may differ between the 
various kinds of duress.577 Therefore, a young, unknown artist or author could also, in 
severe cases, argue that they were under duress when signing a contract, if - for example 
- the producer threatened them that they would use their influence and make sure that 
no other company would sign a deal with the artist. There is, however, not a suitable 
copyright related case to demonstrate this. As such, for the purposes of subsequent 
discussion, only a brief introduction of general features of the rules for duress are 
provided below. 
It was at one time common to treat the legal rules relating to duress (and frequently 
also the equitable rules relating to undue influence) as resting on the absence of consent. 
A party who was subject to duress, or even undue influence, was often said to have had 
his will “overborne” so that s/he was incapable of making a free choice, or even of 
acting voluntarily. Most of the older cases rest on this assumption and even many 
modern decisions use the same language.578 But the basis of the law relating to these 
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topics has been reconsidered in light of the speeches in the House of Lords in Lynch v 
D.P.P. of Northern Ireland579. The case, albeit criminal, contains an extensive analysis 
of the juridical nature of duress in the law reports, and on this question, there appears 
to be no difference between the criminal and the civil law. Indeed, two of their 
Lordships in the case specifically relied upon the analogy of the law of contract.580 All 
five members of the House of Lords in Lynch 's case rejected the notion that duress 
deprives a person of his free choice, or makes his acts non-voluntary.581 Duress does 
not “overbear” the will, nor destroy it; it “deflects” it.582 Duress does not literally 
deprive the person affected of all choice; it leaves them with a choice between two 
evils583 (signing a bad record deal or signing no deal at all). A person acting under 
duress intends to do what he does; but does so unwillingly584.585 
At a later stage, in Universe Tankships of Monrovia v I.T.W.F.586, Lord Diplock said 
that the rationale was that the party's consent was induced by pressure which the law 
does not regard as legitimate with the consequence that the consent is treated in law as 
revocable.587 Similarly Lord Scarman agreed that the real issue is whether there has 
been illegitimate pressure, the practical effect of which is compulsion or absence of 
choice588.589 
An analogy with fraud and mistake can also be drawn. In Lynch and in Barton v 
Armstrong590 cases, the analogy with fraud and mistake has been relied upon by the 
courts. As such, duress renders a contract voidable rather than void; and in this respect 
it operates like fraud, and not like non est factum591. No doubt there will be extreme 
                                                 
579 Lynch v D.P.P. of Northern Ireland [1975] A.C. 653. 
580 See Chitty on contracts (2016), 8-004 
581 Lynch v D.P.P. of Northern Ireland [1975] A.C. 653: Lord Morris of Borth-y-Gest at 670, 675; 
Lord Wilberforce at 680; Lord Simon of Glaisdale at 690–691, 695; Lord Kilbrandon at 703; and 
Lord Edmund-Davies at 709–711. 
582 Lord Simon, [1975] A.C. 653, 695. 
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cases of duress, as there are extreme cases of fraud or mistake, in which non est factum 
is available as a plea and in which there is a total absence of consent: for example, if 
one party seizes another's hand, puts a pen in it and physically forces the other's hand 
to produce a signature. Equally, the gunman who actually helps himself to his victim's 
wallet is stealing it against his victim's consent, and in no sense obtaining it by means 
of a coerced contract. But the gunman who demands and is given the wallet by the 
victim, is obtaining it by duress. Analogy with fraud was also used in Barton v 
Armstrong to justify the view that, at least in a case of duress to the person, a contract 
entered into under duress may be avoided provided that the duress had some effect on 
the mind of the party threatened, even if he might have entered the contract anyway for 
other reasons. However, the contract will stand if it can be shown that the threat had no 
effect on his mind at all.592  
Unconscionable bargains as an umbrella doctrine?   
Equity can also provide relief against unconscionable bargains593 in cases in which one 
party is in a position to exploit a particular weakness of the other one, and in those 
cases the burden of justifying such a transaction is on the former. Professor Phillips 
even argues, that the doctrine of unconscionable bargains should provide a unifying 
doctrine protecting those who are in a disadvantageous negotiating position.594 One 
could argue that a creator negotiating his/her first exploitation deal would normally be 
in such a disadvantageous position. While promises should be fulfilled, as they 
engender reasonable expectations in the party to whom they were addressed, the 
liberalism of the classical contract law theory should be “qualified and tempered with 
coherent mechanisms for relieving persons in disadvantageous position from 
transactions that are unfair or unjust”.595 The doctrine of unconscionable bargains is in 
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592 Ibid Beale (2016), para 8-007  
593 More on the notion of unconscionable bargains see Hugh Beale, Chitty on Contracts: Vol. 1: 
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Professor Phillips´ view the most appropriate doctrinal tool for achieving this objective. 
It responds sensitively to a whole range of context. And since unconscionability 
underpins related doctrines – such as undue influence, duress, and some aspects of 
mistake – these doctrines should be replaced by an overarching doctrine of 
unconscionable bargains.596  
The equitable relief against unconscionable bargains historically derives from English 
Court of Chancery´s power, but has seen its most expansive development in Australia. 
The relevant principles were set out by the High Court of Australia in Commercial 
Bank of Australia v Amadio597: “The jurisdiction is long established as extending 
generally to circumstances in which (i) a party to a transaction was under 
a special disability in dealing with the other party with the consequence that there was 
an absence of any reasonable degree of equality between them and (ii) that disability 
was sufficiently evident to the stronger party to make it prima facie unfair or 
“unconscientious” that he procure, or accept, the weaker party's assent to the 
impugned transaction in the circumstances in which he procured or accepted it. Where 
such circumstances are shown to have existed, an onus is cast upon the stronger party 
to show that the transaction was fair, just and reasonable… (emphasis added by the 
author) “598. 
One could argue that requirement of ´special disability´ is met in the cases discussed 
above through the young (or otherwise ´novice´) creator´s inability to grasp fully the 
extremely complex web of transactions, stakeholders and flow of value pertinent to 
exploitation of copyright works, disabling him/her to reap fully what he/she sewn 
through the creative effort. Professor Phillips argues that the term ´special 
disadvantage´ should better be used for the first requirement and include not only 
constitutional disadvantages but also lack of business acumen, situational 
disadvantage, etc. Such situational disadvantage could mean a broad spectrum of 
factors, such as the relative bargaining position of the parties599, the length and 
complexity of the negotiations600, pressure applied during negotiations, or even lack of 
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income601.602 It is not difficult to imagine how an unknown artist trying to get a deal 
with the record company is facing any and all of these disadvantages. 
The second requirement, of knowledge of the special disadvantage, means that the 
disadvantage must be “sufficiently evident” to the stronger party to make it 
unconscionable for the party to accept the weaker party´s consent to the deal603. Such 
requirement will be satisfied not only with the stronger party´s “actual knowledge” of 
the facts but also if the party was “aware of facts that would raise such possibility in 
the mind of a reasonable person”604. It is also general belief that the stronger party need 
not act in a “morally reprehensible” manner and actively exploit the other party´s 
weakness; a “passive acceptance of a benefit in unconscionable circumstances”605 is 
sufficient for a relief to be granted.606 Such approach makes this doctrine even more 
attractive for the purposes of protection of authors and performers. In addition, it seems 
that the doctrine of unconscionable bargains could be suited to fight in general against 
remuneration that is not appropriate from the start not only - at a later stage - requesting 
additional compensation when the work or fixation of a performance becomes a 
financial success. The artist can realise that the remuneration negotiated is not 
appropriate by the work becoming a bestseller. But it can also happen through talking 
to peers, eventually being able to hire an agent, getting more experience in the field or 
being offered other – better – deals. Further assessment will follow in the later part of 
this work, but – possibly – this doctrine could become the “English protection of the 
weaker party in copyright contracts” should the EU harmonisation fail or come too late 
for the UK to be still caught by it due to its leave of the EU. It admittedly does sound 
very optimistic, even naive (given the English courts´ reluctance to apply the doctrine 
unconscionable bargains in general) but it surely is worth exploring.  
Another feature of this doctrine that makes it attractive is that – although not fully 
settled – the principles of unconscionable bargains are applicable to business 
undertakings, including companies.607 Small businesses, even if incorporated, should 
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not be precluded from relying on the doctrine.608 If that truly was the case and the 
doctrine would apply to cases of creators getting inadequate remuneration, such 
protection would place the creators in better position under English law than is the case 
on the continent, in most civil law jurisdiction, where the protection is afforded to 
authors and performers as natural persons only.  If, under the English law, the weaker 
party is not the author (natural person) who created the work but his/her “employer” 
(i.e. the company he/she created) and is still allowed to argue presence of 
unconscionable bargaining because they were, in fact, in a disadvantageous position, 
that would be a considerable advantage compared to, for example, Czech law. 
According to Czech law, such work would fall under the provisions of employee work 
(so far same as in the UK) but under Czech law, such employer will not be able to argue 
a weak position because there is no statutory provision such employer could use. The 
outcome of any such case would always depend on the facts, but it is hard to imagine 
a successful argument that while an employer, a person is first and foremost an author 
in a weaker bargaining position when negotiating a deal with a producer. The laws 
expect certain degree of professionalism and experience from employers. 
As pointed out by Professor Phillips, “some consider that the statutory protection of 
consumers should mark the limits of intervention on the basis of procedural 
unconscionability in the law of contract”609. In addition to judicial reluctance to apply 
the doctrine, academics also object that as it creates an unacceptable level of 
uncertainty610.  This may be true but, firstly, any such protectionist provision creates to 
some extent legal certainty as to whether and how they will be interpreted and applied 
by courts (e.g. the provisions enabling Czech authors and performers to withdraw from 
the exclusive licenses granted by them in case of change of conviction or inactivity of 
the licensee, as discussed earlier). But that should not be the reason to abandon them. 
It is a matter of policy and here the public interest in protecting weaker parties to the 
contract was chosen to prevail over legal certainty (and freedom of contract). Equally 
importantly, one must acknowledge that often such provisions are not imposed into 
                                                 
608 Ibid, at 843 
609 Ibid at 845 referring, as an example, to National Westminster Bank Plc v Morgan [1985] A.C. 686 
at 708. Through the influence of acquis, however, we can since 1985 see more and more cases – 
even in English law – of protectionist tendencies, with regards to employees to name some. 





laws with the view of being frequently evoked. They more serve as a “motivation” for 
the stronger parties in relationships to bargain fairly. As such, the mere knowledge of 
existence of such doctrine (and possible application in similar cases) should deter the 
stronger parties in the relationship from exploiting weakness of the ´disadvantaged´ 
party. It would serve as an “incentive through uncertainty”. Do I want to wait and see 
if a contract is set aside due to unconscionable bargaining over the weaker party – the 
author – or, do I introduce fairer and more responsible practices into my contract 
negotiation?  
It is worth noting here that (at least in civil law jurisdictions) once certain principle in 
law is formally acknowledged (e.g. by its incorporation into statutory law or by 
adjudication), “stronger” parties (if responsible enough, and also if having the 
necessary resources), evaluate the risks of non-compliance and often times adjust their 
conduct accordingly; whether by amending their T&Cs and/or template contract or by 
changing their practices. As one example for all, with the adoption of the new Civil 
Code in the Czech Republic in 2014, new mandatory rules became applicable to so 
called “contracts of adhesion”.611 Larger institutions with strong bargaining position, 
for example banks, changed in advance their “template” contracts with T&Cs in 
miniscule print or with terms extremely disadvantageous for their consumers (common 
practice under previous legislation) in preparation for the new law, ready by January 
2014. They assessed the risk and realised that the uncertainty of how courts will apply 
these new provisions (expectedly very strictly in favour of consumers) and the potential 
costs of litigation are not worth maintain the practice. They were not reactive to law 
suits, they were proactive in protecting their assets and also, most likely, reputation. 
There is a slight chance that as a result of protectionist legislation on the continent or 
aligned application of the doctrine of unconscionable bargains in the UK there would 
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be more pressure on the producers (first creators’ transferees) to apply profit based 
(royalty) remuneration rules rather than lump sum. Or, ideally, their combination: a 
lump sum at the beginning for the initial “creative effort”, followed by a profit based 
remuneration payable only after the producer recoups their investment. This after all 
seems to be a common conclusion in all the discussed scenarios, first outlined in the 
end of chapter 2.4 and finally repeated in the final recommendations. 
In fact, relatively recently a copyright case was argued referring, inter alia, to the 
doctrine of unconscionable bargains. Even though the judge declined to set aside a 
settlement in question in Minder Music v Sharples612, as not sufficient evidence was 
presented to show that there was any undue pressure (in fact, to the contrary, the judge 
found that the co-author of the song claiming unconscionable bargaining being imposed 
on her actively sought the agreement to resolve her financial problems), it is positive 
to see the doctrine “at work”.613 Although, Ms Adamson argued her disadvantageous 
position being in her financial situation at the time the settlement agreement was signed 
(rather than claiming inexperience or weaker bargaining position or so), claiming that 
at the time of signing the settlement agreement through which transferred part of her 
copyright she had been “unfairly pressured”, “bullied” and “surrounded and badgered” 
into signing the agreement with the defendant, his management company and his 
lawyer. The court found that not enough evidence was provided to prove that. 
 
                                                 
612 Minder Music Ltd. v Sharples [2015] EWHC 1454 (IPEC) 
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4.3.2. Market Practice 
“Even on a film like “Notting Hill”614, my contract precluded me from sharing in the 
massive financial success the film has enjoyed since it was released in cinemas. Nor 
have I seen a single cent from video or DVD sales. This is creative accounting of the 
very highest order!” says Roger Michell, Director of one of the biggest best-seller 
movies ever.615 
Market practice (judging from the conclusions of the studies) does not support claims 
for additional /fair remuneration. While collective/union bargaining may be involved 
in some industries, in many sectors creators are left fully “to their own fate”.  
 
4.3.3. Conclusion to Chapter 4.3. 
The regulation of copyright contracts and remuneration of authors and performers in 
the UK is very different from what was described in relation to the two civil law 
countries. Only very limited regulation is provided; most arrangements are left on the 
parties to agree on; market regulates itself. Where there is more direction provided, it 
usually results from obligations to implement certain rules based on international or 
regional instruments.  
Arguably though, the UK creative industries are one of the most successful in Europe 
(if not most) and probably the only ones effectively competing with the United States. 
Is it a coincidence, that jurisdictions that regulate the sectors through law to the smallest 
possible extent and protect investment more than creators are the most profitable? 
Probably not. But is that fair? Going back to the 2010 SABIP Study and its comment 
that economists do not care about fairness, they consider efficiency, this approach is 
very much reflected in the English approach to exchange of value within copyright 
industries. Also, the strong resentment to interfere with parties´ freedom of contract 
plays important role. 
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Further details on the creators of the movie and its box office can be found at 




It does not need to be further emphasised that no such instrument as “best-seller” clause 
or “equitable remuneration”, in the sense of general fair compensation, will be found 
in English law. Maybe through the “unconscionable bargain” doctrine in equity – if it 
develops in the direction as discussed above – creators could achieve some satisfaction. 
Otherwise they should hope that the proposed DSM Directive passes through the EU 
legislative process before the effective day of Brexit and that as such, it will stay part 
of English law through the effect of the Great Repeal Bill. On the other hand, the UK 
Parliament would first have to transpose the provisions of the DSM Directive into the 
national legislation. Judging by the way private copying levies were handled, one might 
wait forever. In addition to possible reluctance to transpose the provision of Article14, 














Chapter 5 – Reconciling the DSMD Proposal with the national laws 






5.1. National laws and their implementation of the DSMD’s Article 15 
Below in this Chapter 5.1., mainly possible ways of implementation/transposition of 
the Article 15 DSMD into the three national legislations are discussed. In addition, 
other provisions of Title IV Chapter 3 of the Proposal are compared to national rules 
and also overall overview of the legislative measures discussed in Chapters 2.5 and 2.6 
is provided in order to assess whether other tools are available to enable achieving the 
goals set in the Proposal and overall the DSM Strategy. 
 
5.1.1. Germany as the higher standard 
It is undisputable, that Germany has the most detailed copyright contract legislation 
aiming at strengthening creators´ position in their contract negotiations. Referring back 
to Chapter 2.5., Germany has very strict restrictions on the form of transfer of rights 
enforced through the doctrinal monistic approach to author´s rights. It has form 
requirements for some contracts616. Scope of rights transferred has to be clearly set in 
the exploitation contracts617, remuneration also has to be agreed (either form the start 
or, for previously unknown types of exploitation once the new type of use becomes 
known)618. In addition, German copyright law provides very broad bestseller clause 
(discussed above and below, Section 32a – Author´s additional participation) which 
was also successfully tested before courts619. Contracts will be interpreted in favour of 
the creator620 and can be terminated for inactivity of the exploiter.621 
To sum up, Germany seems to take very seriously their commitment set out in Section 
11 UrhG that “copyright protects the author in his intellectual and personal 
relationships to the work and in respect of the use of the work; it shall also serve to 
ensure equitable remuneration for the exploitation of the work”. Below is for 
completeness of the comparison provided table with provisions on the “contract 
adjustment mechanism” and “transparency obligation” but is clear that the Commission 
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should endeavour to transpose German copyright law into EU legislation, not the other 
way round (if that option existed) if they truly want to support the creators in their aim 
to get fairly remunerated. 
Article 15 – Contract adjustment mechanism 
German copyright law DSMD Proposal 
Section 32a UrhG 
(1) Where the author has granted an 
exploitation right to another party on 
conditions which, taking into account the 
author’s entire relationship with the other 
party, result in the agreed remuneration 
being conspicuously disproportionate to 
the proceeds and benefits derived from the 
exploitation of the work, the other party 
shall be obliged, at the author's request, to 
consent to a modification of the 
agreement which grants the author further 
equitable participation appropriate to the 
circumstances. It shall be irrelevant 
whether the parties to the agreement had 
foreseen or could have foreseen the 
amount of the proceeds or benefits 
obtained.  
(2) If the other party has transferred the 
exploitation right or granted further 
exploitation rights and if the conspicuous 
disproportion results from proceeds or 
benefits enjoyed by a third party, the latter 
shall be directly liable to the author in 
accordance with subsection (1), taking 
into account the contractual relationships 
within the licensing chain. The other party 
shall then not be liable.  
(3) The rights under subsections (1) and 
(2) cannot be waived in advance. An 
expected benefit shall not be subject to 
compulsory execution; any disposition 
regarding the expected benefit shall be 
ineffective. However, the author may 
grant a non-exclusive exploitation right to 
everyone free of charge.  
Article 15: 
[…] authors and performers are entitled 
to request additional, appropriate 
remuneration from the party with whom 
they entered into a contract for the 
exploitation of the rights when the 
remuneration originally agreed is 
disproportionately low compared to the 
subsequent relevant revenues and 
benefits derived from the exploitation of 




(4) The author shall have no claim under 
subsection (1) if the remuneration has 
been determined according to common 
remuneration standards (Section 36) or by 
a collective bargaining agreement and if 
further appropriate participation is 
expressly stipulated for the case referred 
to in subsection (1).  
Comparing the German clause on authors additional participation with the Czech 
bestseller clause, what is appreciated is creators are expected to go first to their “first 
transferees” to claim the additional participation. Only when this fails, they would go 
to the arbitration body or ultimately court. This is supports economy of disputes and 
time effectiveness. 
Article 14 – Transparency obligation 
German copyright law DSMD Proposal 
Section 32d  UrhG (Right to information 
and accountability) 
(1) Where an exploitation right has been 
granted or transferred in return for 
payment, the author may once a year 
request from his contracting party 
information and accountability in respect 
of the extent of the use of the work and 
the proceeds and benefits derived 
therefrom on the basis of information 
which is generally available in the 
ordinary course of business activities. 
(2) The entitlement under subsection (1) 
is ruled out if 
1.  the author has made only a secondary 
contribution to a work, product or 
service; a contribution is, in particular, 
secondary where it has little influence on 
the overall impression created by a work 
or the nature of a product or service, for 
example because it does not belong to the 
typical content of a work, product or 
service or 
2.  the claim on the contracting party is 
disproportionate for other reasons. 
Article 14: 
(1) […] authors and performers receive 
on a regular basis and taking into account 
the specificities of each sector, timely, 
adequate and sufficient information on 
the exploitation of their works and 
performances from those to whom they 
have licensed or transferred their rights, 
notably as regards modes of exploitation, 
revenues generated and remuneration 
due. 
(2) The obligation in paragraph 1 shall be 
proportionate and effective and shall 
ensure an appropriate level of 
transparency in every sector. However, 
in those cases where the administrative 
burden resulting from the obligation 
would be disproportionate in view of the 
revenues generated by the exploitation of 
the work or performance, Member States 




(3) The author shall have no claim under 
subsection (1) and (2) if the remuneration 
has been determined according to 
common remuneration standards 
(Section 36) or by a collective bargaining 
agreement. 
 
Section 32e UrhG (Right to information 
and accountability in a licence chain) 
(1) Where the author’s contracting 
partner has transferred the exploitation 
right or granted further exploitation right, 
the author may also demand information 
and accountability pursuant to section 
32d (1) and (2) from those third parties 
1.  which essentially economically 
determine the use processes in the 
licence chain or 
2.  from whose profits or benefits the 
conspicuous disproportion pursuant to 
section 32a (2) results. 
(2) In order to be able to assert the 
entitlements under subsection (1) it shall 
be sufficient that there are clear 
indications based on verifiable facts that 
their conditions are met. 
(3) The author shall have no claim under 
subsection (1) and (2) if the remuneration 
has been determined according to 
common remuneration standards 
(Section 36) or by a collective bargaining 
agreement. 
 
Later in Chapter 5.1.2. and in Chapter 5.2, it is criticised that assessing the level of 
contribution of the creator to the success of a work can be very subjective and thus can 
create unfairness. The German wording, however, seems very well thought of and what 
constitutes “secondary” contribution seems to be acceptably defined. This may also be 




5.1.2. Czech Republic’s comparable scope of protection (or not?) 
Comparing the provisions of the Czech copyright law with the Proposal´s Article 15, it 
seems that minor amendment of current law would suffice in order to implement the 
provision, provided that Article 15 DSMD remains unchanged throughout the EU 
legislative process. 
Czech copyright law DSMD Proposal 
Section 2374 (1) NCZCC: 
Where the amount of the royalty has not 
been derived from the proceeds from the 
utilization of the licence and where such 
an amount is so low that it is in obvious 
disproportion to the profit from the 
utilisation of the licence and to the 
importance of the work for the 
achievement of such profit, the author 
shall be entitled to an equitable additional 
remuneration.622 
Article 15: 
[…] authors and performers are entitled 
to request additional, appropriate 
remuneration from the party with 
whom they entered into a contract for 
the exploitation of the rights when the 
remuneration originally agreed is 
disproportionately low compared to the 
subsequent relevant revenues and 
benefits derived from the exploitation 
of the works or performances. 
The most significant difference between the two provisions is that according to Czech 
law, the best-seller clause623 applies only where the original remuneration is defined by 
a lump sum (i.e. “not derived from the proceeds of the utilization of the licence”). Also, 
according to the provision of Section 2374 (1) NCZCC, it will apply only where the 
profit from the utilisation of the licence is in obvious disproportion to the “importance 
of the work for the achievement of such profit”. This is a “tricky” provision. On the 
one hand, it enables to eliminate claims from “supporting” artists, and is subject of 
many of the amendment proposals tabled by the MEPs in relation to the DSMD 
Proposal as discussed below in Chapter 5.2. On the other hand, this condition represents 
additional hurdle for the creators to establish that they qualify for the claim under the 
best-seller clause. How does one establish importance for success. This will depend on 
                                                 
622 By reference from Section 2378 NCZCC, same applies to performers 




circumstances of each case, but will normally be very subjective assessment. What one 
person can view as secondary feature of a work, another one can perceive as the main 
reason to buy a copy of a work. For example, illustrations in a book made by someone’s 
favourite artist can induce such person to buy a book without being interested in its 
content and vice versa. Similarly, one person can be interested in a specific movie for 
its musical score while other will want to watch it because of their favourite actress, 
who nevertheless only plays a small part in the movie. Another person will come to the 
cinema to see the musculature of the lead actor in the same movie and another one is 
simply intrigued by the overall synopsis. Which of the authors or performers is entitled 
to the claim for additional fair remuneration when the movie becomes another Titanic? 
How does the court assess how big a portion of the millions of viewers came to the 
cinema specifically for the music when James Horner624 (or his heirs) comes to claim 
additional compensation? 
Nevertheless, going back to Czech Republic´s obligations to transpose the Directive, 
if the Czech Ministry of Culture notifies the Commission that there is no need to adopt 
any new specific measures in order to implement Article 15 DSMD based on the above 
demonstrated similarity of the two provisions, it is likely that any discrepancies would 
go unnoticed. 
Just for completeness, below is also a comparison of the “transparency obligation” 
provision introduced in Article 14 DSMD. It is an important tool in support of the 
claim under Article 15 and thus it is worth additional focus. 
 
                                                 
624 Author of musical score for the Titanic movie; died in 2015.  
 This also raises an interesting question for each of the jurisdictions, answer to which will strongly 
be impacted by the legal tradition followed in the country: is this claim considered an economic 
right and can thus be invoked by the creator´s heirs, or, does it cease to exist with the creator´s 
death? In each jurisdiction, this will be dealt with differently, depending on specific shape of their 
monistic/dualistic or common law principles. This is when even seemingly obsolete notions, as the 
adherence to specific tradition may seem, demonstrate their relevance. In Czech, the claim is one 
of creators´ economic rights, which are inheritable as long as they are not personally connected to 
the creator (not the case). The claim is a receivable which occurs as soon as the remuneration 
received becomes disproportionately low. If that happens during the creator´s life such receivable 
is inheritable as any other. The question is whether the receivable is inherited as a „conditional 





Czech copyright law DSMD Proposal 
Section 2366 NCZCC: 
(2) Where the amount of the royalty has 
been agreed in dependence on the 
proceeds from the utilisation of the 
licence, the licensee shall be obliged to 
make it possible for the author to audit 
the relevant accounting documents or 
other documentation in order to establish 
the real amount of the royalty. Where the 
licensee thus provides the author with 
information designated by the licensee as 
confidential, the author may not divulge 
such information to any third party, nor 
use it according to his needs in 
contravention of the purpose for which it 
has been made available to him.”625 
(3) The licensee shall submit to the 
licensor periodic accounts of the fee 
under Subsection (2) at the stipulated 
intervals; unless stipulated otherwise, the 
licensee shall submit the accounts at least 
once a year. 
Article 14: 
(1) […] authors and performers receive 
on a regular basis and taking into 
account the specificities of each sector, 
timely, adequate and sufficient 
information on the exploitation of their 
works and performances from those to 
whom they have licensed or transferred 
their rights, notably as regards modes of 
exploitation, revenues generated and 
remuneration due. 
(2) The obligation in paragraph 1 shall 
be proportionate and effective and shall 
ensure an appropriate level of 
transparency in every sector. However, 
in those cases where the administrative 
burden resulting from the obligation 
would be disproportionate in view of the 
revenues generated by the exploitation 
of the work or performance, Member 
States may adjust the obligation in 
paragraph 1. 
 
The Czech provision imposes the obligation to provide information only in relation to 
proportional remuneration (which may make sense in the context that where revenues 
are not relevant for the reward, the creator does not need to know). In the background 
of the aim of the Commission to be able to provide transparent system across all uses, 
it makes sense that the European proposal is wider. It also emphasizes another problem.  
                                                 




Given that under Czech copyright law there is no obligation to provide “equitable 
remuneration” and at the same time there are no limitations on the type of remuneration 
allowed, if nothing changes, Czech creators will still have difficulties to receive what 
they deserve. There is currently nothing in applicable copyright law that prevents 
producers from providing inadequate compensation to creators. Therefore – for the 
creators to be adequately rewarded – one of the following should happen: either the 
Article 15 DSMD is amended to the effect as to impose an obligation on MSs to 
implement provisions on “equitable remuneration”, or, Czech legislator should 
introduce such provision on its own. The current protection for creators stipulated in 
the NCZCC is nowhere near sufficient. Even though there is a bestseller clause in place, 
as outlined in Chapter 4.2. and further demonstrated through the Case study in Chapter 
5.3., it simply “does not work”. 
In addition, the Czech “transparency provision” does not take into account the specifics 
of each sector as the Draft DSMD suggests. It is difficult though to imagine how to set 
“taking into account the specificities of each sector”? 
More effort will need to be dedicated to implementation of Article 16 of the Draft 
DSMD as currently no such body exists and proper evaluation will need to be 
conducted to see whether the arbitration body should be established within existing 
judiciary system, arbitration or maybe collective management organisation. 
To conclude the assessment of provisions provided to creators under Czech copyright 
law to improve their bargaining position, from the legislative tools discussed in Chapter 
2.5, Czech copyright law not only provides a best-seller clause examined in depth in 
Chapter 4.2. and above in this chapter, but also provides restrictions related to the form 
of transfer of rights by banning assignment of author´s rights inter vivos626,  requires 
written form for exclusive licences627, provides rules on interpretation of the scope of 
licence agreements that in doubt or if agreement is missing, clause is interpreted 
                                                 
626 Section 26(1) CZCA 




restrictively. Authors also have the right to terminate contracts due to inactivity of 
licensees628. 
But despite all the measures just described, it seems from the above and below outlined 
that except for the protection from full assignment and waivers of rights Czech 
copyright law does not provide much help to creators to balance their bargaining 
positions. Surely, additional statutory tools, such as the amended proposal, would be a 
good start. But also, more attention should be paid to encouragement of collective 
bargaining and/or formation of unions or guilds, to raising awareness and to looking at 
additional statutory measures as introduced recently by German legislator. Given the 
historical connection between the two legal systems and the fact that the post-
communist Czech copyright law was heavily built on German law, it could be feasible 
to propose additional inspiration. Otherwise, it will be difficult to achieve the goals set 
overall by the Commission in the DSM Strategy. 
 
  
                                                 




5.1.3. UK and its almost non-existent protection of creators’ economic interests 
As commentators claim, as with all current EU legislative proposals, implementation 
of the Directive in the UK is not only subject to adoption by the European Parliament 
and the Council of Ministers, but also, following a Brexit, UK Government approval 
of the relevant provisions.629 
Assuming that the UK will aim to implement the provisions of the DSM Directive, 
there is one provision from Title IV Chapter 3 that may not have to be specifically dealt 
with. The Copyright Tribunal with a bit of adjustment could function as a facilitator of 
the voluntary dispute resolution procedure as anticipated in Article 16.  
Otherwise, Articles 14 and 15 would need particular attention. It seems superfluous to 
speculate at this stage about the specific technique that could be used to implement the 
provisions. It would also very much depend on how the rest of the DSMD provisions 
shape up during the current discussions and what tool would be chosen. 
At the same time, in the UK the Proposal has probably brought most disapproval, given 
the different legal tradition, which the Proposal does not always take into account. For 
example, the BSAC comments that “encouraging more collective agreements, of the 
sort that apply in the UK, is a better approach to deliver fair remuneration for authors 
and performers without the risk of the damaging consequences (particularly in the form 
of lower content investment) likely from the proposals in the draft Directive.”630 It also 
comments that rewards in a contract reflect the risk being taken, and that rights holders 
today have more opportunities to go directly to market (or to a wide variety of other 
intermediaries) if they are unhappy with the terms on offer from a particular 
intermediary.631 Not surprisingly, the BSAC believes that interfering in freely 
negotiated contracts is not justified, and that intervention, if any, in this area should 
take into account sectoral differences.632 That is indeed something that resonates 
                                                 
629 Ed Baden-Powell, Karim Amijee, ´European Commission proposal to modernise copyright´, Ent. 
L.R. 2017, 28(1), 9-12, 12 
630 ´Comments from The British Screen Advisory Council (BSAC) on the Digital Single Market 
Copyright Proposal published by the EU Commission on 14 September 2016´, 
<http://www.bsac.uk.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/BSAC-Response-EU-Sept-2016-






throughout the many previously discussed studies and reflection of which is completely 
neglected in the initial Proposal. In the following Chapter 5.2. it is seen to be the subject 
of several commentary and/or amendment proposal during the EU legislative process 
with the Proposal. 
Similarly, some comments tabled in the April 2017 session of the Parliamentary 
Committee on the Internal Market and Consumer Protection confirm BSAC´s argument 
that accordingly, agreements such as those existing in the UK (collective and 
individual, that provide for payments to authors and performers linked to future 
exploitation of content) should in no circumstances be capable of being re-opened633. 
Given the nature of the body, it is not surprising that the BSAC suggests that there 
should be very clear criteria to establish the very limited set of circumstances, if any, 
in which a contract could be opened up retrospectively.634 Nevertheless, this does not 
seem to be the intention, as understood from the transitional provisions (see more above 
in Chapter 3.2.2.3.). 
We may conclude that UK´s implementation of the provisions of Title IV Chapter 3 of 
the Proposal is a biggest question mark in this whole examination. 
 
  
                                                 
633 Ibid. 
634 ´Comments from The British Screen Advisory Council (BSAC) on the Digital Single Market 
Copyright Proposal published by the EU Commission on 14 September 2016´, 
<http://www.bsac.uk.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/BSAC-Response-EU-Sept-2016-Copyright-




5.2. Proposals to amend Article 15 DSMD within the EU legislative debate 
Since the publication of the Proposal in September 2016, members of bodies of the 
European Union and associated institutions had a chance to comment on the overall 
proposition as well as individual provisions of the Draft DSMD. It is not a surprise that 
a lot of debate has commenced in this respect. However, commentary on the Title IV, 
Chapter 3 of the Proposal is a little scarce as much more controversy accompanies the 
provisions on exceptions and limitation, and – more prominently – on the cross-border 
availability of VOD services.  
Nevertheless, first comment specifically on the contract adjustment mechanism arrived 
shortly after the Proposal´s divulgation. The SAA commented on its web site as 
follows: “In its proposal for a Directive on Copyright in the Digital Single Market 
presented on 14 September 2016, the European Commission proposes to generalize an 
exploitation transparency obligation (authors should receive on a regular basis 
information on the exploitation of their works) and a contract adjustment mechanism 
for authors considering that the remuneration originally agreed is disproportionately 
low compared to the revenues derived from the exploitation of the work. These are 
welcome provisions to start addressing the issue even if they need some amendments 
to ensure that they deliver the intended effect and are not easily avoided.”635 
The Resolution on a coherent EU policy for cultural and creative industries (CCIs), 
adopted by the European Parliament on December 13, 2016636 calls for the 
“establishment of the right to fair remuneration and legal protection for authors”. 
Associations637 now call on the Parliament to make this a reality and to “strengthen the 
provisions in the Commission’s proposal for a Directive on Copyright in the DSM and 
to add the right to fair remuneration through an unwaivable right to remuneration.” 
Cécile Despringre, Executive Director of the SAA said: “SAA is delighted that such a 
                                                 
635 The Society of Audiovisual Authors´ website, article Authors’ Remuneration - The last resort: 
going to court, posted 13.12.2016,  http://www.saa-authors.eu/en/blog/312-authors-remuneration--
-the-last-resort-going-to-court (accessed July 2017) 
636 See the Report at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-
//EP//TEXT+REPORT+A8-2016-0357+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN (accessed July 2017) 
637 E.g. the SAA, see “European Parliament calls for Right to Fair Remuneration for Authors”, 
published on 14.12.2016 at http://www.saa-authors.eu/en/news/313-european-parliament-calls-




large majority in the European Parliament638 can get behind a right to fair 
remuneration for authors. They now have the opportunity to put this in legislation and 
make a massive difference to the lives of screenwriters and directors across Europe 
who are too often disconnected from the economic success of their works.” 
Also practitioners comment on the proposal, stating that industry reaction has focused 
on the measures of the DSMD aiming to achieve a well-functioning marketplace for 
copyright. Copyright holders (and their representative bodies) have praised the 
measures for addressing the "transfer of value" issue, as well as the intention to redress 
the current imbalance of interests between user upload platforms and rights-holders. 
They argue that upload platforms such as YouTube should ensure the functioning of 
agreements with rights-holders to make works available, and that a rights-holder’s 
remuneration should be proportionate to the revenue that upload platforms generate by 
exploiting that content. Google’s response is that this would effectively turn the internet 
into "a place where everything uploaded to the web must be cleared by lawyers before 
it can find an audience".639 If the proposal is adopted, it could represent a significant 
victory for the creative industries.640  
They add, to the interest of this examination, that another key element of the Proposal, 
which has not yet received the same level of discussion, is the proposal to give authors 
and performers the right to request "appropriate remuneration" where contractual 
remuneration is disproportionately low in comparison with the revenue and benefits 
derived from exploitation. “It remains unclear how such a principle would work in 
practice and how far recording artists, composers, writers and other creators might be 
able, in the future, to challenge the terms on which they are remunerated.”641 
Authors of this commentary point out that as the proposals go forward to the Parliament 
and EU Council, discussions may focus on the obligation on online service providers 
to take "appropriate and proportionate" measures to protect third-party copyrights, as 
                                                 
638 The resolution was adopted by a massive majority with the support of 540 MEPs. 
639 https://europe.googleblog.com/2016/09/european-copyright-theres-better-way.html   (Accessed 
July 2017). 
640 Ed Baden-Powell, Karim Amijee, ´European Commission proposal to modernise copyright´, Ent. 





well as the related right for press publishers "to conclude licence agreements" with—
and so, in effect, to demand payment from—online service providers that reproduce 
press content on their services. That would, in their view, particularly affect search 
engines and news aggregation sites that include snippets of text alongside hyperlinks 
to published content. Critics are referring to this as a "link tax". 
Two important discussions took place within the EU floors. In April 2017, during a 
session of the Committee on the Internal Market and Consumer Protection in the 
European Parliament, members of the Parliament (“MEP”s) had a chance to table their 
proposed amendments to the draft DSM Directive. In May 2017, the Council Working 
Party discussion in the Council of Europe took place. 
 
5.2.1. April 2017 session of the Parliamentary Committee on the Internal 
Market and Consumer Protection642 
At the session of the Parliamentary Committee on the Internal Market and Consumer 
Protection (“IMCO”) held on April 5, 2017, several amendment proposals were 
suggested by the MEPs. In total, there were 576 amendment proposals643; proposal 
numbers 515 to 556 relate to Articles 14 -16 Draft DSMD.644 
 
Proposals to amend Article 15 
Some proposals suggest also a name change for the Article 15; Pascal Arimont (Am. 
542) suggests calling the Article 15 as follows: Contract adjustment mechanism 
Remuneration for the use of works or performances. He further suggests that a new 
paragraph 1 is added (Am. 543) of the following wording: “1. Member States shall 
                                                 
642 In the following text, any strikethrough text represents a text suggested to be removed while any 
underline text represents the author´s suggestion for additional text. 
643 Below in the text an abbreviation „Am.“ refers to the amendment proposal (and its number 
following the abbreviation) 






ensure that authors and performers are entitled to an appropriate remuneration derived 
from the exploitation of their works.” 
Similarly, Eva Maydell (Am. 545) suggest the following wording of Article 15: 
“Member States shall ensure that authors and performers are entitled to request 
additional, appropriate equitable remuneration from the party with whom they entered 
into a contract for the exploitation of the rights when the remuneration originally agreed 
is disproportionately low compared to the subsequent relevant revenues and benefits 
derived from the exploitation of the their works or performances. 
Both the above proposals suggest that the remuneration claim introduced in Article 15 
should not be limited to “additional fair remuneration” – for bestsellers – but should 
overall capture “general right to fair compensation”, similarly as the German model of 
“equitable remuneration” under Section 32 UrhG.  
In a similar tone, Philippe Juvin (Am. 541) proposed introduction of new Article 14a, 
which, however, better fits to be adopted as a new Article 15a or as new paragraph (1) 
of Article 15. It is called “Fair and separate remuneration” and reads as follows: 
“Member States shall ensure that authors and performers receive fair remuneration for 
each mode of exploitation of their protected works and other subject-matter.” 
Pina Picierno (Am. 546) suggests that the Article 15 reads as follows: “In the absence 
of existing procedures under applicable national laws or industry practices enabling the 
modification or annulment of contracts for the exploitation of rights in appropriate 
circumstances, Member States shall ensure that authors and performers are entitled to 
request additional, appropriate the adjustment of the agreed remuneration from the 
party with whom they entered into a contract for the exploitation of the rights when, in 
cases where the remuneration originally agreed is disproportionately low has become 
strikingly disproportionate compared to the subsequent relevant unanticipated net 
revenues and benefits derived by the contracting party from the exploitation of the 
works or performances. When assessing the disproportionality, the appropriate 
circumstances of each case, including the nature and significance of the contribution of 
the author or performer to the overall work or performance, should be taken into 




remuneration (comparably to  Section 32a UrhG), but proposes further qualification for 
its use. 
Similarly, Maria Grapini (Am. 552) proposes that the article should be invoked “In the 
absence of national legislative provisions regarding cancellation or modification of the 
copyright assignment agreement”.  
On the other hand, there are some proposals which even suggest that Member States 
should be able to decide if the introduce best-seller clause (by changing shall ensure to 
may decide – Am. 547, Daniel Dalton, Anneleen Van Bossuyt), or at least that it should 
be invoked only if the remuneration is widely disproportionate to the unanticipated 
benefits (Am. 551, Antanas Guoga). The same MEP also suggests (Am. 555) that new 
paragraph (2) should be introduced stating that “Paragraph 1 does not apply when the 
contribution of the author or performer is not significant having regard to the overall 
work or performance, or when a revenue or profit share has been agreed.”, by which, 
similarly as is currently the case in the Czech Republic, the provision of Article 15 
would only apply if the reward was agreed as a lump sum. It would also only apply to 
“lead” artists and main authors (and only sometimes). How subjective can this 
assessment be is discussed in Chapter 5.1.2. above. 
Some amendment proposal do not significantly change the wording and meaning of the 
provision, they only suggest little clarification, such as: “Member States shall ensure 
that authors and performers, or representatives they appoint,  are entitled to request 
additional, equitable, appropriate remuneration from the party with whom they entered 
into a contract for the exploitation of the rights when, or their successor in title, when, 
it is duly justified to claim that the remuneration originally agreed is disproportionately 
low compared to the subsequent relevant revenues and benefits derived from the 
exploitation of the works or performances.” (Am. 549, Virginie Rozière, Marc 
Tarabella, Sylvie Guillaume, Pervenche Berès). 
The above mentioned is just a selection of some proposals, there are more but they 




Proposals to amend Article 14 
Over 20 proposals were suggested to amend Article 14: Transparency obligation). This 
Article is not paramount for this study but is still important for context. Below are just 
a few selected proposals. 
Pascal Arimont (Am. 524) proposes new subparagraph of paragraph (1), stating the 
following: “Where the contracting partners of the authors and performing artists have 
transferred the right of use or granted further rights of use, the authors may also demand 
information and accountability from those third parties which essentially determine the 
financial aspects of the use processes in the licensing chain.”  
This is a frequent line of thinking. In the proposal in the concluding chapter, it is 
suggested that the obligation to provide sufficient remuneration to creators for uses 
throughout the whole supply chain is imposed on the “first transferee”, in effect 
transferring the liability for obtaining all the necessary data on them. They would 
probably need to secure this contractually from their contracting partners, such as 
distributors. As such, even the information obligation should be carried over to the first 
transferees. If, however, there is no amendment of Article 15 to the effect of the first 
transferees having responsibility for the whole supply chain, imposing the information 
obligation on the subsequent transferees would be crucial for creators in order to obtain 
sufficient data on the uses of their works and fixations of performances. Also, this 
obligation of subsequent transferees to provide information may be important for the 
control of management of rights curtailed (and remunerated) by way of exceptions to 
copyright protection as proposed by the other DSM Strategy documents. 
Stricter version of Article 14 was also proposed by Antanas Guoga in Am. 529, when 
suggesting amendment of paragraph 2 of the Article 14: “The obligation in paragraph 
1 shall be proportionate and effective and shall ensure an appropriate level a high 
degree of transparency in every sector. However, in those cases where the 
administrative burden resulting from the obligation would be disproportionate in view 
of the revenues generated by the exploitation of the work or performance, Member 
States may shall adjust the obligation in paragraph 1, under the condition that the level 




and ensures an appropriate level of transparency.”. Similar effect would have proposal 
of Virginie Rozière, Marc Tarabella, Sylvie Guillaume, and Pervenche Berès (Am. 
530). 
 
5.2.2. May 2017 Council Working Party discussion 
In the Presidency’s Issues Paper for discussion at the Council Working Party (“CWP”) 
10 and 17 May 2017645, the Council of Europe prepared materials for Exchange of 
views on key issues on Articles 10-17 of the Proposal for a Directive of the European 
Parliament and of the Council on copyright in the Digital Single Market. The document 
presents a number of issues that were raised by Member States at the Council Working 
Party (16-17 January, 15-16 February and 1 March 2017) and which the Presidency 
wished to discuss in more detail in the CWP in May 2017. 
In relation to Fair remuneration in contracts of authors and performers (Articles 14 to 
16), the following has been discussed and questions asked. 
 
Article 14: Transparency obligation 
Persons subject to the transparency obligation 
“Article 14(1) of the proposal provides that the transparency obligation 
(information on the exploitation of the rights) is imposed on the persons that 
have entered into licensing or transfer agreements with authors and 
performers. The Commission explained that the proposal concentrates on 
the relationship between individual creators and their contractual partners. 
Against this background, some delegations asked whether such obligations 
shall be limited to the first contractual partner or extended to other parties 
involved down the value chain. Some delegations underlined the possible 
risk that the first contractual partner may not exploit the work himself. In 
this case, the first contractual partner would not be in a position to report 
relevant information to the creators, especially in some sectors where 
contractual arrangements such as commissioning, project companies or 
special-purpose vehicles – SPVs are relatively common. Similar concerns 
were also raised with regard to possible circumvention of the transparency 
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obligation (e.g. the creation of shell companies to circumvent the 
obligation).” 646 
The following questions were drafted to initiate the discussion at the CWP: 
• Do the delegations consider that the application of the transparency obligation 
in Article 14 to the direct contractual partner of the creator is sufficient in order 
to meet the objective of improving the bargaining position of creators? 
• Should actors of the value chain other than the first contractual partner such as 
distributors be also subject to some requirements? If so, how? 
• Do the delegations think that the proposal should clarify that the obligation in 
Article 14 applies to the creator's first direct contractual partner who is exploiting 
the work and not only to the first formal contractual partner who may not directly 
exploit the work (e.g. to take into account contractual arrangements such as 
commissioning)? If so, how? 
• Do the delegations have concerns regarding the practical enforcement of this 
mechanism? 
It is therefore evident that the concern about how far the supply chain should be affected 
by the provisions of the Proposal is shared across the stakeholders´ camps. In this 
thesis, the aim is to focus specifically on Article 15 of the Proposal and – as such – 
specific recommendations are provided only in relation to that provision. Nevertheless, 
in order to achieve an efficient mechanism providing creators with tools to claim fair 
compensation for the transfer of their rights and wide-ranging use of their creations, 
the wording (and use) of the provisions in Title IV, Chapter 3 of the Proposal must be 
well interconnected and corresponding with each other. 
 
Content of the transparency obligation 
“Pursuant to Article 14(1) of the proposal, the sharing of information shall 
be regular, timely, adequate, sufficient, and shall take into account the 
specificities of each sector. The Commission explained that the main 
objective of the obligation is to provide creators with sufficient information 
to assess the economic value of their rights. Some delegations questioned 
                                                 




how the sector-specific transparency requirements will be determined and 
the role of stakeholders' dialogues in this regard.”647 
And the following question was discussed at the CWP: 
• Do the delegations think that the proposal should be more specific regarding the 
determination and application of the transparency obligations to different 
sectors? If so, what would be the reasons to do so and what concrete provisions 
should be added? 
 
Articles 15 and 16: contract adjustment mechanism and dispute resolution 
mechanism 
Practical application of the contract adjustment mechanism 
“Article 15 of the proposal allows authors and performers to request additional, 
appropriate remuneration from their contractual partners when the remuneration 
originally agreed is disproportionally low compared to the subsequent relevant 
revenues and benefits derived from the exploitation of the works or performances. 
Some delegations requested for clarifications on the practical application of the contract 
adjustment mechanism, and its enforcement by competent authorities.” 648 
The following questions were drafted to initiate the discussion at the CWP: 
• Do the delegations think that the proposal should provide further clarification on 
the conditions of application of the contract adjustment mechanism (e.g. level of 
disproportion, revenues and remuneration to be taken into account)? 
• What are the delegations’ views of how this alternative dispute resolution will 
work taking into account that other similar mechanisms may already be in place 
in Member States? 
• Do the delegations consider that representative organisations of authors and 
performers could have role in such mechanisms? 
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Exclusion of collective management organisations (CMOs) from Title IV, Chapter 3 
of the Commission proposal 
“Article 14(3) of the proposal excludes the entities covered by Directive 
2014/26/EU from the application of Article 14(1) of the proposal, since they 
already have to comply with transparency obligations pursuant to Article 18 
of that Directive. The Commission considered that even if Articles 15, and 
therefore 16, would in most cases not apply to such entities, they should not 
be explicitly excluded from the application of these two articles since they 
are not subject to similar obligations existing in the EU acquis. Some 
delegations nevertheless argued that CMOs should be excluded as well from 
Articles 15 and 16 of the proposal.”649 
The CWP then discussed with the delegations whether they think that CMOs should be 
excluded from the entire Title IV, Chapter 3 of the Commission proposal? If so, why? 
  
                                                 




5.3. Case study 
In order to demonstrate how the best-seller clause provisions (or lack thereof) work in 
practice, a short case study will be presented here. The case study is based on an actual 
situation which happened in 2013/2014 in the Czech Republic (interestingly, around 
the time the Czech civil law and correspondingly partially also copyright law 
experienced big changes). For privacy and prevention of liability reasons names of 
any persons, as well as other features will be changed. 
 
5.3.1. Factual background 
Maria is a famous Czech singer. She has stayed among the top 5 most popular female 
singers in the country for over a decade. She is in her late 30s and her fan base is very 
diverse in terms of age, musical preferences, geographical and social position.  Her 
style is a main stream pop, however, her fame does not stem from production of 
popular albums but primarily from performing in theatre musicals (this being rather 
unique phenomenon). Her voice is easily distinguishable and is considered by experts 
one of the best in the country, with capability to hit high, complex notes. 
Dobey Inc. is an American film studio, top in their field for many decades. Dobey´s 
main domain are animated movies for children, although they also have other streams 
of activities. Every few years, Dobey releases an animated movie which becomes a 
major blockbuster and becomes inseparable part of one children´s generation. Every 
such hit is accompanied with an abundance of merchandising material. Sometimes the 
hit movies are turned into secondary works, such as musicals or similar shows. 
In late 2013, Dobey released another work, animated musical fantasy called “Chosen” 
telling a story of a lead character princess Emma and her sister Ava, and the struggle 
they have gone through. Chosen is a beautiful story, full of stunning songs, with a lot 
of emphasis on the performance of the lead character, Emma. Chosen quickly becomes 
a hit of the holiday season, partially due to the catchy beautiful main song, “Let it 
Glow”.  
As customary in non-English speaking territories, given the age of the target audience, 




unusually, Emma´s parts in the script are voiced over by two artists: an experienced 
dubbing actor for the speaking parts and by Maria for all the singing parts.650 Maria 
was chosen specifically by a Dobey representative due to the quality of her voice and 
her ability to sing well even high notes present in the lead dong, Let it Glow. It is 
undisputed that there are not many singers in the country who would be able to 
perform the song easily. In addition, Maria´s good reputation as a person represents 
important factor, given the target audience. 
When recording the voice over songs in the studio, Maria was presented with 2 page 
long contract and was not given a chance to consult her manager or lawyer as she 
would normally do. She was told that (in no aggressive but firm tone) by the studio 
staff that if she did not sign the document they cannot start the recording and that they 
are instructed by Dobey always to insist on the artist´s signature of an unchanged 
version as presented before work commences. Should the artist refuse or require 
changes, different artist would be engaged. It was a standard practice in the studio, 
which provides dubbing for Dobey productions on a regular basis. With that in mind 
and seeing that (i) she had already spent considerable amount of time preparing for 
the recording, learning the song, (ii) relied on good manners and name of the producer, 
Maria decided to sign the contract and go ahead. After all, having to license rights for 
reproduction, distribution and connection of the recording with other works in the 
widest possible scope was relatively customary in the market. In such cases, a 
recording would normally be used for theatrical release, production of physical 
carriers, possibly on-line sale and to extent necessary for any advertisement. It was 
not customary to exploit works/performances beyond that based on a contract like the 
one presented. 
Chosen, in a dubbed version, was released in Czech cinemas before Christmas 2013, 
on BlueRay in April, and on DVD in June 2014, all in the same, dubbed, version. 
In addition to Chosen becoming a cinema and DVD sales hit, Dobey through their 
intermediaries organises a show called “Dobey on Ice”. It is a chain of shows 
performed in large sport arenas throughout the world where performers ice-skate 
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dance to songs from Dobey feature hits. The songs are not performed live, they are 
played from recordings. Where available, the recording used is in the local language 
of where the given show takes place. The show takes about 90 minutes and comprises 
of several songs, Let it Glow, lasting approximately 4 minutes, being one of them. The 
show took place in Prague for two nights in December 2014. Maria was very surprised 
to learn that her recorded performance was used for the show without her knowledge 
and any additional remuneration. When contacting representatives of Dobey, her 
manager was told that Maria transferred all her rights to Dobey and as such will not 
receive any payment. 
Generally, as part of the merchandising, Dobey often sells dolls, soft toys, clothing 
etc. with the characters of their movies. In this case, they also sell talking (or, more 
accurately, singing) dolls. The “Emma doll” sings Let it Glow upon a push of a button. 
The voice used in the dolls marketed in the Czech Republic belongs to Maria, utilising 
the recording she did during the dubbing session in October 2013651. The dolls are 
released into circulation in the Czech Republic in late 2014, just in time to make most 
of the upcoming holiday season. Each doll is sold at a RRP approximately 45,- 
EUR/65,- USD. The dolls are marketed by emphasising that the main Chosen song is 
sung by the doll in Czech language (which would be decisive factor for many children 
and their parents), however, Maria´s name specifically is not mentioned. Maria was 
never approached by Dobey or any of their agents about this and never received any 
additional remuneration for such use of the recording. In fact, she was unpleasantly 
surprised when she learned about the existence of the doll and its sale from a TV 
advertisement, recognising her own voice coming from the speakers. 
 
                                                 





5.3.2. Contractual provisions 
5.3.2.1. Payment 
Maria, who recorded the songs in a studio in October 2013, received an overall 
payment of 15.000,- CZK652, half for the performance (7.500,- CZK) and half for the 
grant of a licence to exploit the recording of the performance (7.500,- CZK). 
 
5.3.2.2. Scope of transfer of rights 
The provisions on the transfer of rights stipulate the following: 
“1. The Artist grants the manufacturer an exclusive licence to use his or her 
performance to make a sound recording of the performance and to combine it with 
visual part into an audiovisual work and to produce reproductions in all formats and 
in any amount, to broadcast the recording of the performance without any  time and/or 
local limitations in all known types of use, for home video purposes, for lending of 
audio and audiovisual recordings in any format produced and broadcasted by any 
technological process, for public performance, in particular cinemas, broadcasting as 
a whole or in parts (with possibility of interrupting the audiovisual work by 
commercials), in television including satellite, cable, paid and subscription television 
by any technical means and methods, by selling, lending and renting video cassettes 
and any audio and video carriers with recording of performance in any language 
version or with subtitles, for purposes of promoting the audiovisual work in any media 
and for transfer of these rights to third parties. 
2. The Artist grants permission to broadcast his or her performance in the manner 
specified in Article IV. para. 1 of this Agreement to third parties, i.e. to natural or legal 
persons in the Czech Republic and abroad with no local and/or time limitation.” 
 
5.3.2.3. Governing law 
The contract and the relationship thus created is governed by the laws of Czech  
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5.3.3. Legal Issues 
The main question is whether the respective national laws give Maria any viable claim 
to request additional fair remuneration for her grant of the exploitation rights, seeing 
that the remuneration she originally received for the exploitation rights (7.500,- CZK) 
seems to be disproportionate to the proceeds generated from the exploitation of the 
recorded performance? 
How does such claim needs to be phrased (or, what needs to be proved) in order to be 
able to succeed with her claim? Who to claim the remuneration from?  
Is there anything stemming from market practice that could also prevent her from 
bringing the claim or succeeding with it? 
 
5.3.4. Application of law 
A little disclaimer is due at this point. The below application does not aim to provide a 
thorough, complete analysis of all options available; same way an attorney work would 
entail. Rather, only certain aspects were chosen to demonstrate the relevant issues. 
In addition, in relation to Germany and UK, the examination is done with the 
acknowledgement of no legal training in the two jurisdictions. Therefore, it is more of 
a guess work that a comprehensive evaluation of Maria´s options. 
Relevant provisions of the Czech and German legislation are provided at the back of 
the work in Annex 1. 
5.3.4.1. Czech Republic 
Maria signed the contract with Dobey´s (actually with the recording studio, Dobey´s 
intermediary) in October 2013 which means that besides CZCA, Act. No 40/1964 Coll., 
the Civil Code and Act No. 513/1991 Coll., the Commercial Code (hereafter as the 
“CMC”), which were in force prior NCZCC became effective on January 1, 2014, must 
be applied on the case.  
In general contract law, the previous legislation was based on the equality of parties, 




as it is obvious in this presented case, it is possible abuse of law to the detriment of the 
weaker party. According CMC all relations between entrepreneurs regarding their 
business activities were governed by CMC. Further, according to CMC special 
provision for protection of a weaker party which enabled it to withdraw from an 
agreement in case such an agreement was concluded in distress and under considerably 
disadvantageous conditions was explicitly excluded for business relations. The reason 
for that was the priority of protecting a legal relationship, even if it is unfavourable to 
one of its parties, over the possibility of a legal relationship being terminated, even if 
the position of its parties is not balanced  
It follows from the above, that the contract under which Maria transferred all her rights 
to Dobey, without having a chance to consult the contract with a lawyer or to amend it 
anyhow, would most likely be considered valid in the case of litigation.  
Maria would have to claim adequate additional remuneration under Section 49(6) 
CZCA because she could not achieve setting aside the contract for invalidity. If she 
could do so, she could then claim unjust enrichment, since it is impossible to return the 
mutual consideration provided on the basis of this invalidated contract. Maria would 
not be able to “un-sing” her part. The unjust enrichment would be determined by an 
expert´s opinion. Such expert opinion would have to take into account - to evaluate 
such enrichment - potential remuneration in similar cases. Employing the “yield 
method” of assessment,  the result of the evaluation would be a “usual reward”. Maria 
would then request as an unjust enrichment in the amount of a usual reward. It is very 
hard to say whether such usual reward would be any higher that the initially received 
payment. In addition, legal costs would apply if she was not successful. 
Going back to Section 49(6) CZCA, Maria, as a performer having the right to the claim 
by way of reference from Section 74 CZCA (analogy between provisions applicable to 
authors and performers), would argue that “the amount of the remuneration is so low 
that it is in obvious disproportion to the profit from the utilisation of the licence and to 
the importance of the work for the achievement of such profit.” She would bring this 
claim against the transferee, i.e. an actual agent of Dobey. Surely, Dobey would argue, 
that she has no claim against them directly. Equally, the studio would claim they had 




that even before getting to the actual calculation of what should form the equitable 
additional remuneration, Maria would have struggled as to whom to bring the claim 
against. Seeing that there is no such condition in the text of Section 49 (6) CZCA 
providing for an option to claim from the first transferee equitable additional 
remuneration for all the uses in the whole supply chain (as proposed in the concluding 
chapter to be introduced for Article 15 DSMD), this would probably terminate any 
Maria´s attempts to sue. 
She could have used the claim under Section 49 (6) CZCA, because “the amount  of  
the remuneration has  not  been  derived  from  the  proceeds from the utilization of  the 
licence”  (i.e.  was not a “proportionate remuneration”). If a proportional royalty was 
agreed, Maria could not use this provision and could only rely on general contract law 
provisions as explained above, but with a very limited prospect of success.  
But, due to a lump sum being agreed, she could not even request any information on 
the amount of proceeds and accounts in order to calculate her equitable additional 
remuneration. 
With all that in mind and the fact that she only received 7.500,- CZK for the license, 
she would most likely give up her efforts very soon. 
It is worth saying here, that if the case was governed by NCZCC (post-2014 
legislation), Maria´s situation would be much better in terms of reliance on general 
contract law. With the new Czech civil code, the principles described above in relation 
to CMC, have shifted and protection of weaker party and promotion of acting in good 
faith is now part of general civil – and thus contract – law.  
The contract with Dobey may be considered as invalid due to conflict with law and 
good morals and Maria would be entitled to claim unjust enrichment  (details on how 
to establish such claim see above). The amount of unjust enrichment would be 
determined by an expert´s opinion through the “yield method”  
After evaluating all her options and probably consulting a lawyer, Maria would most 





For the sake of better argument, it will be assumed that Maria is evaluating her options 
now, only after the March 2017 amendment of the law.  
Maria´s claim in Germany would have much stronger chance of success. Her claim to 
further equitable participation, appropriate to the circumstances of the transaction under 
Section 32a UrhG should be relatively easy to establish.  
The law says that performer has the claim where he/she has granted an exploitation 
right to another party on conditions which, taking into account the author’s entire 
relationship with the other party, result in the agreed remuneration being conspicuously 
disproportionate to the proceeds and benefits derived from the exploitation of the work. 
Maria does not have the accounts info yet, but following the “Pirates of the Caribbean” 
case, this seems to be likely to be established. 
Since Dobey has probably “granted further exploitation rights to a third party and the 
conspicuous disproportion partially also results from proceeds or benefits enjoyed by 
such third party (producer of dolls, producer of the Dobey on Ice show), these two 
subsequent licensees will be directly liable to Maria, taking into account the contractual 
relationships within the licensing chain.” Maria will have to find out which person 
made what profit and then she can evaluate her claim. 
In order to calculate the claim, she will make use of the new provisions of Sections 32d 
and 32e UrhG, respectively. She will request information from Dobey, the studio, as 
well as the producer of the Dobey on Ice show. She is entitled to request this 
information, because she did not make only a secondary contribution to the work, 
product or service; (“her contribution was not secondary, as where was more than little 
influence on the overall impression created by a work or the nature of a product”). 
It is very likely that Maria would be able to establish her claim to equitable 
remuneration also under Section 32(1), last sentence UrhG, arguing that the agreed 
remuneration is not equitable and thus requiring the other parties to consent to a 
modification of the agreement so that the she is granted equitable remuneration. 




5.3.4.3. United Kingdom 
Basically, there is no statutory provision providing any support to Maria in her 
situation. Therefore, she will need to turn to the general contract law as shaped by case 
law and evaluate, whether she can rely on any of the doctrines discussed in previous 
chapter 4.3.1. 
Generally, freedom of contract will apply unless she is able to provide evidence that 
any of the mentioned parties imposed undue influence or duress, were bargaining 
unconscionably or that the contract represents restraint of trade. Even then, however, 
she will not be able to claim additional fair remuneration. She could only achieve for 
the contract to be set aside.    
The equitable doctrine of undue influence could only be used if Maria could prove 
that the transaction between her and Dobey/the studio was in a relationship of trust 
and confidence and that such trust has been abused. Since neither of these factors can 
truly be established, it is unlikely Maria could rely on this doctrine, albeit “equitable”. 
Neither was Maria threatened by Dobey to sign the contract. True, Maria had some 
doubts about signing the contract (she did not want to read it as her lawyer normally 
does so), and was told that without signing they will not record. As a result, seeing the 
effort she already put into learning the difficult part, she decided to go ahead. Surely 
though, this cannot be a threat. Duress can therefore also be ruled out. 
Some hope could be expressed towards the equitable doctrine of unconscionable 
bargain. But after a closer look, the chance of establishing that Maria is in this specific 
case in a position of particular weakness which Dobey chose to exploit is also unlikely. 
Dobey would be the one with burden of proof, having to justify the transaction, but it 
does not seem unlikely to be possible. 
Since the contract is very simple and does not prevent Maria to record similar part 
with other studies, restraint of trade does not provide solution either. 





5.3.5.1. Czech Republic 
The result may be surprising for an observer not familiar with the ways in the Czech 
legal system. Seemingly, all the provisions of copyright contract law are there to 
support Maria´s claim. Yet, due to inadequacy of the statutory wording, lack of 
supporting mechanisms such as Guilds or Unions, costs of legal proceedings, Maria´s 
prospect of receiving any additional compensation are extremely low. There is a 
paradox in the situation. No court would grant any additional compensation without 
first consulting an expert opinion. Such expert opinions are, however, very expensive. 
To provide a context, for a matter relatively complex as the one Maria represents, an 
expert opinion could cost in a realm of 150.000, - to 250.000, - Czech Koruna. With a 
supportive expert opinion, Maria does have some chance of success. But even if 
stretched to an extreme it is unlikely that Maria could request more than 150.000, - 
CZK. That would not even cover the expert opinion if budgeted in the higher part of 
the scale. If she did not succeed, she would not get any compensation and in addition 
would have to cover the costs of the whole proceeding. No attorney would therefore 
recommend Maria to sue unless they wanted to make it their profile case and agreed on 
a success fee and coverage of legal costs. 
5.3.5.2. Germany 
It seems that Germany is the only jurisdiction out of the three assessed where there is 
a considerable prospect of any additional Maria´s participation to be awarded. Both 
statutory provisions and existing case law would suggest so. Mr. Off´s success in his 
case gives a good signal to others. His case is comparable to what Maria experienced. 
In addition, it may be interesting to see how German case law and practice could help 
Maria when arguing her case before Czech law. Specifically, one may wonder whether 
Czech courts, when assessing what represents a customary reward in given time and 
for given use, would accept Maria´s comparison of remuneration received for equal 
performance in Czech Republic and Germany. Seeing in the Prates of the Caribbean 
case how big gaps there are between Czech and German voiceover artists, one could 




provided to court for its assessment of “customary reward”, this comparison could be 
made. In the end, however, it would depend on the individual judge whether they would 
be willing to look at “how the neighbours do it” (actually, quite a common character of 
Czech people, judges including). 
5.3.5.3. UK 
Not only is there no particularly suitable measure in English law that Maria could rely 
on, in addition, it may be beyond Maria´s financial capabilities. Court proceedings are 
on its own very expensive. In addition, given Dobey´s high profile, they would be very 
well prepared. If they were not and were not successful defending the case, this may 
open a “Pandora box” with similar claims and that is definitely a scenario Dobey 
would want to avoid. Given the adversary type of proceeding, if Maria lost she would 
end up with enormous debts in legal costs. With that prospect, it is unlikely Maria 
would even attempt to bring claim forward. 
If there was a slightly bigger chance for Maria to succeed with her claim, they may 
attempt to settle. However, given the preceding description of Maria´s outlook to 
succeed, they would have no reason to do so. 
 
5.3.6. Conclusions 
Clearly the outcomes are as different as the three national legislations in questions. The 
results support the assumption that Germany is on a good track in helping to strengthen 
creators´ bargaining position. Some may even argue that Germany has reached the goal 
and going any further would now be counterproductive. Surely, the industries´ 
representatives are less excited about the outcome. 
It is also worth mentioning here that outcomes of this law-applying exercise just 
presented is only one side of the story. The fact that Maria may not chose to pursue her 
claim because she simply did not want to “go against” her potential source of further 
business is the other side.  
Dobey Inc. are a powerful and omnipresent studio and further work may come from 
their side. If Maria decided to go against Dobey and pursue her claim for additional 




Czech market is rather small in terms of opportunities, but still full enough of artists 
looking to make a break through. Cooperation with a major worldwide studio is one of 
those rare occasions when a breakthrough is possible.  
Maria, when recording the songs for Chosen, was already at a stage of her career that 
the cooperation represented connection of two well-known names in the territory. 
However, if that was not the case and equally talented, but yet unknown singer got and 
utilised the same opportunity, arguably, such singer would benefit from the mutual 
cooperation to the same extent as Dobey, irrespective of the remuneration received. 
Being able to be connected in the eyes (ears) of your “consumers” with such a 
household name as Dobey is an invaluable advertisement for any artist.  
Performing artists such as Maria have two main sources of business, sale of their 
records and demand for life performances. The type of “clientele” as well as the 
proportion between these two main sources of income may vary considerably653; 
however, for both these streams of revenue a publicity based on voice-over of a major 
season (or even decade) blockbuster cannot be properly evaluated. Being “the voice of 
Chosen lead character” attracts more traffic to the performer´s life performances. It is 
likely that playlists of such shows will contain “the hit” and since it is not otherwise 
possible to hear the lead song from Chosen live (after all, it is a movie hit, not a regular 
“chart” song) this becomes a magnet and a considerable selling point. It is equal to a 
band´s own hit song attracting fans to concert shows. 
As such, one may argue that this represents the “benefit” (in the “revenues and benefits” 
part of the best-seller clause) arising from the exploitation of a performance, although 
in these cases, such benefit should be accounted for on the performer´s side of the 
remuneration equation. Establishing and maintaining a world known, successful film 
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theatre musical under any condition, and their main source of income is divided between sale of 
CDs/digital tunes and payments for appearance on festivals or their own big concert shows/gigs; 




studio with such strong reputation is a long run and represents a chain of investment 
successes and failures throughout years. One can never predict if a project will become 
a success; however, no one invests into an undertaking hoping it will fail. But without 
the initial investments and the risks they entail there would be no successful and 
popular content. This case study demonstrates that this is also one of the aspects one 
must consider. How do the failed investments transpire into the overall remuneration 
equation? If one wanted to make a point through exaggeration, one could ask a 
rhetorical question: “Should overpaid Hollywood actors reimburse the studios if – due 























Unfortunately, due to the enormous debate on the Proposal for the DSMD within the 
EU structures (primarily caused by the controversy of the first part of the Proposal), 
the discussion and progress with its amendments and adoption is taking a delay from 
the original estimates. As such, at the time of the submission of this thesis less has been 
resolved than the author of this work had hoped.  
While there is enough indication from the above discussed commentary and 
consultations that amendments will be proposed and that if Articles 14 to 16 are not 
adjusted accordingly it will stir a lot of disapproval, due to the delay, the following 
proposals are accompanied with a lot of “if”s. Many aspects can change in the process, 
including addition or deletion of some provisions in total.  
The below conclusions and recommendations therefore work with the proposal as was 
introduced in September 2016 and the debate happening until June 2017. It is based on 
the author´s understanding of the specific issue of fair remuneration of authors and 
performers taken somewhat out of context of the rest of the Digital Single Market 
agenda and issues discussed within.  
Due to the topicality of the research, it is impossible to guarantee that any conclusions 
discussed here will be equally relevant at the time of the defence of the thesis. It is still 
worth the analysis but undertaking a research that is too topical runs a risk of loss of 
relevance. For example, in July 11, 2017 the European Parliament Industry and Culture 
committees voted in favour of an unwaivable right to fair remuneration for authors and 
performers for the making available of their works654.  As explained by the SAA, this 
is supported by the European audiovisual authors’ community, because “such a 
remuneration right would ensure that screenwriters and directors receive royalties when 
their works are exploited on on-demand services, wherever in Europe, thanks to its 
collective mechanism.”655  
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This is the kind of progress that can either enforce the need for the changes proposed 
below (e.g. exclusion of remuneration based on collective management from the 
obligations imposed in Articles 14 and 15 DSMD), or, it can initiate a significant shift 
in the whole process of adopting the DSM Strategy. For example, of addressing specific 
issues and proposed provisions can be “redistributed” within the whole range of legal 
instruments proposed in the DSM Strategy. 
 
Scope of amendments proposed 
The provisions that will ultimately govern the creators´ contractual remuneration must 
be sufficiently broad to cater for all the diversity and intricacies of relations and 
transactions within dealing with copyright works and performances. On the other hand, 
it should not be too vague. That could allow the businesses to abuse any difficulty to 
clearly meet the criteria given in the provision and to rely on the need to refer 
interpretative questions back to courts.  
How exactly the provision should read will also depend on the overall objective of the 
EU legislator for Article 15. Was it to provide a general best-seller clause as known in 
other jurisdictions? Or, was the goal to provide a corrective tool which will enable the 
author to reclaim any (additional) fair remuneration, irrespective of the mode of 
exploitation and the identity of the exploiters and users, i.e. taking into account any and 
all modes of exploitation and business models, possibly not even known at the time of 
the drafting? Should it be a provision that could be used as a “last resort” measure if 
other paths fail to secure for the author or performer a fair share of revenues generated 
by exploitation of the work or fixed performance?  
From all that was evaluated above in the thesis, the conclusion inclines much more 
towards the latter. In this light, following proposals will be designed. Nevertheless, if 
Article 15 of the Draft DSM Directive remains unedited throughout the ongoing 
legislative process on the EU level, it is unlikely that it will achieve either of the aims, 
irrespective of what the Commission set out to accomplish when proposing it. Not even 




It has been shown, that in some Member States, specifically in the Czech Republic, 
provisions seemingly compliant with the requirements of the current DSMD text are 
already in place. That does not secure fair remuneration for authors and performers any 
more that it is secured in jurisdictions without any contract adjustment mechanism in 
place, specifically the UK. Not without either much better education, enforcement, and 
judicial acknowledgement and interpretation, or, without further and more detailed law 
of copyright contracts. This is demonstrated also in the outcomes of the Case study in 
Chapter 5.3.  
On the other hand, in Germany, with their provisions connected well with each other, 
dealing with any potential “workaround” that have been thought of by the businesses, 
much stronger protection of creators in their endeavour to be fairly compensated is 
seemingly achieved. However, as pointed out, only with more time passing it will 
possible to truly evaluate the impact of the adopted legislation.  
The EU legislator does not expressly state what measures should be employed to 
“ensure that authors and performers are entitled to request additional, appropriate 
remuneration”656 but if a specific form, text, or tool were requested, the Commission 
knows better than to leave the options this open. But leaving the requirement extremely 
vague for execution in national laws can be unhelpful. 
The Czech text, for example, now reads “where the amount of the royalty has not been 
derived from the proceeds from the utilization of the licence and where such an amount 
is so low that it is in obvious disproportion to the profit from the utilisation of the 
licence and to the importance of the work for the achievement of such profit, the author 
shall be entitled to an equitable supplementary remuneration”657. That may assure that 
the author is entitled to the request additional, appropriate remuneration, however, that 
does not necessarily mean that the creator will be able to enforce it due to difficulty to 
establish such factors as “importance of the work for the achievement of such profit”. 
This was evaluated in Chapter 5.1. with respect to Czech national law. This was also 
tackled in the German – more specific – provision of Section 32d (2) UrhG658, which 
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demonstrates the scope of detail a provision can be drafted in. Surely, if no amendment 
of Article 15 DSMD takes place, sooner or later there will be an interesting test case to 
be referred to the CJEU for preliminary question, but until such time there will be 
additional provision in the European copyright law difficult for national courts to 
interpret and enforce. 
On the other hand, if European copyright law is ever to shift towards stronger protection 
of creators and clearer balance between the interests of creators, exploiters and users, 
the effort must commence somewhere. 
Returning to the objective of Title IV, Chapter 3 of the DSMD, it seems safe to 
conclude that the primary goal was not to differentiate between digital and “analogue”, 
domestic and cross-border transactions with copyrighted content. In order to 
incentivise creativity, creators should be allowed an overall fair remuneration in 
contracts. That will not be achieved by providing a bestseller clause, i.e. a reactive 
claim. In combination with the transparency obligation that is surely welcome and 
achievable. But it should at least include also the need to involve transactions 
happening at a later stage of the supply chain. The hypothetical example of calculating 
additional participation of a German creator provided in Chapter 4.1.2.3. was quite 
enlightening. On the other hand, a limitation to the current wording must be suggested 
based on use of the words “in contracts” in the title of Title IV Chapter 3 of the DSMD.  
It suggests that these provisions truly do not capture compensation based on exceptions 
and limitations.  
Recommendations 
As demonstrated above, in the Czech Republic, many of the provisions strengthening 
the position of authors and performers are also implemented. They are not that detailed 
and “fine-tuned” as in Germany but they are still quite extensive. Nevertheless, from 
Chapter 4.2.2. on Czech Market practice, it can be deducted that the existence of 
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in particular, secondary where it has little influence on the overall impression created by a work or 
the nature of a product or service, for example because it does not belong to the typical content of a 
work, product or service or 




provisions in the statute does not secure achieving the goal these provisions were 
implemented with. The provisions should be sufficiently interconnected with each 
other and possibly also with other provisions on contract law in order to prevent any 
“workarounds”; such as in Germany. This should also be the case for the DSM 
Directives´ provisions. They should “play well” with each other. However, since no 
“other” provisions on protection of creators exist in European copyright law 
framework, it would be difficult for Article 15 DSMD to achieve its objective. That is 
why the below suggested amendments should place the Article in a better context. 
Possibly, the “safest” solutions would be to introduce extensive provisions as in 
Germany to cover all possible “bases”. However, this would neither fit the current 
European copyright legislative framework, nor would it be possible for Member States 
such as the UK to incorporate them into their national laws which come from a 
completely different legal tradition, employing different techniques in legislation. 
Trying to accommodate for all variety of legal systems within the EU may have also 
been the driver behind drafting Articles 14 to 16 in such “minimalistic” manner659. 
While acknowledging this possibility, below are some proposals for a “gentle” 
amendment of Article 15 DSMD. Two options will be presented. These 
recommendations reflect all the previous analysis – the context of the regulation, 
previous experience in Member States, and already tabled proposals of the MEPs. 
Option 1660 
Option 1 aims at improving merely the “best-seller” scenario. Only the minimal extent 
deemed necessary is suggested. Additional comments on the rationale behind the below 
options are provided after both recommendations are outlined. 
Acknowledging the text of Article 14, in order to secure better enforcement of the 
“best-seller” scenario, it is suggested to amend Article 15 DSMD as follows: 
                                                 
659 because Germany was subject of all the studies referred to in Chapter 3.3. and as such the 
provisions and analysis on the extensivity and shape of ´German remuneration provisions were 
available to European bodies 
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Option 1  
(1) Member States shall ensure that authors and performers are entitled to request 
additional, appropriate remuneration from the party with whom they entered 
into a contract for the exploitation of the rights when the remuneration 
originally agreed is disproportionately low compared to the subsequent relevant 
revenues and benefits derived from the exploitation through the whole supply 
chain of the works or performances, or, when the remuneration received does 
not reflect all modes of exploitation of the works or performances actually 
utilised. 
(2) Without prejudice to Paragraph 1, any remuneration received by the author or 
performer for the exploitation of their work or performance through collective 
management (compulsory or voluntary) or other similar mode of exploitation or 
as a result of collective bargaining shall be considered when determining 
wheteher a remuneration is equitable or additional remunaration is adequate. 
 
Option 2 
Option number two aims at securing overall fair remuneration for creators, not only 
exploitation of commercially successful works. 
Change of Article 15 Title: 
Article 15 – Fair contractual remuneration for authors and performers and 
contract adjustment mechanism 
Change of Article 15 Text: 
(1) Member States shall ensure that authors and performers are entitled to request 
additional, appropriate equitable remuneration for expolitation of their rights 
from the party with to whom they entered into transferred by a contract for 
the such exploitation of the rights; Member States shall also ensure that 




remuneration when where the remuneration originally agreed is 
disproportionately low compared to the subsequent relevant revenues and 
benefits derived from the such exploitation through the whole supply chain 
of the works or performances, or, when the remuneration received does not 
reflect all modes of exploitation of the works or performances actually 
utilised. 
(2) Without prejudice to Paragraph 1, any remuneration received by the author 
or performer for the exploitation of their work or performance through 
collective management (compulsory or voluntary) or other similar mode of 
exploitation, or as a result of collective bargaining shall be considered when 
determining wheteher a remuneration is equitable or additional remunaration 
is adequate. 
 
Rationalle behind proposed changes 
The suggested text works – as a basis for the recommendations – with the original text 
of the Proposal, trying to add as little new paragraphs as possible in order to make only 
minimum changes necessary. If the whole draft was created “from scratch”, the 
wording would probably be slightly different, maybe more in line with the current 
German legislation (although not that extensive).  
Also, the semantics chosen by the Commission reflect quite well the differences in 
concepts of author´s rights jurisdictions and common law countries, including the 
terminology, by choosing relatively neutral expressions. The proposal uses the term 
“transfer”, which can reflect both, assignment and licence, and thus does not pose 
implementation challenge for MSs following either of legal systems. It also stipulates 
that “revenues and benefits” are taken into account which is approach taken in Germany 
and accepted with agreement. 
Both Options 1 and 2 impose more burdens on the first transferees (e.g. producers, 
publishers, broadcasters) by way of granting the entitlement to request equitable 
remuneration/additional adequate remuneration for the “exploitation through the whole 




On the other hand, it attempts to balance any unfairness towards the exploiters by 
making sure that remuneration already secured through collective bargaining, 
collective rights management and new modes of exploitation (such as possibly 
individual licensing directly to users in sectors where possible) is reflected when 
calculating the request. 
European Copyright law already acknowledges situations when reference between 
different sources of payment is needed. Recital (35) of the InfoSoc Directive for 
example states that “in cases where rightholders have already received payment in 
some other form, for instance as part of a licence fee, no specific or separate payment 
may be due. The level of fair compensation should take full account of the degree of 
use of technological protection measures referred to in this Directive.”661 Similarly, 
connection between different sources of revenue can surely also be made in Article 15 
DSMD.. But Recitals are not binding; for the rule to be easily interpreted and clearly 
enforceable, it must form part of the body of the binding text. 
 
The bracket with reference to (“compulsory or voluntary”) collective management is 
just for consideration. This is additional suggestion to clarify that any remuneration 
channelled through collective rights management should be taken into account when 
assessing whether remuneration is equitable, irrespective of the basis for such 
collective management; however, it is noted that this addition may be considered 
superfluous. 
Option 2 is drafted in a way that it covers wider set of scenarios and should – ideally – 
secure the author or performer a fair remuneration for any and all uses (if correctly 
transposed, interpreted and enforced) that may be the result of the transfer of rights to 
a first transferee. By emphasising that the author “transferred by a contract such 
exploitation rights” the vision was that it is clear that if the author enters into several 
contracts with first transferees for different exploitation right each, that each such 
transferee will be responsible for guarantee to the author equitable remuneration for the 
uses resulting from their specific contract. For example, if the author transfers rights to 
                                                 




publish their book to a publisher and the rights to make the book into a movie to a film 
producer, the book publisher will be responsible for making sure that the author gets 
proper remuneration for sale of hardbound copies, paperback, e-books; irrespective 
whether they further “hire an intermediary” with better capability to do the digital 
exploitation. Equally, such book publisher will have to provide regular accounts to the 
author for all such uses. That means that such publisher has to negotiate mirroring 
provisions with the intermediary providing the online exploitation for him. If, however, 
the author grants the digital rights to the book separately from the right to exploit the 
book in hard copy, each such publisher has their own obligation towards the author. 
Correspondingly, the film producer (if acquiring rights for all the modes of exploitation 
of a film) will be bound to provide remuneration (and accounts) for all releases – 
theatrical, BlueRay & DVD, VOD, “sale” on iTunes, etc. 
For this reason though, it is crucial that the rights and/or modes of exploitation are 
clearly stated in any of the contract for transfer of rights between an author or a 
performer and their first transferee(s), or, that, in doubt, the contracts are interpreted in 
favour of the author or performer. Such need would speak in favour of adopting, even 
on EU level, provision requesting the scope of rights transferred being expressly agreed 
(following German example). On the other hand, it may happen that the practice will 
regulate itself exactly for the risk on the part of exploiters of facing creators´ claims. 
With the new responsibility for equitable remuneration and transparency obligations, 
it would, however, be expected that producers, publishers, broadcasters, and the like 
would pay much more attention to remunerating properly the rights/uses subject to the 
contract in question. As such, “take it or leave it” and “buy-out” contracts should also 
slowly disappear. It would be only until the first successful case was argued where an 
author claims either remuneration for any and all uses of their work (even where such 
uses are outside reach of the transferee) or claim that the purpose of the transfer was 
only for theatrical and DVD release but not for online uses, and sold the online rights 
to a competitor, that the practices of the frequent “out-buyers” would start shifting. 
Hopefully. But as with any other legal issue this depends on appropriate interpretation, 




When discussing other measures that could accompany the contract adjustment 
mechanism provisions, it is worth remembering that throughout the previous debate, 
both on law and market practice, the type of remuneration also seemed to be important 
factor in achieving fairness of compensation. While separately mere lump sum as well 
as proportionate compensation do not secure the desired effect, when combined they 
seem to be effective. Therefore provision on type of remuneration may also be added 
to the European harmonised provisions. They could, for example, state something 
along the line that combination of lump sum and royalty based remuneration is to be 
applied, with the royalty portion only being triggered when the producer recouped the 
investment made into marketing of the creation. 
 
Additional commentary 
Provision of Article 16 also needs to be evaluated here. As was described in relation to 
the Czech Republic, court proceedings are lengthy and cases are heard by unspecialised 
judges, not trained in copyright law. It is therefore of no use that Czech copyright law 
does have a best-seller clause if it is almost impossible to enforce it. In some countries, 
in addition, court proceedings are extremely costly (we did conclude that Maria in the 
Case study would also struggle financially to fight her case before court in the UK). It 
is therefore, in the opinion of the author of this thesis, important that the Commission 
also indeed introduces provision requesting the Member States to implement a 
mechanism that would enable to eliminate these barriers that authors and performers 
have to face when trying to secure their rights. Whether this will be done effectively 
through existing Copyright Tribunals or IP Courts, where they exist, or through newly 
established bodies is fully in the hands of each MS. But let us hope that the Member 
States will not be too indifferent to these provisions. After all, the main controversy of 
the Draft DSM Directive is not in the final Chapter 3 and there is a threat that MSs will 
have their hands full focusing on the preceding provisions of the Proposal.  
It follows also, that the provisions must be adequately interpreted and, more 
importantly, enforced by the courts. Above all though, there must be sufficient 




these provisions mean and how to use them for their own benefit, and without 
requesting adequate reference to them in the contracts, the creators will not get any help 
through these rules. The studies also concluded that authors all over Europe lack legal 
skills and knowledge about the legal framework and this may be one of the causes of 
why they enter contracts without being fully aware of what they are signing. 
 
Final remarks 
Seeing all the attempts in Germany to help creators level their positions with the 
industry and how the law is never able to cover all the situations life may bring, 
especially in such a labyrinth of relations as the one seen in the market with copyright 
subject matters, one may think: how far does it make sense to go? It is evident that the 
German legislation is by far most detailed in their capture of copyright contract content 
and aim to balance the parties´ strength. But even in Germany new and unexpected 
challenges arise which must be faced. And the statutory provisions get longer and more 
and more casuistic, while the industries always manage to catch up and find a way 
around them. But when the law was more general, vague even, it did not meet its 
objective either. Courts – unlike in common law jurisdictions – are not used to co-
shaping the law and filling the gaps. It is not in the country´s tradition. But the 
continuous adding of new provisions addressing new inadequacies is likely to have to 
stop at some point. What is the way forward then? A combination of the best features 
from each system? It would not work. The traditions and principles which make the 
systems different from each other are too enrooted in them. It would not work taking 
one principle (for example equity from English law) and planting it without proper 
surrounding “soil” into the German ground, next to all the statutory provisions 
strengthening authors´ positions. The pall mall that would be thus created would not 
survive. Therefore, while trying to figure out the best way forward, taking small steps 
in the shape of the provisions of the DSMD is more than the creators hoped for less 
than a year ago.  
And while a lot of suggestions for improvement, criticism even, are presented on the 
account of the Proposal´s Article 15 in this thesis, it is for some a welcomed initiative 




this initiative will create can generate more public awareness and industry´s self-
reflection than any other attempt made in the past few years. Even open discussion and 
raise of awareness is a positive development for authors and performers. 
On the other hand, a sceptical person may argue that attempts to tackle the issue have 
been seen in various national legislations (including, as described here in detail, in 
Germany and Czech Republic) but still there is no hard evidence that implementing 
bestseller-clause-like provisions actually helped strengthen the creators´ position. Not 
even in Germany with a 100% success. Probably such sceptical person may ask: Why 
then imposing such regulation on a European level at all? From that, there is difficult 
way back. And they may be right. Perhaps, even stronger, economic, evidence should 
precede this type of regulation. Sufficient, specifically targeted studies thoroughly 
thought through ought to be commissioned before committing to a solution that may 
not even bring its desired effect. 
To conclude: raising awareness of the issue is good but why the rush? Sometimes, no 
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